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I.

INTRODUCTION

The current state of the law regarding the tax treatment of fringe
benefits is confusing. The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 specifically
excluded many such items from its definition of income, and administrative actions excluded- others. Still, some fringe benefits are included in income, despite the absence of a rational justification for
distinguishing them from the excluded benefits. Current law reflects
the legislators' continuing failure to develop a coherent fringe benefit
policy, a failure which dates back to the inception of the income tax.
This article will explore the reasons for the past failure to systematically analyze the fringe benefit problem and will suggest a simple,
straightforward solution. The resolution is to follow the principles of
section 83 of the Code to tax all fringe benefits to employees.
Issues of this nature must be addressed now, particularly in light
of recent developments in Congress. In the Tax Reform Act of 1984,1
Congress addressed the fringe benefit issue rather thoroughly. Nonetheless, the changes made in the law essentially codified pre-existing
administrative exclusions. 2 One significant 1984 reform is the congressional intent to apply anti-discrimination provisions to all fringe
benefit programs for an exclusion to be available.'
In the main, however, the 1984 legislation does not make a meaningful change in the taxation of this important part of compensation
packages. The Treasury apparently believes further reform efforts are
needed.4 Nevertheless, Congress, ever subject to the pressures of lob1.

Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 531, 98 Stat. 494, 877 (added the new

fringe benefit provisions to the Code).
2. New §§ 117(d) and 132 originated in the "Permanent Tax Treatment of Fringe Benefits Act of 1983," H.R. 3525, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. A major reason for the codification of the

rules was that certain practices are "long established, and generally have been treated by employers, employees and the Internal Revenue Service as not giving rise to taxable income." See
JOINT COMM.ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT

REDUCTION ACT OF 1984, at 840 (Comm. Print 1984) [hereinafter cited as JOINT COMm ON

TAXATION].
3. See LR.C. §§ 132(h)(1), 117(d)(3) (West 1985). See also JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION,
supra note 2, at 861-62. Exceptions to the application of the general nondiscrimination rules

are working condition fringes and de minimis fringes other than subsidized eating facilities. In
other words, it is perfectly permissible to provide studio executives with corner offices and lim-

ousines for use on business trips, without having to provide such amenities to clerical
personnel.
4. The Treasury Department's original tax reform proposal would have repealed virtually
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byists, has not expressed a clear willingness to work toward such
base-broadening reforms.5 What is clear, however, is that fringe benefits and the problems they create in the tax system will not go away.
Therefore, consideration of both the policy and the technical aspects
of taxing them remains an important matter for scholarly attention.
Analysis of fringe benefit taxation is important for other reasons
as well. Tax reform will likely continue to be a vexing political problem raising the perennial concerns of fairness and equity in the current income tax system.6 As the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 has
grown longer and more riddled with special interest provisions, the
question of whether reform of the present- system is necessary has
been examined with increasing popularity. Although desirable fundamental reform is unlikely to occur, the debates about broadening the
tax base and seeking to provide more incentive for saving may well
lead to less fundamental structural changes.
One of the most important issues in either the current system or a
structurally different system is how to define the tax base. As to inclusion of compensation in the base, the Code currently taxes both
wages paid in cash and many forms of compensation paid in-kind.
However, not all forms of in-kind compensation are taxed. An understanding of how the current system treats in-kind compensation for
the performance of services and why it does so is fundamental to an
all the current exclusions for fringe benefits. See OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, GROWTH AND SIMPLICITY: THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT REPORT

TO THE PRESIDENT, Vol. 1, at 73-74 & Vol. 2, at 26-55 (1984) [hereinafter cited as TREASURY I]. A
comparative analysis of the treatment of fringe benefits under TREASURY I and the modified flat
rate income tax bills pending in Congress in the Spring of 1985 can be found in Simon, Base
Broadening Proposals and Fringe Benefits, 29 ST. Louis U.L.J. 1201, 1203-07 (1985).
The President's tax reform proposal retreated from the original Treasury position, and
suggested much more moderate reform of the fringe benefit area. See THE PRESIDENT'S TAX
PROPOSALS TO THE CONGRESS FOR FAIRNESS, GROWTH AND SIMPLICITY, ch. 3 (1985) [hereinafter
cited as PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL]. Although the PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL would set up a uniform
nondiscrimination standard for all fringe benefits, id. 1 3.04, it would repeal outright only the §
101(a) exclusion for employer-provided death benefits and the exclusion under § 127 for employer-provided transportation. See id. W13.02 & .03. As to health benefits, the PRESIDENT'S
PROPOSAL stands TREASURY I on its head and asks for the taxation of a certain minimum
amount of health benefits rather than taxing benefits provided above a certain cap, as the Treasury had originally suggested. Compare 1 TREASURY 1, supra, at 28-34 with PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL,

supra, 1 3.01.

5. See, e.g., Act of May 24, 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-44, § 1, 99 Stat. 77, 77 (1985) (Congress
acted quickly to repeal a contemporaneous recordkeeping requirement in § 274 which had been
imposed by the Tax Reform Act of 1984); Conferees Agree on Bill Repealing Auto Recordkeeping Requirement, 27 TAX NOTES (TAx ANALYSTS) 565 (May 6, 1985). See generally Sheppard,
Tax Reform Redux: The State of the Record, 28 TAX NOTES (TAx ANALYSTS) 1215 (Sept. 9,
1985) (discussion of the difficulties of base broadening tax reform).
6. The recent spate of tax reform proposals has generated significant debate in the lay
press and in scholarly journals as well. See, e.g., Berger, In Behalf of a Single-Rate Flat Tax,
29 ST. Louis U.L.J. 993 (1985); Simon, supra note 4, at 1201.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol36/iss5/1

4

1984]

Simon: Fringe Benefits and Tax Reform Historical Blunders and a Proposal
FRINGE BENEFITS: TAX REFORM

informed critique of general reform proposals that would alter the
tax base or that would move away from taxing income to taxing consumption. 7 It is within that broader perspective that the issues raised
in this article with regard to taxing fringe benefits should be
considered.
Defining the term "fringe benefit" has proven to be a difficult
task. For this article, a broad and widely comprehensive definition
was chosen to simplify the point of departure. All benefits, facilities,
or services furnished by employers to employees, beyond the bare
minimum required for adequate performance of services, will be considered fringe benefits. The term, therefore, includes items such as
carpet on the floors, pictures on the walls, and a receptionist to answer the phone. It also includes far more significant items currently
excluded from income under various provisions of the Code such as
employer-funded health insurance and deferred compensation plans.
This article will consider the historical treatment of all forms of
fringe benefits under the Internal Revenue Code - from pictures to
pensions - as a prelude to a proposed mechanism for determining
whether to tax them and how to tax them, in one simple system.8
7. A consumption-type tax system would mandate taxation for certain expenditures and
others would be exempted from taxation. If one determined that expenditures for food and
lodging, for example, were taxable, then it should be determined whether employer-provided
housing, meals and other personal expenditures should be included in the tax base at their fair
market value. If certain expenditures such as pension fund investments are deemed tax-exempt, a mechanism is needed to ensure nondiscriminatory application. In other words, the determination of the base and the fringe benefits included in it presents a problem of the same
magnitude for a consumption-based system as for an income-based system.
With a pure consumption system, determining the treatment of expenditures by employers
for their employees in cases where the expenditures were not tax-favored would also be necessary. For example, under a consumption system, an employer-provided house would presumably be nontaxable if it were business-related compensation. No symmetry problem would arise
because such housing would be a nontaxable expenditure at the employer level and a taxable
expenditure at the employee level.
To a certain extent, the present system shares features of both consumption and income
systems by favoring certain expenditures over others. Pension plan investments provide a clear
example of the use of the consumption theory in an income tax context. The proposals made in
this article retain that amalgamation for investment in pension plans.
For general discussions of consumption tax proposals, see Andrews, Fairness and the Personal Income Tax: A Reply to Professor Warren, 88 HARV. L. REv. 947 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as Andrews II]; Andrews, A Consumption Type or Cash Flow PersonalIncome Tax, 87 HARV.
L. REV. 1113 (1974); Warren, Fairnessand Consumption-Type or Cash Flow PersonalIncome
Tax, 88 HARV. L. REv. 931 (1975). For a discussion of the consumption tax treatment of fringe

benefits under H.R. 1165, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., see Simon, supra note 4, at 1204-06.
8. This article will not, however, address taxation of items such as paid vacations and
flexible work schedules, considered within the broadest definition of fringe benefit. The Bureau
of Labor Statistics includes such items in its compilation of employee benefits. BUREAU OF LABOR

STATISTICS,

U.S.

DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN INDUSTRY,

1980, Bull. 2107, 1-2

(1981). The reason for not including them is that compensation paid for periods not worked is
already taxed as income. Although amounts paid for leisure could be taxed at higher rates than
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Historically, certain fringe benefits coming within the broad scope
of the definition given above have been excluded from the tax base
because they are characterized as "conditions of employment" rather
than taxable items of compensation. It has been long accepted that
items coming within the "working condition" definition are nontaxable despite the difficulty in defining the term precisely.9 Yet the fact
that the employer furnishes working conditions principally to provide
a better working environment for the employees (an essentially noncompensatory reason) certainly does not eliminate the compensatory
value to the employee who would continue to exist quite well without
the carpet or pictures. Nevertheless, suggesting that ordinary office
furnishings ought to be included in income is similar to suggesting
that the psychic pleasure derived from enjoying a job should be included in a person's taxable income. While taxing such intangible
benefits has been suggested as a theoretical possibility by wellrespected commentators such as Henry Simons, 10 broadening the definition of income to include intangible psychic income in the base
would make no sense because of the practical difficulties of measurement. The same can be said of many fringe benefits that are essentially working conditions. On the other hand, the wide-ranging exclusions of compensatory fringe benefits, as opposed to
other compensation, development of such a scheme would lead to unnecessary and undesirable
complications.
9. The use of the imprecise term "working condition" or "condition of employment" is
fraught with the same difficulties as is the use of the term "fringe benefit." For discussions of
the two terms, see, e.g., H. MACAULAY, FRINGE BENEFITS AND THEIR FEDERAL TAX TREATMENT 48 (1959); H. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 52-53 (1938); J. SNEED, CONFIGURATIONS OF
GROSS INCOME 101-04 (1967). See also Finnerman, Fringe Benefit or "Condition of Employment": Uniformity, Certainty and Compliance, 78 Nw. U.L. REv. 193 (1983).
While counsel to the CIO, former Justice Arthur Goldberg urged a broad interpretation of
the term "working conditions" for tax purposes. See A. Goldberg, "Compensation Other Than
Cash," Paper Presented before the Section of Taxation at the American Bar Association (Sept.
18, 1951), cited in Guttentag, Leonard & Rodewald, Federal Income Taxation of FringeBenefits: A Specific Proposal, 6 NAT'L TAX J. 250, 252-53 (1953).
In a curious confusion of the two concepts, new § 132(a)(3) refers to one category of excludable benefits as the "working condition fringe." See I.R.C. § 132(a)(3) (West 1985). A working condition fringe is defined in § 132(d) as "any property or services provided to an employee
of the employer to the extent that, if the employee paid for such property or services, such
payment would be allowable as a deduction under section 162 or 167." Id.
The same confusion of terms can be found in the Macaulay book, where he notes that
"conditions of work have also become important in compensating employees." H. MACAULAY,
supra.
See also Prop. Reg. § 1.61-18 (draft), [19831 II FED. TAXES (P-H) 70,181. The proposed
regulation defines a working condition as "any property, service or facility provided with the
specific intent either to enable or facilitate the performance of employment services." Id. In
addition, a working condition must generally be provided at the recipient's place of employment and during normal working hours. Id. As of this writing, the draft of the proposed regulation has not been withdrawn.
10. See H. SIMONS, supra note 9, at 53.
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noncompensatory working conditions, from income create well known
inequities our society must address." Thus, limiting the definition of
working conditions is crucial.
One of the principal reasons for the exclusion for working conditions is that they are difficult to value. Difficulty of valuation is a
significant factor with respect to all other fringe benefits and an important rationale for excluding many of them. Valuation difficulties
are not usually the major determinant of taxability or nontaxability.
In the area of compensation in-kind, when one goes beyond necessary
working conditions into the realm of private secretaries and free
parking privileges, one might find that the valuation difficulties, although great, may be insufficient to outweigh the inclusion of the
items in the taxable base.
Nevertheless, as the tax system has evolved from its simple beginnings in 1913 to the complexities of today, valuation difficulties have
frequently been raised in efforts to exclude more fringe benefits from
taxation. The result has been a blending of fringe benefits and nontaxable working conditions and a blurring of the distinction between
them. That trend should not be allowed to continue. We need to create a system of taxation that does not depend on individual perceptions of worth, but instead succeeds in taxing those benefits that are
compensatory, relatively easy to value and includable in the tax base
from a policy standpoint. This article will advance a proposal
designed to establish such a system of taxing fringe benefits, and it
will .explore the benefits of the system proposed as well as problems
created by it.
From a historical perspective, it is clear that Congress has been
reluctant to deal with the question of fringe benefits in a systematic
manner that would establish such a general policy. That trend is continuing and accelerating, as the most recent foray into the problem of
fringe benefits clearly demonstrates. Part II of this article, which discusses the manner in which the various nontaxable fringes have come
into being, addresses this problem.
When one analyzes the history, it becomes quite clear that a
mechanism for taxing fringe benefits would be a suitable reform mea11. Mathematical demonstrations of inequity may be found in Popkin, The Taxation of
Employee Fringe Benefits, 22 B.CJL. REv. 439, 450 (1981) (demonstration of vertical inequity);
Richmond, Tax-Free FringeBenefits and Social Security: Is it Time to Change the Rules?, 6
NovA L.J. 83, 89-91 (1981) (demonstration of horizontal inequity). See also Simon, supra note
4, at 1207-12. See generally Nolan, Taxation of Fringe Benefits, 30 NAT'L TAX J. 359 (1977)
(analysis from the standpoint of simplification); Note, Federal Income Taxation of Employee
FringeBenefits, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1141, 1142-48 (1976) (presenting as "Framework for Analysis"
the various aspects of inequity and inefficiency). A more complex discussion of these matters
can be found in Part IV.
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sure. The proposal for taxing fringe benefits found in Part III of this
article is just such a reform measure. Its technical aspects and practical impact are discussed in Part III. Finally, focusing on this proposal, Part IV demonstrates why any proposal, for tax reform must address the problem created by nontaxation of fringe benefits. The
proposed vehicle for taxing fringe benefits is geared to the current
system of income taxation, but could also serve as a model for other
12
systems of taxation the United States may adopt in the future.
II.

THE EXISTING PATTERN -

CURRENT EXCLUSIONS FROM INCOME

To understand the importance of competely overhauling the way
in which the current system taxes fringe benefits requires an understanding of what the system is and how it came about. Essentially
three different types of fringe benefits are excluded by the current
tax structure: long-time exclusions codified in the 1954 Code as originally enacted; exclusions provided by amendments to the Code, including those made in 1984; and exclusions by administrative regulation, ruling or "time-honored tradition" which have never been
codified. Due to congressional action in 1984, this final group has
shrunk. Clearly, however, some fringes still fall into the final category
under current law.
Except for a few exclusions added to the Code in the late 1970's,
12. A change from the current progressive tax system to a flat-rate system, without some
attempt to require the inclusion of a number of fringes in the income tax base, would increase
the pressure on the labor market and tend to shift people into jobs providing the best untaxed
fringes. As a result, more nontaxable benefits might be provided in those economic sectors
which have not provided a significant amount of fringes. The transition, however, might prove
dislocative for many people. The current trend in compensation is toward more fringes; as a
result, allocative inefficiency may be expected to increase.
One of the recent "flat tax" bills introduced in Congress, The "Fair Tax Act," S. 409, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REc. § 1172-93 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1985), recognized the problem of
fringe benefits in the system. The bill proposed to eliminate cafeteria plans, the most flexible of
the current exclusions. See infra notes 174-83 and accompanying text. In addition, the bill
would have repealed the exclusion for dependent care assistance plans and qualified transportation plans. Also, employer purchases of group term life insurance for employees would be taxable, as would employer purchases of health insurance or funding of health plans, except in very
limited circumstances. The bill would include all unemployment compensation in the tax base.
Although far-reaching changes, they do not repeal all exclusions currently in the law. It therefore seems appropriate to suggest additional analysis of these matters by the bill's supporters.
See also Hall & Rabushka, Low Tax, Simple Tax, Flat Tax, 17 U.C.D. L. REv. 1009 (1984),
where the authors noted the explosion of fringes is strictly an artifact of our tax system and is
an economically inefficient way to pay people. Were the tax system neutral, taxing fringes at
the same rate as cash wages, people would prefer to receive their income in cash and make their
own decisions about health and life insurance, country club dues, exercise facilities, and the
like. Furthermore, the failure to tax fringes ensures that taxes on other types of income are
artificially high. Bringing all types of income under the same tax system is essential for low
rates. For a more detailed analysis of the proper treatment of fringe benefits under a modified
flat rate income tax system, see generally Simon, supra note 4.
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the responsibility for the mishmash of exclusions must be shared by
the Congress and Treasury Department. In the earliest stages of tax
law administration, the Treasury took a relatively inflexible position
that many non-cash benefits constituted income. This position gradually changed to the point that almost all of the specific exclusions
contained in the 1954 Code had their origins in administrative determinations that the item in question was not properly includable in
the tax base. Although some exclusions grew more directly out of
provisions of previous revenue acts, many of those had their origins
in administrative policy. It is, therefore, fair to say that the Treasury
Department as a whole and the Internal Revenue Service in particular have played a major role in developing a relatively lenient fringe
benefit policy. This policy has, of course, led to an enormous increase
in fringe benefit compensation for the nation as a whole.13
Despite supervision by Treasury Department administrators, the
development of separate exclusion provisions was never well coordinated with existing exclusions to ensure an overall coherent scheme.
Particularly distressing is the lack of systematic analysis by the Treasury in its published decisions as to the taxability of the various benefits. The Treasury's analytical inconsistency gave Congress little
guidance when it considered new Code provisions. The Treasury, in
turn, was forced to reason by analogy and provide broader exclusions.
This made it difficult to forcefully articulate any basis for opposing
continued erosion of the tax base when these items came up in Congress. More recently, however, the Treasury decided to take policybased positions that are opposed to the continual broadening and extending of legislative exclusions. 4
13. Between 1947 and 1957, companies reported to the United States Chamber of Commerce that all fringes, including paid leisure such as vacations, rose from 15% to 23.7% of
payroll. H. MACAULAY, supra note 9, at 10. Congressman Barber Conable, the ranking Republican on the House Ways and Means Committee, suggested in a letter to constituents in December 1982, that fringe benefits at "top companies now amount to 35-40 per cent of the total cost
of payroll." 18 TAx NoTEs (Tx ANALYSTS) 15 (Jan. 3, 1983) (text of Conable letter). See also
Employees Get More Benefits, N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 1982, at 30, col. 1.
14. The Treasury decided in 1975 to tax certain fringe benefits about which it had previously made no clear policy choice. See Prop. Reg. § 1.61-16 (Discussion Draft), 40 Fed. Reg.
41,118 (1975), [1985] 2 FED. TAXES (P-H) 1 7371. Congress responded to the Treasury's desire
to close some loopholes by enacting new ones, see, e.g., I.R.C. § 132 (West 1985), and by
preventing the Treasury from going ahead with its plans. In 1977 Congress imposed a moratorium on the issuance of fringe benefit regulations, which was later extended until December 31,
1983, by various provisions of other revenue laws. See Tax Treatment Extension Act of 1977,
Pub. L. No. 95-615, § 3, 92 Stat. 3097, 3097 (1978) (Oct. 1, 1977 through June 30, 1978); Act of
Oct. 7, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-427, § 1, 92 Stat. 996, 996 (May 1, 1978 through Dec. 31, 1979). A
further extension was imposed by the Act of Dec. 29, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-197, § 1, 93 Stat.
1275, 1275 (1979) (until May 31, 1981). The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA), Pub.
L. No. 97-34, § 801, 95 Stat. 172, 349 (1981), imposed a further moratorium which then expired
at the end of 1983. Although the Treasury had complied with the moratorium by not issuing
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A.

The 1954 Code as Originally Enacted
1. Deferred Compensation Plans

By far the largest current exclusion is employer contributions to
pension and other qualified deferred compensation plans for the benefit of employees and their beneficiaries. Coupled with the exclusion
for income earned on invested pension funds, the tax expenditure for
1984 was estimated to be in excess of forty-seven and one-quarter
billion dollars, and will rise to more than eighty-two and threequarters billion by 1989.1' The present exclusion provisions for pension, profit-sharing and other deferred compensation plans are extremely complex and provide complicated rules for plan qualification,
vesting standards and taxation on distributions. 6 The current system
is the product of many years of tinkering with exclusion statutes, the
first of which appeared in 1921. The manner in which employer-provided retirement benefits are taxed to the employee has not, however,
differed significantly from its original 1913 form.
The earliest ruling regarding pension plans, coming at a time
when no specific section of the law required inclusion, provided that
"pensions or retiring allowances paid by the United States or private
persons" were deemed to constitute income.' This rule was announced without explicit statutory authority as a corollary to regulations treating deductions for expenses for employee compensation
under the Revenue Act of 1913. The earliest reference to the income
tax treatment of pensions is thus found in the rules for determining
any final regulations while it existed, it did issue the second discussion draft in early January
1981. See Prop. Reg. § 1.61-18 (draft), [1981] II FED. TAXES (P-H) 1 70,181. After that, however,
the Treasury preferred to allow Congress time to deal with the issues. See Daily Tax Rep.
(BNA), June 17, 1981, at G-2. Later, after the 1981 Act extension of the moratorium, the Treasury announced that it and the Internal Revenue Service would not issue "any regulations or
rulings altering the tax treatment of nonstatutory fringe benefits prior to January 1, 1985." See
Ann. 84-5, 1984-4 I.R.B. 31. By that time, of course, there was a new statute.
More recently, the Treasury opposed the extension of the § 127 exclusion for educational
assistance programs. See Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), Apr. 29, 1983, at J-8 (statement by William S.
McKee, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Treasury for Tax Policy, at Hearing on Apr. 29,
1983, of Senate Finance Comm. Subcomm. on Taxation & Debt Management). But it, of
course, had no success. See infra note 200 and accompanying text.
The current Treasury took a cautious position regarding legislation now codified in §§ 132
& 117(d). Administration'sFiscal Year 1984 Budget Proposals-I:Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 28-32 (1983) (testimony of John Chapoton, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
15. Joint Comm. on Taxation, Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years
1984-1989, 25 TAX NOTES (TAX ANALYSTS) 721, 727 (Nov. 19, 1984).
16. I.R.C. §§ 401-25 (West 1985). For an analysis of the present law, see generally 1 B.
60-62 (1981) and the articles cited
BITTKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES & GIFTS
therein.
17. Regulations 45, art. 32, 21 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 180 (1919).
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the deductibility of the amounts paid as ordinary and necessary business expenses in Regulations 33, promulgated under the first revenue
acts.18 Article 136 of Regulations 33 (Revised) denied a deduction for
amounts contributed to a trust established for the purpose of paying
employee pensions, allowing instead a deduction for "the amount actually paid to the employee." 19 The placement of Article 136 in those
regulations clearly suggests that the issue was principally one of distinguishing such payments from "donations," made to employees,
that lacked an element of compensation and, therefore, were nondeductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses.20 Apparently,
the employer deduction was tied to an inclusion by an employee or
other beneficiary. Therefore, gifts, excludable under both the previous and current statute," could not give rise to a deduction whereas
"compensation," clearly includable under section 1I(B) of the 1913
Revenue Act could.
Thus, from the beginning, the proper time for the employer to
take a deduction has been when the employee has an inclusion in
income, that is, when there is a payout from a plan or a trust. No
deduction was available when the employer contributed to the pension fund. Presumably, under general cash accounting principles
these employer contributions were excludable from the employees'
income at the time they were made, but there was no need to address
this issue since the timing of the deduction was deferred to match
that of the inclusion.
The remaining issue of the taxability of the earnings on the funds
set aside in trust or otherwise for the future payment of pensions to
employees, led to the first congressional action regarding pensions in
1921. In 1920 the Internal Revenue Service ruled that an employer
18. The Treasury first promulgated Regulations 33 under the Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16,
38 Stat. 114 (1914). Apparently, the official promulgation of the Regulations was contained in
T.D. 1944, which should be found between T.D. 1943 and T.D. 1945 in the official Treasury
Department publication of Treasury Decisions. Volume 16 of the series of Treasury Decisions,
however, allegedly published in 1915, contains a blank space where T.D. 1944 should be found
on page 26, despite a reference to T.D. 1944 in the index at 314. 16 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 23-27
(1918). The entire "Regulations No. 33, Revised," promulgated on January 2, 1918, is found at
the back of volume 16.
19. Regulations 33 (Revised), art. 136, 16 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 73 (1918). The deduction
was for amounts paid as pensions to retired employees, families, and dependents. This is distinct from amounts paid to an employee's widow or heirs in continuation of the employee's
salary "in recognition of the services rendered by the individual," amounts which were not
determined to be deductible because they were not "ordinary and necessary." Regulations 33
(Revised), art. 137, 16 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 73 (1918). The next set of regulations promulgated
pursuant to the Revenue Act of 1918, eliminated this difference in treatment. See Regulations
45, art. 108, 21 Tress. Dec. Int. Rev. 204 (1919).
20. Regulations 33 (Revised), art. 135, 16 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 73 (1918).
21. See Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 4, 39 Stat. 756.
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would be taxed on earnings of a revocable profit-sharing trust because those amounts were under the employer's control and could be
used for business purposes.2" In 1921 Congress made its first foray
into the treatment of pension and other employee benefit plans specifically to overrule this IRS ruling, and in doing so, it laid the foundation for the development of the current system.
The 1921 provision was a part of the section concerning the taxation of trusts and their beneficiaries and it specifically excluded the
employer from taxation on the earnings of the trust.2 3 Although the
new provision did not specifically exclude from employee's income
contributions to exempt stock-bonus or profit-sharing trusts when
made, that result was mandated by the manner in which beneficiaries
were taxed: "[T]he amount actually distributed or made available to
any distributee shall be taxable to him in the year in which so distributed or made available to the extent that it exceeds amounts paid
in by him."2 4 This essentially confirmed the Treasury's treatment of
contributions, but it did not deal with the question of deducting
them. The 1926 Act added pension trusts to the taxation system, but
remained silent on plan contributions.
Finally, in 1928 a new section explicitly provided for an employer
deduction when a plan contribution was made to a specific type of
trust.2 5 Thus, from 1928 on, the statute recognized the forerunner of
today's "qualified plan"2 and permitted a deduction for certain contributions coupled with a deferred inclusion for the employee and exclusion of earnings on the invested funds from the employer's income. Apart from a 1938 revision which restricted employer access to
the funds if the trust was to qualify for an exemption, 7 the numerous amendments made during the next few years were designed only
to shield all appreciation in the value of the trust assets from being
characterized as income to a distributee.25
In 1942, however, a major change was made in what was then section 165 of the 1939 Code. The general scheme of exclusion for employer contributions to qualified plans, coupled with deferred inclusion of the benefits, remained the same.29 Congress, however, enacted
22.
23.
24.
25.
tion for
26.
27.
28.
169.
29.

See Solicitor's Memorandum 1329, 2 C.B. 69 (1920).
Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 219(f), 42 Stat. 227.
Id.
See Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, 45 Stat. 791 (new § 23 explicitly provided a deduccontributions to pension trusts).
I.R.C. § 401(a) (West 1985).
See Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, 54 Stat. 447.
See Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, 49 Stat. 1648; Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, 47 Stat.
See H.R. REP. No. 920, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 4, reprinted in 1942-2 C.B. 285, 287.
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section 165(c), which provided that a beneficiary of a nonexempt
trust would be taxed on contributions made by the employer in the
year in which the beneficial interest in them became nonforfeitable3 0
Section 165(c) represented the first retreat from the general notion of
excluding employer contributions and including only benefits paid
out. Such treatment of nonqualified plans is clearly appropriate
today."
Between 1942 and the enactment of the 1954 Code, little legislative activity occurred in the pension area. With the 1954 Code, Congress enacted a comprehensive scheme for taxing pension plans and
their corresponding contributions and distributions. 2 Since that
time, in addition to frequent tinkering,3 3 Congress has passed two
substantial amendatory acts shaping the current scheme of taxation
in the pension area.
The first of these acts, the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (ERISA), 4 made sweeping changes in the law. No change
was made in the general rule of nontaxability of contributions to
plans, but the requirements for plan qualification were tightened
considerably.3 5 More recently, in 1982, the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA)36 made additional fundamental changes in
the manner in which self-employed and employer-funded plans are
taxed. The system progressed from one in which there was substantial inequality between the two to one where the amounts that may
be contributed without current inclusion in the income of the employee or self-employed person are essentially the same.3
This discussion of the development of the pension plan legislation
shows that the general tax treatment of pensions has not varied
much since the 1920's. Thus, the major benefit that employees derive
30. Id. The 1942 Act provided that the amount distributed was to be taxed to the distributee "as if it were an annuity," thus taking into account the "investment in the contract." Id.
31. I.R.C. § 404(a)(5) (West 1985).
32. See Revenue Act of 1954, ch. 736, §§ 401-04 & 421, 68 Stat. 1, 134-47.
33. For an analysis of the legislative changes made to the 1954 Code in the area of pensions, see generally STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF SENATE COMM. ON LABOR & PUBLIC WELFARE, 94TH CONG., 2D SESs., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURiTv AcT OF 1974 (Comm. Print 1976) (ERISA); Tax Mgmt. Portfolio (BNA) No. 314 (1976)

(post-ERISA); Goodman, Legislative Development of the Federal Tax Treatment of Pension
and Profit-SharingPlans, 49 TAXEs 226 (1971) (pre-ERISA).
34. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829.
35. The Pension Equity Tax Act, H.R. 6410, proposed in the first session of the 97th
Congress, involved standards similar to the current § 410 anti-discrimination standards for
qualification of all employee benefit plans. See [1982] 9 FED. TAXEs (P-H) 1 60,247. The only
part of this anti-discrimination proposal that survived in The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA) was an amendment to § 79. See infra note 160.
36. Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 323.
37. Id.
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from the exclusion of employers' contributions has consistently been
the benefit of deferral. In addition, there is a possible reduction in
the amount of tax paid as a result of the lower rates that apply to
smaller amounts of income (this is particularly true if the taxpayer
takes advantage of ten-year averaging). Nevertheless, the issue with
respect to the taxability of pension plan contributions is not

"whether," but "when. "38

Pension plans are an extremely important factor in the current
labor market and in the economy as a whole. The assets they own are
tremendous and contribute to the power of the plans' trustees. A
scheme, such as the one proposed in this article, that would tax currently employer contributions to the plans might be strongly resisted.
However, the deduction mechanism that is designed to continue the
current system with a little less complexity would presumably overcome some of that resistance.3 9 Thus, although current inclusion of
the contributions might be required, providing a deduction for a specific amount of contributions to certain types of plans would alleviate
much of the burden produced by the inclusion.
2.

Employee Stock Option Plans

Unlike pension and other retirement benefit plans, the deferred
compensation arrangement known as a stock option plan had a
rather involved history prior to the enactment of the 1954 Code. Nevertheless, by 1954 it was reasonably well settled that two different
types of stock option plans had emerged. Of the two, only a "statutory" plan gives deferral. Under a "nonstatutory" plan, the employee
is taxed on the fair market value of the spread at the time the option
is granted. If the option does not have a fair market value, the time
of exercise is the time of tax. Under a statutory plan, of which there
are currently two types (incentive stock options, defined in section
422A, and employee stock purchase plans, defined in section 423), the
employee is not taxed until the stock is sold, at which time any compensatory element is taxed as capital gain. 40 Thus, unlike pensions on
38. Deferral should not be regarded as an insubstantial tax benefit. Creating a deduction
for an amount of money put into a retirement account, which is what an exclusion essentially
does, is at least as valuable as creating an exemption for the return from the savings made
through the investment in the retirement plan. The length of time of deferral is also a significant feature. Cf. Halperin, The Time Value of Money - 1984, 23 TAX NOTES (TAx ANAYSTS)
744, 751-52 (May 14, 1984).
39. See infra text accompanying notes 350-53.
40. The employee stock purchase plan (ESOP), defined in § 423, also provides deferral
under the current statute. Congress added that provision in 1964, and such plans generally
cover a broader group of employees than other option plans. See Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L.
No. 88-272, § 423, 78 Stat. 19, 67 (general benefits, deferral plus conversion, are the same).
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which the tax is merely deferred, with stock options the deferral is
coupled with conversion of ordinary income to capital gain.
Stock options have long been used as employee benefits, but for
many years their tax status was in doubt. The conceptual difficulty
that existed for some time with respect to taxing the compensatory
element in a bargain purchase of the employer's stock was related to
the existence of the two elements of such purchases - the fact that
the transaction itself was a purchase 4 1 and the fact that it was made
for less than fair market value in an employment setting. Because of
these two factors, the Board of Tax Appeals in Geeseman v. Commissioner developed what became known as the "propriety interest doctrine." This doctrine excluded from income any value in the option if
the purpose of the option was42 to encourage equity participation by
the employee in the business.
The Commissioner accepted the Board's theory in Geeseman,4 3
and amended the applicable regulations to distinguish between compensatory and proprietary stock options; the former were held to be
taxable while the latter were not.44 The disparate treatment between
the employee paid in cash who was permitted to buy stock and the
employee given a "proprietary" stock option was obvious and employees began to demand such options as a part of their compensation packages. In addition, there was a disparity in the treatment of
fringe benefits resulting from bargain purchases of stock and bargain
purchases of other items not covered in the amendments to the regulations. Although it is not altogether clear, it seems that bargain
purchases of manufactured goods, for example, were considered to be
taxable.4 5
Despite the acquiescence in Geeseman, the Commissioner continued to litigate questions about the taxability of stock options, and
finally won a victory in Commissioner v. Smith, decided in 1945.46 In
41. See Manomet Cranberry Co. v. Commissioner, 1 B.T.A. 706 (1925) (ordinary arms
length purchase would not result in receipt of income even though the acquired property was
worth more than the price paid). See also Hunley v. Commissioner, 25 T.C.M. 355 (1966). In
1923, the Treasury attempted for the first time to tax the bargain element both in a sale by a
corporation to a shareholder and in a sale by an employer to an employee. The latter sale was
taxed as compensation and the former was taxed as a dividend. See T.D. 3435, Il- C.B. 50
(1923). The Supreme Court in Palmer v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 63, 70 (1937), held the bargain
element of a shareholder purchase of corporate assets had to constitute a distribution of earnings to be a dividend. This holding tends to support the analysis used in employee stock
purchases that the bargain element must be intended as compensatory.
42. 38 B.T.A. 258 (1938).
43. Acq., 1939-1 C.B. 13.
44. See Treas. Reg. 101, art. 22(a)-1; T.D. 4879, 1939-1 C.B. 159, amending the same
article of Treas. Reg. 86 (1934) and 94 (1936).
45. See Regulations 33 (Revised), art. 4, § 21, 1 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 22 (1918).
46. 324 U.S. 177, aff'd on reh'g, 324 U.S. 695 (1945). This holding accorded with Old
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Smith, the Supreme Court held the statute was "broad enough to
include in taxable income any economic or financial benefit conferred
on the employee as compensation, whatever the form or mode by
which it is effected. ' 47 This included the value of the "spread" in a
stock option, the difference between the fair market value of the
property and the amount. paid for it. The Tax Court in Smith had
held that the option did not have a market value when it was issued.
Therefore, the Supreme Court held that the time for taxing the compensatory element in the option was at the time of exercise.4 8 But the
Court's opinion left open the possibility that if the option could be
valued when granted, it might be taxed then, with no further consequences upon exercise. Accordingly, the Treasury issued new regulations in 1946 to tax all stock options in that manner.4
In 1950 Congress sought to reverse the trend toward taxing stock
options by providing for certain executive compensation arrangements that would permit deferral for employees.5 0 To achieve the desired deferral, the employer was required to transfer a stock option
and the stock to the employee according to fairly definite rules permitting "restricted" stock option plans. In 1964 Congress terminated
the use of restricted stock option plans. Rules under which an option
could be received and exercised by an employee without tax consequences were set out in a totally new section which created "qualified" stock option plans and which was substantially stricter and
more limited than its predecessor. 1
In the meantime, the Supreme Court decided Commissioner v. Lo
Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929) (holding payment of an employee's tax
liability by an employer to constitute income).
47. 324 U.S. at 181.
48. Id. at 695. Under the Smith facts, the initial "exercise" did not effectively pass title in
the stock to the taxpayer, and the Tax Court held the time for taxing the income was in the
year of the delivery of the stock. The Treasury had originally published a ruling in 1938 that
adopted as the time for taxation the time of exercise and as the amount subject to tax the
"spread." See I.T. 3204, 1938-2 C.B. 126.
49. T.D. 5507, 1946-1 C.B. 18; I.T. 3795, 1946-1 C.B. 15. The Tax Court nonetheless felt
compelled to continue to distinguish between proprietary and compensatory options. See, e.g.,
Lo Bue v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 440 (1954); Rosenberg v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 5 (1953);
Nicholson v. Commissioner, 13 T.C. 690 (1949).
50. Revenue Act of 1950, ch. 994, § 218, 64 Stat. 906. In its report on the amendments
creating "restricted" stock option plans, the Senate Finance Committee noted its disagreement
with the Treasury's application of the Smith rule on all stock options, whether or not they were
"proprietary." See S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 59, reprintedin 1950 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWs 3053, 3155.
51. Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 221(a), 78 Stat. 19, 63-64. Old § 421 was
renumbered § 424 in the process. For an analysis of the similarities and differences between
"restricted" and "qualified" stock option plans, see Baker, Employee Stock Option Plans
Under the Revenue Act of 1964, 20 TAX L. REv. 77 (1964).
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Bue.52 That case reached essentially the same result as Smith, but
made it clear that options without a readily ascertainable fair market
value (even if they had acknowledged value) were taxable at the time
of exercise in the amount of the spread between the option price and
the fair market value of the stock on that date.53 Thus, the Lo Bue
case created substantial certainty as to the taxable event and its
proper timing where stock options are used as compensation for employees by opting, in almost all instances, for measurement of and
inclusion in income when it is easiest to measure the amount to be
included. The result in Lo Bue made the treatment of stock options
not covered by the 1950 legislation similar to the treatment of other
taxable employee bargain purchases, deferring the timing of the income until the time of purchase. The right to purchase conferred earlier was thought to be too amorphous and thus too difficult of valuation to be the occasion for taxation.
The difficulty with a rule that defers taxation until the purchase
of stock is that in an inflationary economy or where stock prices are
increasing for other reasons, it produces additional compensation income attributable only to appreciation in value of the property subject to the option. Offsetting the pain of including an additional
amount in income in a deferred purchase situation pursuant to an
option is the balm of deferral. Particularly in the case of stock, an
employee's worth may be much enhanced, even though his spendable
income is not, as a result of ownership of an option to acquire stock
whose exercise is somehow restricted.
A similar enhancement of wealth is accomplished when an item of
property is transferred outright but subject to restrictions on its complete ownership or use. If the restrictions on the option were sufficient to cause the option to not have a readily ascertainable fair market value, the 1946 regulations required the inclusion of income not
at the time of grant, but at the time of exercise, and deferral was
available. Those regulations did not, however, address the situation
where property is transferred outright but subject to restrictions that
make the circumstances not materially different from the transfer of
an option. Nor did the regulations solve the potential problem that
arises when an immediately exercisable option is granted but the
property obtainable upon the exercise of the option is subject to
restrictions.
52. 351 U.S. 243 (1956). This case also ended the proprietary-compensatory dispute: "In
our view there is no statutory basis for the test established by the court below. When assets are
transferred by an employer to an employee to secure better services they are plainly compensation." Id. at 247.
53. Id. at 249.
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These gaps in the regulations were made more obvious by Kuchman v. Commissioner,4 a 1952 Tax Court decision that permitted
stock subject to a relatively meaningless resale requirement to be excluded from income in the year of issue.5 5 In Lehman v. Commissioner,56 decided a year earlier, the Tax Court had held that the time
at which any restriction lapsed was not the proper time for taxing the
compensation. 7 The Kuchman decision, taken together with Lehman, created a serious problem for the Treasury in its attempt to
time the taxable event in accordance with Lo Bue. These decisions
essentially made the receipt of a valuable share of restricted stock,
clearly transferred for compensatory purposes, never taxable to the
transferee as income.
The Treasury sought to remedy the defects in the earlier regulations with new regulations, proposed in 1956 and finalized in 1959.
These new regulations set out comprehensive rules governing the
treatment of transfers of restricted property and options not covered
by section 421, the "qualified" stock option provision." But the 1959
regulations themselves left open certain loopholes.5 9 Not surprisingly,
restricted stock purchase plans tailor-made to fit within the regulations' parameters became very popular because they permitted circumvention of the rules for qualified stock option plans and also
placed a clear limit on the amount of income from the receipt of the
option that would be subject to tax. In 1968, the Treasury proposed
another set of regulations that would have eliminated the benefits
available through the use of such arrangements. ° However, the regulations were never finalized because Congress enacted section 83 in
1969 to provide clear rules for taxing transfers of restricted
property. 1
The benefits available under "qualified" employee stock option
plans were also curtailed at the time section 83 was enacted.62 In
1976 an even more reform-minded Congress decided to eliminate
such plans altogether as of May 20, 1976.63 In its place, Congress ap54. 18 T.C. 154 (1952), acq., 1952-2 C.B. 2.
55. Id.
56. 17 T.C. 652 (1951), acq. on this issue withdrawn and nonacq. substituted, 1962-1 C.B.
7. The Tax Court belatedly overruled Lehman in Lighthill v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 940 (1976).
57. Lehman, 17 T.C. at 652.
58. See Treas. Reg. § 1.42-6(d) (1959) (stock options); id. § 1.61-2(d)(5) (restricted property), promulgated by T.D. 6416, 1959-2 C.B. 126.
59. The 1959 regulations limited the taxable amount to the spread at the time of the
grant in deference to the Kuchman decision. See T.D. 6416, 1959-2 C.B. 126.
60. 38 Fed. Reg. 15870 (1968).
61. See generally infra Part IV.
62. See S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 120, reprinted in 1969-3 C.B. 423, 500.
63. See I.R.C. § 422(b) (1976) (defining a qualified stock option as one which must be
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parently adopted the rule of section 83 as the operative provision
governing the timing and amount of income includable by the recipient.64 No amendment to the statute was made, nor does it seem that
one was necessary given the broad scope of section 83.65 Nonetheless,
the entire matter was rendered moot in a complete policy reversal by
the 97th Congress which recreated, with numerous changes, the old
"qualified plan" as the "incentive st pck option" (shades of Geeseman) under section 422A. The rule of the new provision were generally made applicable to options granted after January 1, 1976, and
exercised or outstanding after December 21, 1980,66 effectively ousting section 83 from the stock option field altogether.
3.

Employee Death Benefits

Turning from pension plans and other deferred compensation
plans to other exclusion provisions in the original 1954 Code, one
finds that they all involve complete forgiveness of tax as opposed to
deferral or deferral plus conversion. The first of these, the employee
death benefit exclusion under section 101(b), does not amount to
much in actual dollars per employee ($5,000).7 Nor is it a large
enough aggregate amount on a national basis to merit mention in the
Joint Committee's tax expenditure estimates.6 The history of the
provision is interesting, however, in that it shows an early lack of
sophistication of the Treasury regarding compensation issues.
In its first published ruling on the question of how death benefits
should be treated both for the employer and for the recipient of the
payment, the government was consistent in its conclusion that the
payment should be given gift status for both parties.6 9 The position
as to the employer was reiterated in the first set of regulations published by the Treasury.70 But as early as 1919 there was a reversal
granted on or before May 20, 1976).
64. See JoINT COMM. ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF
1976, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 152 (1976), reprinted in 1976-3 (vol. 2) C.B. 165. The regulations
under I.R.C. § 83 were appropriately amended. See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-7 (1978).
65. Cf. Pomeroy, The Metamorphosis of the Nonqualified Stock Option Under the Tax
Reform Act of 1976 - The Strange Case of the DisappearingLoophole, 54 TAXEs 761 (1976)
(criticizing Congress for not explicitly changing the law).
66. See I.R.C. § 422A(c) (1982), added by the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub.
L. No. 97-34, § 251, 95 Stat. 172, 256 (1981).
67. See Joint Comm. on Taxation, Estimate of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal
Years 1984-1989, 29 TAX NoTEs (TAx ANALYSTS) 721, 727 (Nov. 19, 1985).
68. Id.
69. See T.D. 2090, 16 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 259, 267-68 (1914).
70. See Regulations 33 (Revised), art. 137, 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 195 (1918) (no deduction as the widow and heirs had rendered no services).
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and, without explanation, an employer deduction was allowed. 7 '
Shortly thereafter, the government issued a ruling giving a gift exclusion to the recipient.7 2
Finally, in 1939, a comprehensive ruling was issued restating and
explaining the gift/deduction treatment. 73 Because the surviving
spouse or other beneficiary of the employee had rendered no services
to the employer, the Treasury ruled that a payment to such person
was entirely gratuitous. It was necessary for exclusion, however, that
there was no contractual commitment to make the payment, because
such a commitment would tend to negate a gift motive. Thus, the
resolution authorizing the payment could state that the payment was
made for past services by the decedent employee so as to preserve
the business expense deduction. In addition, a gift exclusion by the
surviving spouse was permitted. Contested cases were, of course,
74
numerous.
In 1950, however, the Internal Revenue Service decided to make
the stakes the same for both parties by issuing a new ruling that required the payments made by reason of an employee's death to be
income because they were made in consideration of services rendered
by the employee even though no services had been rendered by the
surviving spouse. 75 The IRS indicated that the mistake of the previous rulings had been to focus on the recipient rather than the payor
with respect to the rendering of services. The IRS determined that
the new approach was more reflective of the general economics of the
situation than the gift theory. The Tax Court, in a series of cases
decided after the change in the IRS position, disagreed. 76 The inclusion issue was settled by Congress in 195177 when it enacted the predecessor of section 101(b) and allowed a limited exclusion.
The legislative history of the new section indicates that the principal motivating force for the change was that in comparing the ex71. See Regulations 45, art. 108, 21 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 204 (1919) (deduction allowed).
72. See O.D. 1017, 5 C.B. 101 (1921).
73. See I.T. 3329, 1939-2 C.B. 153, holding the payment deductible as a business expense
and reiterating the position regarding gift treatment to the widow taken in O.D. 1017, 5 C.B.
101 (1921).
74. See, e.g., Brayton v. Welch, 39 F. Supp. 537 (D. Mass. 1941); Aprill v. Commissioner,
13 T.C. 707 (1949).
75. See I.T. 4027, 1950-2 C.B. 9, 10.
76. See Luntz v. Commissioner, 29 T.C. 647 (1958); Estate of Foote v. Commissioner, 28
T.C. 547 (1957); Estate of Hellstrorn v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 916 (1955); MacFarlane v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 9 (1952). See also Rodner v. United States, 149 F. Supp. 233 (S.D.N.Y.
1957). For a discussion of these cases, see Crown, Payments to Corporate Executives' Widows,
N.Y.U. 19TH INST. ON FED. TAX'N 815 (1961); Pelisek, Tax Treatment of Payments to the Widows of Corporate Officers and Employees, 44 MARQ. L. REV. 16 (1960).
77. Revenue Act of 1951, ch. 521, § 302, 65 Stat. 452, 453, amending I.R.C. § 22(b)(1)
(1939).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol36/iss5/1

20

Simon: Fringe Benefits and Tax Reform Historical Blunders and a Proposal
19841

FRINGE BENEFITS: TAX REFORM

clusion from tax for life insurance proceeds with the taxability of
death benefits that were not funded by life insurance, that there was
a "hardship" that needed correcting.78 The correction was not a major one, however, as the exclusion was limited to $5,000 from the outset, as compared to the unlimited exclusion for the proceeds of life
insurance under what is now section 101(a). The disparity between
the amounts excludable under the two different subsections of section 101 has obviously increased since 1954 as a result of inflation,
making the current $5,000 exclusion somewhat silly. Interestingly,
this is one of only two exclusions for fringe benefits that the President's tax reform proposal plans to abolish.7"
The 1951 legislation did not resolve the question of whether and
under what circumstances a gift exclusion might be available in addition to, or instead of, the death benefit exclusion. Thus the litigation
continued, and there were well-known attempts to whipsaw the government on the deduction/exclusion issues.80 Congress eliminated one
point of contention with the enactment of the 1954 Code when it deleted the requirement of the 1951 provision that the benefit be paid
under a contractual agreement. Finally, in 1962, the enactment of the
$25 limitation on the deductibility of business gifts resolved these
matters in an unintended fashion." Under section 274(b), an employer cannot deduct gifts in excess of $25 per employee per year if
the gifts are excludable from income under section 102.82
4. Employee Health Benefits
One of the most common fringe benefits available to employees is
78. See S. REP. No. 781, 82 Cong., 1st Sess. 50, reprinted in 1951 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1969, 2020-21.
79. See PRESIDENT'S PROPOSA, supra note 4, 1 3.02.
80. See Loewy Drug Co. v. United States, 356 F.2d 928 (4th Cir. 1966) (corporate payor
denied deduction because of concession that payment was a gift and that no corporate benefit
was involved); Poyner v. Commissioner, 301 F.2d 287 (4th Cir. 1962) (allegation that payor
intended a gift is possible on the facts, Tax Court decision vacated and proceeding remanded).
Cf. Bank of Palm Beach & Trust Co. v. United States, 476 F.2d 1343 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (payments
to deceased employee's widow deductible under § 162 even though gift to widow); Fifth Avenue
Coach Lines, Inc. v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 1080 (1959) (deduction allowed even though gift
treatment to the recipient possible), rev'd on other grounds, 281 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 366 U.S. 964 (1961); Weyenberg Shoe Mfg. v. Commissioner, 23 T.C.M. (CCH) 1997
(1964) (gift treatment to widow does not itself prohibit § 162 deduction).
81. The Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, 76 Stat. 960, was clearly intended to
reduce abuses in the area of business entertainment expenses and, to respond to President
Kennedy's call for tax reform, included a limitation on the deductibility of business gifts. See
H.R. REP. No. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 19, reprintedin 1962-3 C.B. 405, 423. The provision of
§ 274 which makes gifts in the business context deductible only up to $25 per employee annually was part of the overall reform.
82. As it currently exists, I.R.C. § 274(b) (1982) is slightly more complicated than it was
originally, but the thrust of the provision did not change.
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accident and health benefits in some form or other.8 3 The definition
of employee health benefits covers a broad range, and includes onsite medical services for accidents occurring on the job, payment of
premiums for health insurance, and paid sick leave. For on-premises
infirmaries, the exclusion for the value of the care is similar to the
general working condition. exclusion. That is not true of health benefit plans which are not limited to job-related injuries.
There are two basic ways in which funded plans for health benefits are set up. First, benefits can be provided through insurance with
the employer paying insurance premiums on behalf of the employee.
Alternatively, the employer may act as a self-insurer by funding its
own insurance plan. Under current law the treatment of the alternative methods of accomplishing the same result is the same so long as
the amount received from. the employer or through insurance is used
for medical care. If, however, an amount paid through insurance or
by an employer under a health plan is used for ordinary living expenses, there are severe restrictions on an exclusion with respect
thereto. In addition to the exclusion of plan benefits, the actual funding of health plans by the employer also does not result in taxable
income to the employee.
This funding exclusion has not always existed, however. Under
the 1913 Revenue Act, the Treasury created an exclusion for health
benefits which covered "amounts received, through accident or health
insurance."84 This treatment seemed to be merely an extension to
nonwork-related illness and injury of the exclusion for on-the-job
medical treatment, generally considered to be merely a working condition. In accordance with this rule, the premiums paid by an employer to purchase accident and health policies were held to be income under the regulations.85 Although the exclusion provision was
not enacted by Congress until 1918,6 it seems that the statute merely
codified the existing law and that the Treasury believed that the interpretation constituted the proper treatment of health benefits as
early as 1913.
On the deduction side, Regulations 33 (Revised), held that actual
payments "on account of' injuries received by employees, or lumpsum amounts paid as compensation for injuries, are proper deduc83. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN INDUS3 (1980) ("Almost all of the workers covered by the survey were provided health
insurance.").
84. See Regulations 33 (Revised), art. 136, 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 195 (1918).
85. See Regulations 45, art. 33, 21 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 180 (1919) ("Premiums paid by
an employer on life, accident or health policies in favor of his employees as additional compensation of such employees are income to the employees.").
86. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 213(b)(6), 40 Stat. 1057, 1066.
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Inclusion of premiums
tions as 'ordinary and necessary expenses.' ,,s1
or contributions to self-funded plans, coupled with exclusion for payments by the insurer or the fund to recompense for medical and
other incidental expenses in the case of actual illness or injury continued without change until the early 1940's. In 1943 the IRS issued a
General Counsel's Memorandum providing inclusion of payments
made by employers to individual employees in the event of sickness
on the theory that the employer plan did not constitute insurance. 88
In 1953, as a forerunner to the 1954 Code changes, Congress granted
an exclusion for employer contributions to employer-funded group
plans.8 9
Beginning in 1954, the original tax structure for health benefits
was altered significantly. Congress codified the 1953 exclusion for employer funding of accident and health plans at the time premium
payment or employer contributions were made in section 106. But
amounts received as compensation for personal injuries and sickness
as a result of these employer contributions are generally includable in
the income of the recipient under section 105(a) unless they fall
within section 105(b) as reimbursements of amounts "expended for
medical care."' 0 Furthermore, the exclusion applies to reimbursements of amounts paid on behalf of the spouse and dependents of the
employee, thus further extending the value of the exclusion for many
taxpayers and moving the exclusion far beyond its origins in the jobsite infirmary."1
Ignoring the 1954 Code sick pay provision,"' which has since been
repealed,' it is clear that the changes made in 1954 were far greater
and more fundamental than necessary to remedy the problems Congress thought existed.9 4 Under the present system, a person is enti87. See Regulations 33 (Revised), art. 136, 16 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 73 (1918). The same
rule was found in Regulations 45, art. 108, 21 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 204 (1920), which was
promulgated subsequent to the enactment of the statute.
88. See G.C.M. 23511, 1943 C.B. 86. for a general discussion of pre-1954 plans, see Note,
Taxation of Employee Accident and Health Plans Before and Under the 1954 Code, 64 YALE
L.J. 222, 223-27 (1954).
89. See Rev. Rul. 209, 1953-2 C.B. 104; Rev. Rul. 103, 1953-1 C.B. 20.
90. See I.R.C. § 105(b) (1982).
91. The employee spouse and dependent expenses provision was added in 1954.
92. The 1954 statute provided an exclusion for wage continuation plan payments ("sick
pay") far broader than currently available under § 105(d). See Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
ch. 736, § 105(d), 68A Stat. 3, 31.
93. See Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, § 122(b) & (d), 97 Stat.
65, 87.
94. Confusion had come about because the IRS was taking the position that an employercreated and funded plan was not covered by the language "accident or health insurance." The
Seventh Circuit disagreed with the strict IRS reading of the statute in Epmeier v. United
States, 199 F.2d 508 (7th Cir. 1952), although it made clear that features of an insurance ar-
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tled to exclude both the premium payments or fund contributions by
the employer and the insurance or plan proceeds to the extent that
they are "expended for medical care." Thus, such an individual is in
a much better position than the person who must pay part or all of
the cost of insurance out of after-tax income. As the exclusion of section 105(b) applies to amounts received by employees whose employers purchased the insurance for them, it provides a clear benefit. To
the extent that the expenditure of the funds received from the insurer provides a deduction because they are used to pay for medical
treatment, the inclusion of the portion attributable to the employer
contribution and the taking of a section 213 deduction would produce
a wash. But two considerable hurdles must be crossed before a section 213 deduction is ordinarily available. The first is the five percent
floor for the deductibility of any medical expenses added by
TEFRA.9 5 The second is the zero bracket amount, which is substantial enough to eliminate the separate deductibility of many expenses
not covered by insurance. Thus it is possible that the entire amount
attributable to the employer contribution will not be equaled by a
deductible expense. This may happen year after year with respect to
normal medical expenses incurred. Whenever it happens, the combination of the provisions results in complete exclusion of the employer-paid amount rather than deferral, thereby undercutting the
limitations on the medical expense deduction imposed under section
213.
It is possible that legislation will be enacted within the next few
years that puts a "cap" on the amount of excludable benefits under
sections 104 and 105,91 although this legislation is not popular with
rangement were required. The Epmeier court's position was later sustained by the Supreme
Court, but only subsequent to the enactment of § 105. See Haynes v. United States, 353 U.S. 81
(1957).
95. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), Pub. L. No. 97-248, §
202, 96 Stat. 323, 421 (amending I.R.C. § 213(a)).
96. See S. 640, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1983), introduced in 1983 by Senator Dole at the
request of the Reagan Administration, which would have imposed such a cap for tax years
beginning in 1984. The proposed limits were $175 per month for family coverage and $70 per
month for individuals. In testimony before the Senate Finance Committee on June 22, 1983,
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Chapoton spoke in favor of the proposal. Hearings, supra
note 14, at 28-29. He also indicated that the Administration favored an even more significant
cut in the benefit in order to fund health insurance for the unemployed. A reduction in the
limits to $169 and $68 would raise an estimated $300-$400 million in additional revenue to be
used for that purpose. Id.
The $175 family/$70 individual ceilings surfaced again in TREASURY I, as part of the general plan to reduce excludable fringe benefits. See 2 TREASURY I, supra note 4, at 23-27. A
rationale for the exclusion ceilings was that most lower income taxpayers would be unaffected
by them. In the months subsequent to the publication of the original proposal, that aspect of
the proposal seems to have receded in favor of the need to raise revenue and to make doing so
much easier. Thus, in PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL, the proposal is that the first $10 per month ($120
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large segments of the public. While a move in that direction is certainly laudatory, it is by no means radical. Indeed, such a move may
be somewhat inefficient in that it adds another level of complexity to
the taxation system. Such a cap would, however, tend to preserve the
.benefit of the exclusion for those who most need it while 9preventing
7
employers from loading up tax-free fringes for executives.
5.

Rental Value of Parsonages and Rental Allowances to Ministers

The parsonage exclusion available under section 107 of the Code
is rather limited. In 1921 Congress decided to provide such an exclusion9 and thereby override the position that had previously been
taken by the Treasury. 9 The apparent reason for the government's
position was that the parsonage was not furnished as a working condition by the employer for its convenience. 100 Presumably Congress
changed the law to favor the clergy and give aid to religion at a time
when Establishment
Clause vigilance was less important than it is
01
today.
The first exclusion provision was only for actual in-kind furnishing of housing, but Congress extended the exclusion to cash allowances in 1954 in order to eliminate a perceived unfairness." 2 The
section 107 exclusion does not appear particularly broad as it is written. Moreover, decisions have been rendered restricting it to actual
payments for housing'0 3 and to ordained ministers or their counterparts.10 4 This exclusion is thus not of major significance, but it is
per year) of individual coverage or the first $25 per month ($300 per year) of family coverage

will be included in income. See

PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL,

supra note 4, at 26-28.

At this writing, the House Ways and Means Committee is in the process of marking up a
bill that may well be the next Tax Reform Act. The material prepared for the markup by the
staff of the Joint Committee includes an option to tax employer-provided health insurance
above a $120 individual/$300 family cap. See JOINT CoMm. ON TAXATION, TAX REFORM PROPOSALS IN CONNECTION WITH COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS MARKUP, XI.E (Comm. Print 1985).
97. See TREASURY I, supra note 4, at 23.
98. See Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 213(b)(11), 42 Stat. 227, 239.
99. See O.D. 862, 4 C.B. 85 (1921).
100. See infra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
101. One wonders, however, about the truth of the last phrase when considering tuition
tax credit legislation recently pending in Congress. This legislation bore a closer resemblance to
the New York state law struck down in Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756
(1973), than to the law upheld in Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983).
102. See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 16-17, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4017, 4040.
103. See Boyer v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 521 (1977); Eden v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 605
(1964) (undesignated salary payments).
104. See Kirk v. Commissioner, 425 F.2d 492 (D.C. Cir.) (no functions of a sacerdotal
character performed), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 853 (1970); Toavs v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 897
(1977) (ordained minister performing services for religious-affiliated nonprofit organization not
entitled to exclusion because organization was not a church); Colbert v. Commissioner, 61 T.C.
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clear that the same theoretical conclusions suggest that it should be
repealed along with the other fringe benefit exclusions.
6.

Meals and Lodging Furnished for the Convenience of the
Employer

The exclusion currently available for the value of meals and lodging reflects the development of an exclusion under administrative
rulings and court decisions that began many years prior to the enactment of section 119 in 1954. The newly enacted section was intended
to be a codification of portions of prior doctrine as well as a legislative overruling of some prior cases, but the major reason for its enactment appears to have been an attempt to provide clarity and to resolve issues that were frequently litigated." 5 Nevertheless, litigation
has continued, with the courts being called upon to resolve a number
of issues presented by the language of section 119 itself. There is,
however, a single major theme running through the administrative,
judicial, and legislative development: the exclusion is available only if
the meals and lodging are furnished "for the convenience of the employer" (and other tests are met). A brief look at section 119's
lengthy and convoluted development follows.
In keeping with its original policy of including in income items
vaguely resembling compensation, the Treasury ruled in 1914 that officers and employees of the United States were required to include in
income the value of quarters, heat and light furnished to them or the
cash allowance paid in lieu of those items, commutation.10 6 This was
the first determination on the subject of meals and lodging furnished
in-kind to employees, and it is most interesting in two respects. First,
the ruling contains a reference to the "employer's convenience" doctrine, 0 7 later to become the most important justification for exclusion, albeit in a somewhat limited fashion. Although the value of
quarters or commutation thereof was held to be includable in income,
where "a greater number of rooms than that allowed by law [is assigned], it is assumed that the excess number is assigned for the convenience of the Government, and the money equivalent only of the
number of rooms allowed by law shall be returned as income."' 0 Second, the ruling dealt with items other than lodging. For amounts re449 (1974) (nonreligious organization paid a Baptist minister an allowance, but services he performed did not constitute religious worship); Lawrence v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 494 (1968)
(ordained Baptist minister did not perform religious "ordinances" and was not a minister of the
gospel).
105. See infra note 132 and accompanying text.
106. See T.D. 2079, 16 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 249 (1914).
107. Id.
108. Id.
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ceived as reimbursements for expenditures made or as allowances
paid beforehand,109 the ruling only required inclusion of the amount
in excess of the expenses incurred while on government business. 10
The 1914 ruling was followed less than a month later by Treasury
Decision 2090, a "synopsis" of rulings issued under the 1913 Revenue
Act. Treasury Decision 2090 includes a general statement to the effect that "[w]here an individual is furnished living quarters in addition to salary, the rental value of such living quarters is regarded as
compensation subject to the income tax." ' This confirmed the earlier holding.
The Treasury continued to adhere to its position regarding includability of lodging furnished in addition to wages through 1918,
when Regulations 33 (Revised) was published. 11 2 The principle was
eroded only one year later, however, with the publication of two rulings, one regarding seamen" 3 and the other regarding Red Cross
workers." 4 These rulings signaled the growing acceptance of the convenience of the employer doctrine. The first ruling involved the inkind provision of meals and lodging on board ship, while the latter
concerned payment of a cash "maintenance" allowance in lieu of
wages, held to be includable only to the extent it exceeded actual
living expenses. In both instances, the unarticulated assumption was
that the employees had to be present where they were, not because
they desired it but rather because there was no other way that the
duties could be performed. Thus, the Treasury allowed an exclusion
in the limited circumstances where the lodging furnished by the employer was essentially a working condition. Also important is that the
Red Cross workers ruling involved an amount paid in cash and not
in-kind. The application of the employer's convenience exclusion to
cash reimbursements for meals and lodging has plagued the courts
for many years.
In 1920, the Treasury published an amendment to the regulations
acknowledging that employer's convenience is essentially the
equivalent of working condition. 1 5 The reference in the new provision was to living quarters "such as camps," the value of which was
109. Examples include per diem and mileage allowances.
110. See T.D. 2079, 16 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 249, 250 (1914). See infra notes 249-53 (employer reimbursements of employee business).
111. See T.D. 2090, 16 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 259, 263 (1914).
112. See Regulations 33 (Revised), art. 4, 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 129 (1918).
113. See O.D. 265, 1 C.B. 71 (1919). Interestingly, the analogy was drawn to shipmasters
and their cabins in Lord Hannen's opinion in Tennant v. Smith, 3 Tax Cas. 158, 172 (H.L.
1892), the major case in England that developed the "convenience of the employer" doctrine.
114. See O.D. 11, 1 C.B. 66 (1919).
115. See Treas. Dec. 2992, 2 C.B. 76 (1920) (modifying Regulations 45, art. 33).
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not includable in the employee's income when furnished for the convenience of the employer. The provision distinguished this situation
from one in which the employee was paid a salary as compensation
and "in addition thereto [was furnished] living quarters."' 1 6 In the
latter circumstances, the Treasury determined that the value of the
living quarters was includable in income.
In 1921, the government further elucidated the new position in a
series of rulings which determined the application of the convenience
of the employer theory to various situations. The rulings cited a
number of different factors to be taken into account in applying the
convenience of the employer test: the employee must accept the
meals and lodging in order to properly perform the work required by
the employer; 117 a requirement that the employee live on the prem18
ises must be imposed by the "location and nature of the work;"'
and the employer must properly account for the value of the meals
and lodging given to the employee free of charge.1 1 9 On the other
hand, where the employees could choose where to live and still adequately perform their duties, no exclusion was allowed. 2 0
From these rulings it is clear that by the early 1920's the Treasury
had considered a number of situations in which an exclusion for
meals and lodging might be available and had determined to grant
such an exclusion to both in-kind and cash items if the employer's
convenience test were met. When studied in detail, these rulings
show a progressive loosening of the employer's convenience doctrine
as different situations were considered. The argument of analogy was
more powerful and persuasive than the differences among the situations. Nowhere was there an attempt to elaborate the rationale of the
various rulings in a cohesive fashion and to flesh out the meaning of
the test for general application.
In opposition to the rulings allowing exclusions, the government
persisted in its original ruling requiring inclusion of meals and lodg116. Id. (emphasis added).
117. See O.D. 915, 4 C.B. 85, 85 (1921) (hospital employees).
118. See O.D. 814, 4 C.B. 84, 84-85 (1921) (employees in fishing and canning industry).
119. See id. The ruling held that, as to employees of the Indian Service, the Department
of Interior accounting procedures were determinative. Thus, if the Department treated the item
as compensation, it was to be taxed as such. This gave effect to the implicit theory that the
employer's handling of the item is determinative of the employer's convenience question, regardless of the facts and circumstances. The ruling also held, however, that the value of the
meals and lodging furnished by the employer to a servant should be reported separately by the
employer, implying that this amount constituted compensation income reportable by the employee. In many such instances, the employer might regard the employee's presence in the
home as mandated by the nature of the services to be performed, but the employer's characterization of the item would not appear to have any bearing on its treatment. See id. at 84.
120. See O.D. 862, 4 C.B. 85 (1921) (parsonage furnished by congregation to clergyman).
See also O.D. 915, 4 C.B. 85 (1921) (hospital employees).
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ing in the income of Army officers presumably because they, unlike
enlisted men, could choose where to live. 121 In 1925, this persistence
led to the first consideration of the convenience of the employer doctrine by an American court in Jones v.. United States.2 2 The Jones
court rejected the Treasury's position and granted an exclusion to an
Army officer. Jones is the first in a long line of decisions that deal
with the question of how the determination of employer's convenience is to be made. The court set out the rule as follows:
If the nature of the services require[s] the furnishing of a
house for their proper performance, and without it the service
may not be properly rendered, the house so furnished is part
of the maintenance of the general enterprise, an overhead exand forms no part of the individual income
pense, so to speak,
123
laborer.
the
of
Like the English case of Tennant v. Smith 24 before it, Jones relied
on the example of seamen on board ship as a rationale for permitting
the exclusion. 2 5 Thus, the question of the intent of the employer to
compensate or not was insignificant; it was the general facts and circumstances of the employment that were determinative. This attention to the facts and circumstances surrounding the furnishing of the
meals and lodging has come to be known as the "business necessity
view" of the employer's convenience doctrine.' 26 As can be seen, the
judicial test did not differ significantly from the test used in the rulings referred to above.
The Jones case further held, with regard to the cash versus kind
problem, that cash payments in lieu of the furnishing of quarters are
28
also excludable. 1 27 In the 1951 case of Van Rosen v. Commissioner,1
however, the Tax Court considered a cash allowance furnished to a
civilian employee of the United States Army Transportation Corps,
and refused to allow an exclusion on the theory that the freedom of
disposition inherent in cash was sufficient to render its receipt taxable.' 29 It is particularly interesting that the taxpayer's allowance in
121. See O.D. 921, 4 C.B. 86 (1921).
122. 60 Ct. Cl. 552 (1925).
123. Id. at 575.
124. 3 Tax Cas. 158 (H.L. 1892).
125. 60 Ct. Cl. at 575-76.
126. As to nonmilitary situations, see, e.g., Benaglia v. Commissioner, 36 B.T.A. 838
(1937) (reviewed by the Board).
127. 60 Ct. Cl. at 574. The IRS seems now to have completely accepted the application of
§ 119 to armed services personnel, including civilians. See Rev. Rul. 71-267, 1971-1 C.B. 37.
128. 17 T.C. 834 (1951) (reviewed by the Court).
129. Id. at 838.
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Van Rosen, like that in Jones, was required to be paid by United
States military regulation, but the cash/kind distinction was appar1 30
ently determinative.
The muddied waters that resulted from these varying judicial
precedents as to cash versus kind, and as to employer's convenience
generally, were not made any clearer by the Internal Revenue Service. In 1950, the IRS issued a Mimeograph declaring the convenience of the employer doctrine to be "simply an administrative test
to be applied only in cases in which the compensatory character of
[the furnished] benefits is not otherwise determinable." ' The new
IRS position was never further elucidated, but it seems to have signaled an intent to depart from the use of the employer's convenience
doctrine to allow exclusions.
This confused state of affairs persisted until Congress sat down to
write the 1954 Code. The resulting solution to the meals and lodging
problem was section 119, which has continued to exist in approximately the same form to the present day. This section should "be
construed as the draftsmen obviously intended it to be - as a replacement for the prior law, designed to 'end its confusion.' "32 In
large part, section 119 did exactly that by establishing very specific
tests. But as everyone familiar with the litigation under section 119
knows, what Congress wanted ain't necessarily what Congress got.
First, there have been numerous decisions interpreting the meaning of the statutory term "business premises." ' In addition, there
130. Id.
131. Mim. 6472, 1950-1 C.B. 15. This mimeograph was echoed in a Tax Court decision
issued in 1953, Doran v. Commissioner, 21 T.C. 374 (1953). In Doran, the state employer's
characterization of the item as compensatory was held to be determinative, despite the fact
that the taxpayer was on 24-hour call. Id. at 376. Congress, in enacting § 119, affirmatively
rejected any reliance on the employer's classification as determinative. See S. REP. No. 1622,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1954), discussed in Commissioner v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77, 91-93
(1977). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1(a)(1) (West 1985) (meals), which applies the statutory
and regulatory tests "irrespective of whether under an employment contract or a statute fixing
the terms of employment such meals are furnished as compensation." Cf. id. § 1.119-1(b)
(lodging).
132. Commissioner v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77, 93 (1977). See also id. at 90-91. For a general
discussion of the confusion in pre-1954 law on this subject, see Comment, Tax Treatment of
Compensation in Kind, 37 CAL'. L. REV. 638 (1949).
133. See, e.g., Adams v. United States, 77-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 9613 (Ct. Cl. 1977);
United States Junior Chamber of Commerce v. United States, 71 T.C. 216 (1978), aff'd, 614
F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1980); Lindeman v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 609 (1973); Dole v. Commissioner,
43 T.C. 697, af'd per curiam, 351 F.2d 308 (1st Cir. 1965); Frensley v. Commissioner, 44
T.C.M. 481 (1982).
Regarding state troopers, the definition of business premises has been interpreted broadly.
See United States v. Barrett, 321 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1963) (every road and highway, and adjacent restaurants as well, constitutes the business premises of the employer, the state). Accord
United States v. Keeton, 383 F.2d 429 (10th Cir. 1967); United States v. Morelan, 356 F.2d 199
(8th Cir. 1966). But see Wilson v. United States, 412 F.2d 694 (1st Cir. 1969) (highway roadside
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was continued need to resolve the cash versus kind question under
the new statute as section 119 is silent as to the proper treatment of
cash allowances. This issue was finally settled in Commissioner v.
Kowalski, T4 where the Supreme Court held that the statute is intended to reach only items furnished in-kind."3 5 But other minor issues continue to be litigated, such as whether direct billing of the
employer for groceries is sufficient for "in-kind" meals. 36
Collateral issues closely related to the issues presented by section
119 remain important. For example, it was not definitively settled
until 1981 that the furnishing of meals and lodging to an employee
does not constitute the payment of wages for purposes of the Social
Security Act and its related provisions. 37 In addition, the Securities
and Exchange Commission has expressed concern about the reporting of such items to stockholders as employee perquisites. 38
Section 119 clearly permits an exclusion for more items than the
administrative test used before its enactment. The major amendment
to the section' 39 since its enactment in 1954 shows greater congressional leniency in the previously unresolved area of spouse and dependent expenses. From litigated cases it is unclear whether prior
Service policy required an allocation and inclusion of those items on
the theory that the employer's convenience extended only to the acrestaurants are not "business premises" of the state).

Cf. I.R.C. § 119(c) (1982), added by the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No.
97-34, 95 Stat. 172, 195 (clarification of the meaning of business premises with respect to overseas camps).
134. 434 U.S. 77 (1977).

135. Id. at 94-95. Cf. Coombs v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 426 (1976) (cash allowance excludable if paid for the express purpose of providing employees with meals at their worksites), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, 608 F.2d 1269 (9th Cir. 1979).
136. See Sibla v. Commissioner, 611 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1980) (firemen's share of meal
expenses excludable under § 119), aff'g 67 T.C. 870 (1977); 68 T.C. 422 (1977); Jacob v. Commissioner, 493 F.2d 1294 (3d Cir. 1974) (value of groceries furnished free to medical institute

director held excludable). But see Tougher v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 737 (1969) (grocery allowance not excludable), aff'd per curiam, 441 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 856
(1971); Rev. Rul. 77-80, 1977-1 C.B. 36 (allowance with which meals are prepared at home not
excludable).
Recent general discussions of § 119 may be found in Kragen & Speer, LR.C. § 119: Is
Convenience of the Employer a Valid Concept?, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 921 (1978); Note, Meal Reimbursements as an Employee Fringe Benefit, 10 Loy. U. CmL L.J. 789 (1979); Note, A New
Look at the Section 119 Meals and Lodging Exclusion, 81 W. VA. L. REv. 483 (1979).
137. See Rowan Cos. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247 (1981). The Rowan result was codified by the Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, § 327, 97 Stat. 65, 126-27
(1983) (amending LR.C. § 3121). The question of whether fringes should be treated differently
for income tax and for payroll tax purposes is discussed in Richmond, supra note 11.
138. See 42 Fed. Reg. 43,059-61 (1977); 43 Fed. Reg. 6060-65 (1978).
139. Tax Treatment Extension Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-615, § 205, 92 Stat. 3097, 3107
(1978) (amendment effective for taxable years beginning after Dec. 31, 1977).
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tual employee. 140 But like the employee health benefit exclusion, this
41
untaxed fringe has grown far beyond its working condition roots.
The value of this fringe benefit to a given individual will vary, but
it can be substantial. 4 2 This possibility should cut against the retention of the section 119 exclusion. Involuntariness does not warrant
continuation of the exclusion as it may with respect to many medical
expenses, nor can its continuation be justified on the ground that the
meals and lodging are working conditions. A working condition exception is appropriate only when limited to items that are relatively
small and that are difficult to value because of problems allocating
them on a per employee basis. 4 ' Allowing an exclusion for meals and
lodging is no different from permitting a deduction for other personal, nondeductible expenses such as commuting. In addition, there
is good reason to believe that valuation of meals and lodging would
be fairly easy in many instances, since the cash wage will be reduced
in an amount that the employer thinks is appropriate to compensate
for the room and board provided free of charge. Fair rental value can
easily be established in most cases from readily available comparisons. In addition, allocating grocery costs is not overwhelmingly
burdensome.
Finally, the existence of the section 119 exclusion has prompted
recent attempts to expand its coverage to housing furnished to
faculty and administrative personnel by schools and colleges. This argument comes in response to an announced IRS policy taxing the fair
market value of such housing.144 Expansion of the already overly
140. Compare Armstrong v. Phinney, 394 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1968) (remand required to
determine if taxpayer's spouse and child were also employees) with Coyner v. Bingler, 344 F.2d
736 (3d Cir. 1965) (employee and wife required to live in building; exclusion allowed for the
entire value of housing). The IRS's first published position regarding the spouse and dependent
portions of the value of housing was found in Rev. Rul. 59-409, 1959-2 C.B. 48, holding that the
value of meals and lodging supplied by a school to the employee's families was includable in the
employee's income, but only one year later, without explanation, the ruling was revoked. See
Rev. Rul. 60-348, 1960-2 C.B. 41.
141. The roots are reflected in the language of § 119 as it relates to lodging. Section
119(a)(2) mandates that the employee be required to accept the lodging "as a condition of his
employment" in order for the exclusion to be available. I.R.C. § 119(a)(2) (West 1985).
142. See, e.g., Adams v. United States, 77-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9613 (Ct. Cl. 1977)
(fair rental value of "prestigious" house furnished by employer to executive employee living in
Japan excludable under § 119 because it was necessary for the employee to live in plush surroundings to be effective in conducting business in Japan; some business conducted in home),
aff'd, 585 F.2d 1060 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
143. See infra Part IV(B)(1).
144. See P.L.R. 8213005 (Dec. 21, 1982), in which the IRS held the differential between
rents charged university employees and the fair rental value of the university-owned housing
was includable in the employee's income and also constituted wages for purposes of FICA and
FUTA. This ruling caused an uproar and resulted in the introduction of legislation making
clear that the fringe benefit moratorium applied to these items. See Letter from Senator John
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broad section 119 exclusion to include an even greater number of
people is wholly unwarranted. Although education may well need additional subsidies, a direct form is better than such an indirect, backdoor approach.
7.

Special Exclusions for Armed Services Personnel

Toward the end of the Second World War, Congress enacted two
special exclusion provisions for armed forces personnel.145 These were
exclusions reenacted in the 1954 Code as sections 112 and 113. Under
section 112 as it currently exists, members of the armed forces who
are in active service are entitled to exclude "combat pay" received
either while serving in a combat zone 146 or while hospitalized as a

result of injuries or disease incurred or contracted on duty in a combat zone. 147 The amount of the exclusion varies depending on
whether the person is an enlisted person, noncommissioned officer or
a commisssioned officer. 4s In addition, section 112(d) permits an exclusion for Vietnam War veterans and civilian armed services employees during the Vietnam War who were designated as missing.
They may exclude all compensation received during any month they
Heinz to Commissioner of Internal Revenue Roscoe Egger (Sept. 22, 1982) referring to S. 2871
(introduced by Senators Heinz and Moynihan), quoted in 17TAx NoTEs (TAX ANALYSTS) 319
(Oct. 25, 1982).
The IRS's position is backed, of course, by well-established authority. See, e.g., Bob Jones
Univ. v. United States, 670 F.2d 167 (Ct. Cl. 1982); Goldsboro Christian Schools v. United
States, 436 F. Supp. 1314 (E.D.N.C. 1977), aff'd on other grounds on motion for reconsideration, 43 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H)
79-868 (E.D.N.C. 1978), af'd by unpublished order, (4th Cir.
1981). In both of these cases, the § 119 exclusion was unavailable mainly because the employees
were not on 24-hour call and the homes were not actually part of the business premises. In the
1984 Act Congress once again indicated its intention to prevent further administrative activity
until there has been a chance for further discussion of the issue of faculty housing. Section
531(g) of the Act forbids the issuance of regulations between December 31, 1983, and January
1, 1986. See JoiNT Comm. ON TAxATION, supra note 2, at 865-66.
145. The exclusion presently codified as I.R.C. § 112 originated in the Revenue Act of
1945, ch. 453, § 141, 59 Stat. 556, 571 (formerly I.R.C. § 22(b)(13) (1939)). Section 113 refers to
payments made pursuant to the Mustering-Out Payment Act of 1944, ch. 9, 58 Stat. 8, 9.
146. An area is considered a combat zone if it is so designated in an Executive Order by
the President. See I.R.C. § 112(c)(2) (1982). Treas. Reg. § 1.112-1(j) (West 1985), provides that
activities performed outside a combat zone are deemed performed in the combat zone if in
direct support of military activities in such a zone and if performed under conditions which
qualify such members for hostile fire pay under the Uniform Services Pay Act of 1963, § 9(a).
37 U.S.C. § 310.
147. The hospitalization period may not extend more than two years after cessation of
combat activity in the combat zone in which the injury occurred. See I.R.C. § 112(a)(2) (1982).
148. Enlisted men and noncommissioned officers may exclude all of their compensation
under § 112(a), while commissioned officers are entitled to an exclusion of only up to $500 per
month under § 112(b). This distinction was held constitutional under equal protection principles. Bruinooge v. United States, 550 F.2d 624 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
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were missing. 149 Section 113 excludes from income the mustering-out
payments received by service personnel leaving the armed forces.' 5 0
These are generally lump-sum items constituting a form of severance
pay.
B.

The 1954 Code as Amended (to 1983)

The next group of exclusions to be considered consists of those
that have been enacted by Congress between 1954 and 1984. Prior to
the late 1970's, when new provisions mushroomed, only one exclusion
section was enacted by the Congress subsequent to 1954. Thus, the
group of new exclusions is generally of quite recent origin. In addition, except for section 79, every post-1954 exclusion added prior to
1984 was without administrative precedent. When one looks at the
growth of fringe benefit provisions in the second half of the 1970's
from the perspective of the early 1980's, it seems apparent that Congress became aware that it could provide more fringes only after the
Treasury issued its first Discussion Draft of Proposed Regulations in
1975.11' Thus, the interaction of the Treasury and the Congress continues, but since 1975 it appears that the major congressional aim has
been to flout the desires of the administrators.
It should be noted, however, that the Treasury proposals regarding the taxation of fringe benefits advanced in 1975152 and again in
198115 did not purport to achieve any radical reforms. In large part,
they represented a systematic statement of the existing practice in a
number of areas. These proposals will be alluded to throughout this
article, but an in-depth analysis of the proposed fringe benefit regulations is beyond its scope and may be found elsewhere.'5 4
1.

Group Term Life Insurance

In 1964, Congress enacted the exclusion provided by section 79 for
149. "Missing" is defined in 37 U.S.C. § 551(2) (1982) and generally means a person who
is a prisoner of war or missing in action.
150. Mustering-out payments are defined by Treas. Reg. § 1.113-1 (1960) as those payments made pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 2105 (Act of Sept. 2, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-857, 72 Stat.
1105, 1224), formerly § 5 of the Mustering-Out Payment Act of 1944, ch. 9, 58 Stat. 8, 9, and §
505 of the Veterans Readjustment Assistance Act of 1952, ch. 875, 66 Stat. 663, 690. Interestingly, while 38 U.S.C. § 2105 was repealed by an Act of June 24, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-50, 79
Stat. 173, the regulations have not. been amended to provide a different definition.
151. See Prop. Reg. § 1.61-16, 40 Fed. Reg. 41,118 (discussion draft), reprinted in [1985]
2 FED. TAXES (P-H) 1 7371.
152. Id.
153. See Prop. Reg. § 1.61-13, reprinted in [1981] II FED. TAXES (P-H) 1 70,181.
154. See Note, Federal Income Taxation of Employee Fringe Benefits, 89 HARv. L. REV.
1141 (1976) (considers the 1976 proposals).
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the employer's cost of purchasing group term life insurance. 155 The
exclusion originated, however, much earlier than the enactment of
the section suggests. The apparent reason for the original administrative exclusion was that no significant employee benefit was derived
from the mere purchase of the insurance by the employer, the benefit
derived therefrom being received only by the beneficiaries of the employee after her death. 156 The original IRS position was to include in
the employee's income the premiums paid by the employer to
purchase life insurance, as well as accident and health insurance.
This was changed in 1920 with the issuance of Treasury Decision
2992 which excluded the employer's cost of group term life insurance
157
from the employee's income.
This position apparently continued until 1964, making section 79
somewhat unique in that it reduced the available exclusion to the
employer's purchase of up to $50,000 worth of insurance coverage.
But in determining the amount of the employer's contributions any
amount the employee contributes is credited to the over-$50,000 portion first.1 58 This significantly enhances the value of the employer
contribution. The statute provides that only group term insurance
qualifies under section 79 and that the permissible factors to be used
in selecting the group should tend to preclude individual selection of
key employees. 159 These requirements of the statute requiring nondiscrimination were strengthened in 1982.160 The fact that there is a
limitation to "term" life insurance means that there are no savings or
other capital value features, as in whole life, accruing to the employee
as a result of the employer's premium payments.' 6'
2.

Qualified Group Legal Services Plans

The first of the recent group of fringe benefit provisions is section
120,162 which was designed to encourage employers to make available
155.
156.

Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 204(a), 78 Stat. 19, 36.
See Sol. Op. 1014, 2 C.B. 88 (1920). See also R. PAUL & J. MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
7.05.
157. See T.D. 2992, 2 C.B. 76 (1920).
158. Treas. Reg. § 1.79-3(a)-(b) & (e) (West 1985).
159. See I.R.C. § 79(d) (1982).
160. See Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), Pub. L. No. 97-248,
§ 244, 96 Stat. 324, 523-24.
161. The T.D. 2992 exclusion was for all premiums, regardless of the amount of insurance
bought, but it did not include "group permanent" life insurance premiums. See Mim. 6477,
1950-1 C.B. 16.
162. I.R.C. § 120(e) was enacted by the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, §

2134, 90 Stat. 1520, 1926. For the legislative history of the section, see STAFF
2

OF JOINT COMM- ON

SESS., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976, HR.
10612, at 668, reprintedin 1976-3 C.B. (vol. 2) 680; S. REP. No. 1236, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 537,

TAXATION, 94TH CONG.,

D
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to their employees access to low-cost legal services through prepaid
plans. Although it is unclear what the previous position of the IRS
was with respect to employer payment of employee legal fees,16 3 it is
safe to surmise that such practices were not widespread, particularly
with respect to lower level employees. Section 120 thus accomplishes
the social objective of making legal services more available. An interesting feature of section 120 is that this was the first fringe benefit
exclusion provision for which Congress specifically set an expiration
date when it enacted the original legislation. The so-called "sunset"
for section 120 initially provided that it would not be applicable for
taxable years beginning after December 31, 1981."' That limitation
was extended by the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 to taxable
years beginning after December 31, 198415 and by the Tax Reform
Act of 1984 to taxable years ending after December 31, 1985.6'
The requirements for a section 120 exclusion are that the amounts
be contributed by the employer to a "qualified group legal services
plan," or that the legal services be provided by, or the reimbursement
made through, such a qualified plan. 16 7 Employees, as well as their
spouses and dependents, benefit from such a plan. The definition of
"qualified plan" is lengthy, but in essence requires the plan to be
nondiscriminatory as to the employees covered and the services provided. 168 In addition, a plan must follow certain notification procedures in order to qualify.1 69
3.

Qualified Transportation Plans

At the height of the energy shortage of the late 1970's, Congress
determined that it was good social policy to encourage employers to
encourage employees to drive to work less. Thus, in the Energy Tax
Act of 1978,1"° it enacted section 124 of the Code excluding from the
employee's income the value of "qualified transportation" to and
reprinted in 1976-3 C.B. (vol. 3), 404, 940.
163. See H. MACAULEY, supra note 9, at 176.
164. See I.R.C. § 120(e), as enacted by the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, §
2134, 90 Stat. 1520, 1928.
165. See Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 802, 95 Stat. 172, 349.
166. Pub. L. No. 98-612, 98 Stat. 3180, extended the exclusion for group legal services
plans to permit a longer period for the completion of the effectiveness study authorized by
Congress when the provision was frst enacted. See H.R. REP. No. 1050, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1984), reprinted in [1985] 2 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) i11 191A.
167. See I.R.C. § 120(a) (West 1985); Prop. Reg. § 1.120-1(a), [1983] 2 FED. TAXES (P-H) 9
8703.4.
168. See I.R.C. § 120(c) (West 1985); Prop. Reg. § 1.120-2, [1983] II FED. TAXES (P-H) q
8703.5.
169. See Prop. Reg. § 1.120-3l, [1983] 2 FED. TAXES (P-H) 8703.6.
170. Pub. L. No. 95-618, § 242, 92 Stat. 3174, 3193.
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from the workplace. Such "qualified transportation" must be furnished in an eight passenger "commuter highway vehicle," 17 1 and the
plan must not be discriminatory. In addition, the plan must specifically state that the transportation is furnished to the employee in
addition to, and not in lieu of, compensation otherwise paid to the
employee. Once again there is a sunset provision, with the exclusion
available only for transportation provided before January 1, 1986.
This provision, like the section 101(b) exclusion for employee death
benefits, is slated for demise in the President's Tax Reform
172
Proposal.
It is interesting to note that Congress went to some length to indicate that the enactment of section 124 was in no way intended to
imply that any other employer-provided transportation would be taxable to an employee. 7 3 Nevertheless, it has quite readily accepted at
other times that such transportation will be taxable in certain instances. 174 The concern expressed by the Congress reflects the general
debate over the taxation of nonstatutory fringe benefits.
4.

Cafeteria Plans

The Revenue Act of 19781 5 provided for the most far-reaching
fringe benefit exclusion ever enacted. Section 125 provides an exclusion for benefits made available under cafeteria plans, which offer
employees a choice among various benefits, including cash. If the
choice is made under a qualified cafeteria plan, an employee will not
be taxed for choosing an otherwise nontaxable benefit simply because
the employee could have chosen a cash option or some other taxable
benefit instead. 17 6 Thus, this statute overrules an important branch
of the doctrine of constructive receipt.
The exclusion for cafeteria plans generally does not extend to deferred compensation arrangements. Thus, a pension plan contribution is not permitted to be one of the choices of nontaxable bene171. See I.R.C. § 124(b) (West 1985), which refers to tax definitions found in id. §
46(c)(6)(B).
172. See PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL,supra note 4, 1 3.03.
173. See H.R. REP. No. 1773, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 53-54, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD.NEws 8071, 8082-83 (Joint Explanatory Statement of the Conf. Comm.).
174. The legislative history of the 1984 Act provisions on fringe benefits makes it clear
that employer-provided transportation will be considered to be taxable if personal use of an
"employer-provided road vehicle" is substantial. See Temp. Reg. §§ 1.132-iT QA 4 & 1.61-2T
QA 11 to QA 20, 50 Fed. Reg. 7075 (1985). For earlier acceptance of this idea, see H.R. REP.
No. 966, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 159 (1974) (an examination of President Nixon's tax returns for
1969-1972 by the Joint Comm. on Internal Revenue Taxation).
175. Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 134, 92 Stat. 2763, 2783.
176. See Prop. Reg. § 1.125-1 Q/A 9, 49 Fed. Reg. 19,321 (1984), which explains that § 125
"provides an exception to the constructive receipt rules" under certain circumstances.
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fits.177 Otherwise, however, many of the fringe benefits already
discussed qualify as nontaxable choices under a cafeteria plan. 171 One
of the theoretical difficulties with the cafeteria plan approach is that
making correct choices as to cash versus kind benefits requires a high
level of sophistication as well as an ability to predict the future with
relative accuracy, qualities few people possess in any great measure.
As with the provisions that have already been discussed, nondiscrimination requirements must be met in order for the plan to qualify. The nondiscrimination requirement here, however, is a two-level
one. There may be no discrimination as to the nontaxable portion. In
addition, there may be no discrimination as to the total benefits
available. 179 The statute also provides that if the plan does discriminate in favor of "highly compensated individuals as to eligibility to
participate, or highly compensated participants as to contributions
and benefits," any person in whose favor the discrimination occurs
will have to include in income any benefits received under the plan,
including those that would otherwise be nontaxable. 18 0 This stiff nondiscrimination requirement was added by the 1984 Act in place of a
rule that only required inclusion of an amount that exceeded the
benefits available to others under the plan.1""
As can be readily seen from the description of these provisions,
the cafeteria plan has become an important feature of the fringe benefit landscape. Indeed, many employers took a fairly aggressive position in order to increase the attractiveness of their plans by adopting
what are known as "flexible spending arrangements" or benefit
banks. These enable an employee to receive amounts for expense reimbursement under, for example, a health insurance plan, without
actually ever incurring the expenses. In the absence of regulations, a
few employers felt that these flexible plans were valid under section
125. However, in February 1984,12 the IRS issued an announcement,
177. See I.R.C. § 125(d)(2) (West 1985) (as amended by the Miscellaneous Revenue Act
of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-605, 94 Stat. 3521, 3529).
178. See generally id. § 125(f). Nontaxable benefits include legal services, "qualified
transportation," educational assistance, and health benefits. See S. REP. No. 1263, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 74, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6761, 6837.
179. See I.R.C. § 125(c) (West 1985). On May 7, 1984, the Treasury proposed regulations
that deal in part with the nondiscrimination requirement for cafeteria plans. Although the Tax
Reform Act of 1984 later amended § 125 rather extensively, the amendments did not materially
affect the nondiscrimination requirement of § 125(c) (the word "statutory" was added before
"nontaxable benefits" each time the latter phrase occurred in the statute), and thus the proposed regulations should be considered to be valid with respect to the nondiscrimination rule.
See Prop. Reg. § 1.125-1 Q/A 19, 49 Fed. Reg. 19,321 (1984).
180. I.R.C. § 125(b)(1) (West 1985). See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 2, at 86970.
181. See I.R.C. § 125(b) (1982) as it read prior to its amendment by the 1984 Act.
182. IRS News, 22 TAX NOTES (TAX ANALYSTS) 687 (Feb. 20, 1984).
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later formalized in proposed regulations issued in May, 18 3 that the
cash in lieu of nontaxable benefit feature of these plans would prevent the plan from meeting the requirements of section 125. Although there was a storm of protest about the IRS's interpretation of
the law, the propriety of that interpretation was confirmed by the
congressional change in the definition in the 1984 Act to require that
the benefits available under a section 125 plan be "statutory" nontaxable benefits. Nonetheless, Congress did bow to industry pressure by
providing a rather comforting grandfather clause.'8 4
Congressional awareness of the far-reaching impact of cafeteria
plans on the availability of fringe benefits in the employment market
caused the imposition of much stricter reporting requirements for
such plans in taxable years after 1984.185 In addition, the Treasury, in
connection with the Department of Health and Human Services, was
authorized to undertake a study to determine the impact of cafeteria
plans which was to be completed no later than April 1, 1985.186 Continued awareness of the need to scrutinize rising health care costs
may well result in the imposition of benefit amount limits for all
fringes, unless, of course, the lobbyists are successful in preventing
187
such a result.
5.

Educational Assistance Programs

Enacted as part of the Revenue Act of 1978, section 127 provides
a $5,000 maximum exclusion for educational assistance program benefits so long as the educational program of the employer qualifies
under section 127(b). 188 The basic requirements of this section are
threefold. First, the education must be provided for the exclusive
benefit of the employees and not for dependents. 18 9 This distin183.
184.
185.

See Prop. Reg. § 1.125-1 Q/A 14 & 15.
See I.R.C. § 531(b)(5) & (6) (West 1985), Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494, 877.
See I.R.C. § 125(h) & § 6039D (West 1985) (added by the Tax Reform Act of 1984,

Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494).
186. In August, 1985, the Treasury and the Department of Health & Human Services
reported the flexible spending accounts were costing $12 billion per year in lost revenues. In
addition, these plans were not containing the growth of health care costs. Government Study
Finds CafeteriaPlan Flexible Spending Accounts a Revenue Loser, 28 TAx NoTEs (TAx ANALYsTs) 868, 868 (Aug. 19, 1985).
187. The lobbyists may have considerable help from certain Senators. See Daily Tax Rep.
(BNA), July 25, 1985, at G-6 (statement of Sen. Packwood). See generally Daily Tax Rep.
(BNA), Oct. 7, 1985, at K-1 to K-4 (reports of unfavorable responses to changes in the fringe
benefit law).
188. See I.R.C. § 127 (West 1985). For a general discussion of educational assistance

plans, see Caplin, EducationalAssistance Programs:A New Fringe Benefit for 1979-1983, 57
TAxEs 75 (1979). See also Pub. L. No. 98-611, 98 Stat. 3176, which extended the life of the
exclusion and imposed the $5,000 maximum.
189. See I.R.C. § 127(b)(2) (1982).
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guishes these programs from educational benefit trusts that have generally been held taxable"1 and tuition remission programs of educational institutions that have been given nontaxable treatment under
the 1984 Act that essentially confirms the pre-1984 administrative
position."" Second, the education must not involve sports or hobbies, 192 unless pertinent to the business of the employer. 193 Finally,
19 4
the educational assistance plan may not be part of a cafeteria plan.
There are also nondiscrimination requirements for plans under
which the benefits are nontaxable. 1 95 These requirements do not,
however, prevent the program from requiring that a participant obtain a certain grade. 9 6 However, they do prevent the employer from
limiting the benefits to persons who are seeking only postgraduate
degrees.1 97 The section also requires that assistance not be provided
for transportation, tools, lodging and other related items.'9 8 Instead,
the section limits excludable benefits to tuition, fees and books.
Although there was a proposal pending to permanently extend
section 127 beyond its expiration on December 31, 1983,199 that did
not turn up in the 1984 Act. The Treasury opposed the legislation,'
but was unsuccessful in defeating a later bill that extended the life of
section 127 one more year.2 1
6.

Dependent Care Assistance Programs

The last of the pre-1984 Act exclusions is section 129, added by
the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981.202 Section 129 excludes from
the employee's income amounts paid or incurred by the employer to
provide dependent care assistance under a qualified program. Section
190. See Armantrout v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 996 (1977), aff'd per curiam, 570 F.2d 210
(7th Cir. 1978).
191. Treas. Reg. § 1.117-3(a) (1960) provided for the exclusion of educational institution
tuition remission programs from 1956 onward.
192. See I.R.C. § 127(c)(1)(B) (West 1985).
193. See Treas. Reg. § 1.127-2(c)(3)(iii) (1982).
194. See I.R.C. § 127(b)(4) (1982).
195. See id. § 127(b)(4) (West 1985); Treas. Reg. § 1.127-2(e) (1983).
196. See Treas. Reg. § 1.127-2(e)(2)(ii) (1983).
197. See id. § 1.127-2(e).
198. See I.R.C. § 127(c)(1)(B) (West 1985).
199. See S. 249, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) ("Employee Educational Assistance Extension Act").
200. Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), Apr. 29, 1983, J-8 to J-9 (statement by William S. McKee,
Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Treasury for Tax Policy, as a Hearing on Apr. 29,
1983, Senate Finance Comm. Subcomm. on Taxation & Debt Management).
201. Pub. L. No. 98-611, 98 Stat. 3176. The committee report accompanying Pub. L. No.
98-611 explains that the provision was continued for one more year to permit the completion of
the effectiveness study by the Treasury. See H.R. REP. No. 1049, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984),
reprinted in 2 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) I 1198W.
202. Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 124(e), 95 Stat. 172, 198.
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129(e) defines dependent care assistance with reference to items considered dependent care expenses for purposes of the credit for dependent care under section 44A.2 °s The plan under which the assistance
is furnished may not discriminate in favor of highly compensated or
upper-level employees or in favor of principal shareholders and owners. 20 4 Furthermore, the employee must be notified of the plan's
existence. 0 5
Although the definition of dependent care assistance is fairly
broad, no exclusion is available for amounts paid by the employer to
2 06
the employee's dependents or children under nineteen years of age.
This provision is clearly designed to limit abuses of the exclusion by
parents attempting to shift income to lower income children or
grandparents.
While Congress was vigilant to eliminate certain abuse possibilities in this area, it was not alert to a major problem with the exclusion. There is a maximum limitation on the excludable amount; it
may not exceed earned income, or in the case of married couples,
earned income of the lesser earning spouse.20 7 However, there is no
limitation on the cost of the care to the employer that will qualify for
the exclusion. Under the section 44A dependent care credit, the limits on the creditable amount of dependent care are very low ($2,400 if
there is one qualified individual receiving care and $4,800 if there are
more). 0 8 Without any limits on the section 129 exclusion, these limits are essentially read out of the statute for persons whose employers
provide dependent care assistance as a fringe benefit.
7.

Summary

These exclusion provisions added to the Internal Revenue Code
since 1975 have nothing whatsoever in common with provisions such
as section 119 and the health benefit provisions which, despite their
current breadth, have respectable origins in the generally accepted
notion that conditions of employment are not taxable. As to the pre1984 Act exclusions, their only rationale seems to have been that
Congress wanted to encourage a particular social policy through the
exclusion. Sometimes these policies were not of enduring importance
or were misguided. In addition to their being substantively question203. See I.R.C. § 129(e)(1) (1985). Included are expenses for household services and for
the actual care costs for a dependent person, as well as expenses incurred at a dependent care
center. See id. § 44A(c)(2).
204. See id. § 129(d)(2) (West 1985).
205. See id. § 129(d)(6).
206. See id. § 129(c)(2).
207. See id. § 129(b)(1) (1982).
208. See id. § 44A(d).
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able, there was little or no attempt by Congress to correlate these
provisions with each other or with pre-existing fringes. Nor was there
an attempt to determine their relative worth, either in terms of social
policy or in terms of their relative cost in number of dollars of lost
revenue.
C. 1984 Act Provisions
The Tax Reform Act of 1984 codified many existing fringe benefit
exclusions that had been available in at least a few District Offices of
the Internal Revenue Service prior to the effective date of the Act. In
so doing, Congress intended to clear up confusion as to national policy concerning specific items (for example, free parking) and to codify
certain stringent requirements for other items (for example, employee discounts). 09 Finally, section 61(a)(1), as amended, evidences
congressional intent to treat fringe benefits as compensation and to
exempt no fringe benefits other than those specifically excluded by
provisions of the Code.21 0
The major change in the taxation of fringe benefits is in new section 132, where provisions excluding "no additional cost service,"
"qualified employee discount," "working condition," and "de
minimis" fringe benefits can be found.21 ' All of these are defined in
careful and elaborate detail, raising the question whether these new
provisions are administrable. It is, in any case, clear from the requirements for exclusion that Congress intends to prevent abuses in favor
of highly compensated employees. There is a strict nondiscrimination
requirement212 and, in the case of "qualified employee discounts" and
"no additional cost" services, there is also a requirement that the
goods or services be available in the line of business in which the
employee is performing services.

13

Although the Committee Reports

indicate a clear awareness of the abuse possibilities available for executives, it is unlikely that the committee staffs anticipated everything that large companies will dream up in the way of nontaxable
compensation packages.
In addition to the exclusions in the new Code section, Congress
209. See supra note 2.
210. See I.R.C. § 61(a)(1) (West 1985), as amended by Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494, 877. Despite this statement, it is clear that Congress did not intend to
require that items such as social security contributions and employee expense accounts should
now be taxed.
211. See I.R.C. § 132 (West 1985).
212. See id. § 132(h)(1).
213. See id. § 132(b)(1) (as to no additional cost services); id. § 132(c)(4) (as to qualified
employee discounts). Reciprocal arrangements among employers in the same line of business
are permissible if the fringe benefit qualifies as a no additional cost service.
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amended section 117, the scholarship provision, to codify a previously
existing exclusion found not in the statute but in the regulations
under that section. Although the prior exclusion had been interpreted to have rather broad coverage, including programs under
which the tuition an employee paid to another institution was reimbursed by her employer,2 14 the statute draws the lines for exclusion
very carefully. It now permits an exclusion only for reductions in tuition for education below the graduate level.2 15 The statute also imposes a nondiscrimination requirement that will undoubtedly make
tuition remission less attractive as a fringe benefit for many educational institutions. 16
Finally, the 1984 Act made a change in the income tax treatment
of interest-free or below-market-rate-interest loans made in the employment context. Although the prior nonstatutory exclusion was unclear both as to its scope and as to its propriety, 217 Congress has now
required the treatment of compensation-related below-market loans
as income under section 7872. Below-market loans are those on which
214. See Treas. Reg. § 1.117-3(a) (1960).
215. See I.R.C. § 117(d)(2) (West 1985), which describes a "qualified tuition reduction" as
one for education below the graduate level.
216. See id. § 117(d)(3). The legislative history of the nondiscrimination requirement
makes it clear that not all employees need be covered by the plan. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 2, at 861. For example, an educational institution could discriminate on the
basis of a permissible criterion such as job description, "provided that the effect of the classification is nondiscriminatory." Id. The meaning of this language is opaque at best since it is clear
that in most institutions all faculty members will be paid more than every other employee
except top administrative personnel. Cf. J. EUSTIcE, THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1984, A SELECTIVE
ANALYSIS 1 5.06[3][c] (taking the position that covering faculty and administrative personnel
will not meet the nondiscrimination requirement).
Another curious aspect of the nondiscrimination requirement is how it ties in with the fact
that remission (query whether reimbursement would qualify?) by other educational organizations is also excludable. It is likely that most colleges and universities that have reciprocal
arrangements have them only for faculty and higher level administrators, but not for staff. It is
hard to determine whether a tuition reduction obtained by the child of a faculty member at an
institution other than the one at which her parent teaches would be under an arrangement that
is "available on substantially the same terms to each member of a group of employees which is
defined under a reasonable classification set up by an employer which does not discriminate in
favor of. . . highly compensated employees." Reciprocity for faculty children only would presumably make the plan discriminatory.
217. Beginning with Dean v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 1083 (1961), the Tax Court held consistently that loans with below-market interest rates did not give rise to income. See Beaton v.
Commissioner, 664 F.2d 315 (1st Cir. 1981); Martin v. Commissioner, 649 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir.
1981); Suttle v. Commissioner, 625 F.2d 1127 (4th Cir. 1980); Baker v. Commissioner, 75 T.C.
166, aff'd, 677 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1982); Creel v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1173 (1979); Zager v.
Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1009 (1979). See also Hardee v. United States, 708 F.2d 661 (Fed. Cir.
1983). The general reasoning behind these decisions was that the taxpayer would have been
entitled to an interest deduction for the additional interest that might have been imputed to
her. This thinking ignores the restrictions on interest deductibility that have become an important feature of the statutory landscape. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 163(d) & 265(2) (West 1985).
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interest is payable at a rate which is less than the "applicable Federal
rate"2 1 if the loan is a demand loan,2 1 9 or, if the loan is a term loan,
loans on which the amount loaned exceeds the present value of all
the payments due under the loan.22 ° Under section 7877(a), foregone

interest on a demand loan is treated as transferred from the lender to
the borrower (as compensation in the case of a "compensation-related" loan) and then back to the lender as interest.221 If the loan is a
term loan, the amount of income will be the excess of the amount
loaned over the present value of all payments required to be made
under the terms of the loan. That amount will be income on the date
the loan is made.222 Since this provision prescribes a rather burdensome result, it is hard to imagine that any loans between employer
and employee will not be structured as demand loans. Although
"compensation-related loan" is defined broadly to include any belowmarket loan between employer and employee (and, incidentally, independent contractors and the people for whom they work),223 there

is a de minimis exception for loans where the outstanding balance
does not exceed $10,000.224
One of the interesting things about these new provisions as they
relate to low interest loans is what happens to the many loans that
fall in the category outside the de minimis exception. While one can
infer from the definition of "compensation-related" that Congress accepts the notion that all loans from employers to employees at a rate
of interest below the applicable federal rate constitute compensatory
arrangements, it is unclear how the below $10,000 loans will be
treated under section 132. One can expect that some loans on which
an amount of interest is foregone will come within the de minimis
218. I.R.C. §§ 7872(f)(1)(A) & (2)(B) (West 1985), the latter of which says that the "applicable Federal rate" for demand loans is the federal short-term rate in effect under § 1274(d).
The proposed regulations set up a safe harbor for the interest rate on demand loans. See Prop.
Reg. § 1.7872-3(c)(2).
219. The term "demand loan" is defined in I.R.C. § 7872(f)(5) (West 1985) to mean "any
loan which is payable in full at any time at the demand of the lender."
220. See id. §§ 7872(e)(1)(B) & (2)(A). In order to determine the present value of all
payments to be made under the loan, the applicable federal rate in effect under § 1274(d) is to
be used and the interest is to be compounded semi-annually. See Prop. Reg. § 1.7872-14, 50
Fed. Reg. 33,553, 33,569-70 (1985), for examples of present value computations. A term loan is
defined by § 7872(f)(6) as being "any loan which is not a demand loan."
221. See I.R.C. § 7872(a) (West 1985). For extensive treatment of demand loans and the
computation of foregone interest, see Prop. Reg. § 1.7872-13, 50 Fed. Reg. 33,533, 33,568-69
(1985).
222. See I.R.C. § 7872(b) (West 1985); Prop. Reg. § 17872-7, 50 Fed. Reg. 33,553, 33,56364 (1985). It is also possible that a below market term loan will be treated as having original
issue discount under § 7872(b)(2).
223. See I.R.C. § 7872(c)(1)(B) (West 1985).
224. See id. § 7872(c)(3).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol36/iss5/1

44

Simon: Fringe Benefits and Tax Reform Historical Blunders and a Proposal
1984]

FRINGE BENEFITS: TAX REFORM

exception of section 132 as well as the de minimis exception to section 7872. Those that do not will undoubtedly not qualify for any
other exclusion under section 132 unless, in some very limited circumstances, the no-additional-cost service rule were to apply to an
employee of a lending institution with lots of extra loan funds available. Thus, it can fairly be said that Congress intends to tax almost all
employment-related low interest loans as compensation.2 2 5
D. Nonstatutory Exclusions
As the law existed prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1984 it was
occasionally difficult to document instances in which the Internal
Revenue Service determined that certain fringe benefits were not
subject to tax because many practices were not generally accepted
even though they were widespread. There are still some exclusions
that are not found in the statute and that seem to survive the 1984
Act. A minor one is the supper money exclusion, which first appeared
in O.D. 514 in 1920. The legislative history of the 1984 Act accepts
this exclusion as a de minimis fringe benefit under section
132(a)(4).226 More significant continuing nonstatutory exclusions are
accorded to employer funding of workers' compensation, unemployment compensation and Social Security. Finally, an important but
rarely discussed fringe benefit, expense accounts for executives, still
exists.
1.

Social Welfare

Three different types of social welfare benefits have a fringe benefit element to them because the benefits themselves are funded
wholly or in part by an untaxed employer contribution made on behalf of employees. These are Social Security, unemployment compensation and workers' compensation. They share the rationale that the
benefits are paid as a result of need. They are also similar in that the
benefits are either wholly or partially excludable from income. Although it may be theoretically appropriate to tax the employer contributions when made, the system of not taxing them is firmly entrenched, as a short description of the history of these fringe benefits
will make clear.
Like the private pension plan contributions discussed above, the
225. The Treasury has permitted certain compensation-related loans that meet the regulations definitions of employee-relocation mortgage and bridge loans to be treated as being
outside the coverage of § 7872. See Temp. Reg. 1.7872-5T(c), 50 Fed. Reg. 33,553, 33,561-62
(1985). In general, however, the Treasury has decreed that § 7872 will have very broad applicability. See generally Prop. Reg. §§ 1.7872-1 & -2(a), 50 Fed. Reg. 33,555, 33,556-57 (1985).
226. See Joirr COMM. ON TAXATON, supra note 2, at 858.
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mandatory contributions made by employers under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) are not includable in the income of
the employees. The manner in which the Social Security tax is set up
requires that employees contribute a certain percentage (5.7% for
1984-1987; 6.06% for 1988 and 1989; 6.2% for 1990 and thereafter)2 2
of their incomes to a fund for old-age and survivors' insurance. An
additional percentage of each employee's wages, equal to that contributed by the employee, is paid by the employer as an excise tax2 8
and is deductible by the employer as a business expense. 22 9 The
amount paid by the employee is deducted from her salary,2 30 but that
amount does not constitute a deductible expense for income tax purposes.23 ' The maximum dollar amount of wages to which the tax applies has risen over the years and the current figure is $39,500.32 The
FICA tax enforces a system of savings for retirement and support for
those already retired by mandating annual contributions to a common national fund.
To the extent that employer contributions go untaxed to the employee when they are made, the employee receives a double benefit.
First, employees are better off than self-employed individuals for
whom the FICA mandate can only be satisfied by their own earnings
without a deduction. 233 Second, and in contrast to private pension
plan contributions by employers which are eventually taxed to the
employee, employer-made FICA contributions are not subject to tax
in many instances because Social Security insurance payments are
not includable in income unless they exceed a certain "base amount,"
defined in section 86(c) of the Code.23 4 While it may well be socially
proper not to tax the insurance benefits of retired individuals, even
to the extent they are attributable to untaxed employer contributions, the unfairness of such a scheme vis-a-vis the self-employed is
readily apparent.
227.

See I.R.C. § 3101(a) (West 1985).

228. See id. § 3111(a).
229. See Rev. Rul. 80-164, 1980-1 C.B. 109 and Rev. Rul. 74-70, 1974-1 C.B. 116 regarding
the timing of the deduction for such items and also for FUTA taxes.
230. See I.R.C. § 3102(a) (West 1985).
231. See Escofil v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. 578 (1971), aff'd per curiam, 464 F.2d 358
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1112 (1972); Summers v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. 58 (1971).
232. See 42 U.S.C. § 430(c) (Supp. 1984).
233. See I.R.C. § 1401 (1954). This tax was added to supplement the FICA tax and extend it to the self-employed. See S. RE:P. No. 1669, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1950), reprintedin
2 C.B. 302, 307-08 (1950). For taxable years beginning in 1989, a deduction for one-half of the
section 1401 taxes will be available. See I.R.C. § 164(f) added by § 124(c)(1) of P.L. 98-21 (Apr.
20, 1983).
234. I.R.C. § 86 was added by the Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 9821, § 121, 97 Stat. 65, 80-84. Prior to 1983 no portion of Social Security benefits was subject to
tax.
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The exclusion for both contributions and insurance benefits has
no statutory authority under either the Internal Revenue statutes or
the Social Security Act.235 In addition, a careful search of the legislative history of the original Social Security provisions 236 indicates no
intent as to exclusion of these items from income taxation under the
then-current Revenue Act of 1936.23' Nevertheless, the Internal Revenue Service determined quite early that these social welfare benefits
should not constitute income.23 s Initially, the intent of the Service
was to treat benefit payments as excludable because they were similar to general welfare benefits paid by federal, state or local governments. 239 This analogy, however, is invalid to the extent that it ig-

nores the compensatory origin of the contributions to which a part of
the insurance benefits must be attributable and on which no tax had
been levied. Nonetheless, the Service has always treated the contribution as excludable from income.
Thus, with respect to Social Security benefits the exclusions provided by administrative ruling amounted to a complete forgiveness of
tax until 1983. In the Social Security Amendments Act of 1983,240
Congress changed the complete forgiveness policy with respect to the
social security benefits received. These are now taxed to the extent
that they exceed certain levels. The inclusion in income is of only
one-half of the benefit to the extent that "modified"'2 41 adjusted gross
income exceeds $32,000 in the case of married individuals filing joint
returns and $25,000 in the case of other individuals. 242 The difference

between social security and privately-funded pensions remains quite
clear. Presumably this difference is justified by the importance of retirement savings and retirement benefits as societal goals to be promoted through a government plan.
235. The legislative history of the Social Security Amendments of 1983 supports the conclusion that no statutory authority exists for the exclusion. See H.R. REP No. 98-125, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 23-24, reprintedin [1983] 11 FED. TAXES (P-H) 1 59,304, 59,304.23.
236. Act of Aug. 14, 1935 (Social Security Act), ch. 531, §§ 801-04, 49 Stat. 620, 636-37.
237. Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, 49 Stat. 1648.
238. See I.T. 3194, 1938-1 C.B. 114; I.T. 3229, 1938-2 C.B. 136; I.T. 3447, 1941-1 C.B. 191.
239. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 78-170, 1978-1 C.B. 24 (state payments to qualified individuals to
reduce cost of winter energy consumption excludable); Rev. Rul. 74-153, 1974-1 C.B. 20 (state
payments to adoptive parents for support and maintenance of adopted children excludable as
general welfare benefits); Rev. Rul. 74-74, 1974-1 C.B. 18 (awards made by New York Crime
Victims Compensation Board excludable); Rev. Rul. 57-102, 1957-1 C.B. 26 (benefits paid to a
blind person under state public assistance law excludable).
240. Pub. L. No. 98-21, § 121, 97 Stat. 65, 80-84.
241. See I.R.C. § 86(b)(2) (West 1985).
242. See id. § 86(c). The includable amount is one-half of the Social Security benefits or
one-half of the amount by which Social Security benefits plus modified adjusted gross income
exceeds the base amount. The effect of this provision may in some circumstances tax the benefits at a rate exceeding 100%. Id. § 86(a)-(b).
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As to unemployment compensation and workers' compensation
there is no specific statutory provision for an exclusion. In addition,
the IRS's acceptance of excluding the plan contributions is generally
unarticulated. It has never been clearly stated that employer contribution to unemployment plans, whether they be private or government-sponsored, are not included in the income of the employees.
Nevertheless, that seems to be the accepted treatment of the contributions despite the fact that the employer is entitled to a deduction
under section 162 for the excise tax paid under section 3301 of the
Code.
As to the benefits themselves, the tax treatment seems to be dependent on the source of the compensation paid. Generally, if the
plan is funded by nongovernmental sources (for example, the employee's union), the benefits are includable to the extent they exceed
the employee's nondeductible contributions to the plan.2 43 If the plan
is government-sponsored, the benefits are generally excludable within
244
certain limitations.
In 1978 Congress enacted the first limitation on the general exclusion of unemployment benefits from income.2 45 Section 85 provides
that if a taxpayer's adjusted gross income, plus unemployment benefits, exceeds a certain base amount, 246 an amount equal to fifty per243.

See I.T. 1293, I-1 C.B. 63 (1922) (superseded in part by Rev. Rul. 71-70, 1971-1 C.B.

27).
244. See generally I.T. 3230, 1938-2 C.B. 136 (superseded by Rev. Rul. 70-280, 1970-1
C.B. 13). See also Rev. Rul. 55-652, 1955-2 C.B. 21 (extending I.T. 3230 to benefits paid pursuant to Title XV of the Social Security Act); Rev. Rul. 73-154, 1973-1 C.B. 40 (excluding payments made under the Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act of 1971); Rev. Rul. 76-63,
1976-1 C.B. 14 (excluding payments made under the Emergency Unemployment Compensation
Act of 1974 and Title II of the Emergency Jobs and Unemployment Assistance Act of 1974);
Rev. Rul. 76-229, 1976-1 C.B. 19 (excluding certain payments made under the Trade Act of
1974).
If, however, the recipient is being paid a fair market wage under the government program,
the benefits will likely be included in income. See Rev. Rul. 63-136, 1963-2 C.B. 19 (on-the-job
training payments made under the Area Redevelopment Act of 1962 or under the Manpower
Development and Training Act of 1962 are excludable since they "are intended to aid the recipients in their efforts to acquire new skills that will enable them to obtain better employment
opportunities"); Rev. Rul. 67-144, 1967-1 C.B. 12 (certain welfare payments intended to compensate for services performed by recipient held includable in gross income otherwise excludable); Rev. Rul. 71-425, 1971-2 C.B. '76 (welfare payments based on personal or familial subsistence requirements not includable in gross income; payments made intended to compensate for
services includable); Rev. Rul. 74-413, 1974-2 C.B. 333 (for payments to be excludable, primary
purpose of the program must be to train the participants, not to compensate them for work
they performed).
245. See Revenue Act of 1978. Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 112, 92 Stat. 2763, 2777.
246. The base amount is defined in I.R.C. § 85(b) (West 1985). It is generally $12,000 or
$18,000 in the case of a joint return. These base amount figures were reduced from $20,000 and
$25,000 by TEFRA. See Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 611, 96 Stat. 243, 706 (1982).
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cent of the excess must be included in gross income.247 This incomeconditioned exclusion is designed to decrease incentives to remain
unemployed and24sthe consequent additional cost of government-sponsored programs.
In the area of workers' compensation, on the other hand, there is
a series of rulings from which it can be inferred that the IRS intends
to exclude from income employer contributions to such plans. 49
These rulings deal with nonoccupational employee disability benefits
and the scope of the exclusion for workers' compensation benefits
under section 104(a)(1). They state that such nonoccupational disability benefits are not in the nature of the benefits intended to be
excluded from income under section 104(a)(10). To the extent that
the employer contributions to the plan were excluded from income,
the benefits themselves are taxable.250
Section 104(a)(1) specifically provides an exclusion for benefits
paid out of the state-maintained workers' compensation funds if the
funds are used to pay for medical care. 251 To the extent a worker who
has a job-related injury collects workers' compensation, the exclusion
of this fringe benefit is a total one. This exclusion is similar to the
one for employer-funded health insurance plans (which workers's
compensation closely resembles) when the plan benefits are expended
for medical care.
2. Miscellaneous
There is one nonstatutory exclusion for a fringe benefit that has
received little attention in rulings, formal announcements of the In247. See I.R.C. § 85(a) (West 1985). This provision was changed from the more complicated original by amendments in 1981 (Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34,
§ 103(c)(1), 95 Stat. 172, 188) and in 1982 (Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982,
Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 611, 96 Stat. 243, 706).
248. See HR. REP. No. 1445, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 48, reprinted in 1978-3 (vol. 1) C.B.
181, 222. The President's tax reform proposal and the Ways and Means Committee options

both would tax all unemployment compensation as income. See

PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL,

supra

note 4, %3.06.
249. See Rev. Rul. 75-449, 1975-2 C.B. 43, amplifying Rev. Rul. 72-191, 1972-1 C.B. 45,
superseding Rev. Rul. 257, 1953-2 C.B. 15, modified by Rev. Rul. 81-192, 1981-2 C.B. 50 (nonoccupational employee disability benefits are includable in gross income to the extent attributable to employer contributions not included in the employee's income).
250. Id. See also Rev. Rul. 79-147, 1979-1 C.B. 80.
251. See I.R.C. § 104(a)(1) (West 1985). For a discussion of § 104(a)(1), see B. BirrKER,
supra note 16, %13.1.2.
Both the President's tax reform proposal and the Ways and Means Committee options
would tax workers' compensation benefits to the extent they are not expended for medical care.
See PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL, supra note 4, 3.06. If these proposals become law, workers' compensation benefits will be treated on a par with health benefits under §§ 104, 105 & 106 as they
are currently in effect (i.e., without a cap or other limitation on excludable benefits).
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ternal Revenue Service, or in congressional deliberations. A valuable
fringe available to many highly compensated employees is expense
accounts and other items of business-related expense reimbursed by
the employer to the employee. The manner in which the Code is currently administered guarantees a rather substantial fringe benefit as
a result of reimbursed employee expenses so long as they are incurred
in the employer's business.
It has long been clear that certain employer-reimbursed items
such as the personal use of cars,2" 2 meals and lodging outside section
119 that are not related to the carrying on of the employer's business, 25 and the use of employer entertainment facilities beyond the
time required for active business discussions,2 54 are taxable as income. But other items such as one's own meal when entertaining a
client, an expensive hotel room, first-class air travel and other wellregarded (by the restaurants, hotels and airlines, 5 5 if no one else)
expense account items seem to be largely accepted as nontaxable
fringe benefits.2 51 To a great extent the reimbursement of travel and
252. See Prop. Reg. § 1.61-2T, 50 Fed. Reg. 7073 (1985), for an explicit statement of the
Treasury position after the 1984 Act. As to pre-1984 case law, see Dole v. Commissioner, 43
T.C. 697, aff'd per curiam, 351 F.2d 308 (1st Cir. 1965); Whipple Chrysler-Plymouth v. Commissioner, 31 T.C.M. 230 (CCH) (1972); Rodgers Dairy v. Commission, 14 T.C. 66 (1950), acq.,
1950-2 C.B. 4. Such items may not, however, be wages subject to withholding. See CCH Ltr.
Rul. Rpt. #223, Ltr. Rul. 8122017 (Feb. 24, 1981). See also JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra
note 2, at 838 n.68, where these cases are cited.
Prior to the 1984 Act, it was unclear whether such items constituted wages or compensation subject to the FICA and FUTA taxes and to income tax withholding. See, e.g., Central Ill.
Pub. Serv. Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 21 (1978) (holding that in order for an employer to be
liable for an employee's taxes on a given item of compensation (reimbursements for certain
lunches), the employer's duty to withhold with respect to that item must be clear and precise);
Ltr. Rul. 8122017 (Feb. 24, 1981) (holding, on authority of Central Illinois, that personal use by
employees of employer vehicles did not constitute wages subject to withholding under §§ 3401
and 3401). As a result, the 1984 Act made numerous amendatory changes to insure that the
treatment of such benefits as income under § 61 would be followed by consistent treatment for
withholding and FICA and FUTA purposes. See I.R.C. §§ 3121(a), 3401(a) & 3501(b) (West
1985), as amended by Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 531(d), 98 Stat. 494, 877.
See also JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 2, at 864-65, explaining these changes.
253. See, e.g., Goldstein v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 164 (1979) (VISTA volunteer); Weinberg v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 771 (1975) (hospital resident).
254. See, e.g., Gottlieb v. United States, 8 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) T 61-5142 (E.D. La. 1961)
(boat); Standard Motors, Inc. v. United States, 8 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) T 61-5141 (E.D. La. 1961)
(boat).
255. The most vocal objections to the Carter Administration proposals to limit the deductibility of "three-martini" lunches came from the restaurant industry, not from the businessmen whose luncheon styles might be changed.
256. See Treas. Reg. § 1.274-5(e)(2) (West 1985). This exclusion of reimbursed expenses
has a long history. See, e.g., T.D. 2079, 16 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 249 (1914) (allowing an exclusion for reimbursements for officers and employees of the United States).
Additionally, employer reimbursements do not constitute wages for purposes of withholding, FICA and FUTA. See Central Ill. Pub. Serv. Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 21 (1978).
It has been estimated that limiting business entertainment deductions to 50% of the
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entertainment expenses is merely a thinly disguised method of paying personal expenses of upper-level employees. Some of the employer payments may be appropriately characterized as "working
condition fringes" under new section 132 where the employer is satisfied as to their propriety, but certain personal items, such as the cost
of one's own meal, should be taxable. Consideration of reform in this
area is of greater importance following the enactment of the section
132 working condition fringe exclusion because of the lack of a nondiscrimination requirement in this context. 5 7 Although it would seem
fairly obvious that there should not be a requirement that all persons
must be treated the same as to the benefits received with respect to
employer paid expenses, some rational limits should be placed on this
fringe benefit. While the trend may be against large expense accounts
for employees, 8s this fringe should not be ignored.
It is interesting to note that the other side of business entertainment - the benefit received by the person being entertained - is
being viewed now by some as a fairly significant fringe benefit. 5 9 The
difficulty of taxing these benefits to the employees (they are, after all,
not furnished by the employer but rather by someone else) has produced suggestions that the deduction for business entertainment be
further limited. 26 0 To sonie extent this notion animates the Treasury
proposals for denying deductions for meals over a certain floor and
for eliminating the deduction for tickets for professional sporting
events, the theater and so on. 26 1 Such an approach may well be the
only way to promote greater fairness with respect to these fringe
benefits.
E.

Summary

The current system of not taxing employee fringe benefits has
proceeded in a piecemeal fashion with little attention to the policy
questions for the various exclusions and with no attempt to justify
each of them in terms of the others. This approach to lawmaking is
amount spent would raise $.5 billion in 1984, $1.1 billion in 1985, and $1.2 billion in 1986. See
Democratic Study Group, Alternative Revenue Options, reprinted in 19 TAX NoTEs (TAx ANALYSTS) 77, 79 (Apr. 4, 1983).
257. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 2, at 855.

258.

See Business Travel: Amenities Curbed, N.Y. Times, June 15, 1983, at D4, col. 1.

The story notes that many executives are now required to fly coach class on business and that
companies are using computers to better track employee tendencies toward lavish expenditures
of corporate funds. See id.
259. See Brannon, The Business EntertainmentDeduction, 29 TAX NoTEs (TAX ANALYSTS)

294 (Oct. 21, 1985).

260.
261.

Id.
See PRESIDENT'S PRoPosAL, supra note 4,
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not particularly sensitive to the needs of a logical tax system that
would take into account many competing economic and social policy
goals in defining the base. Given that conclusion, the most rational
approach to dealing with taxation of fringe benefits would be to start
over again. The Congress should reach conclusions about what benefits should be included in income, when they should be taxed and
what amount should be taxable on a more rational and comparative
basis. That is what the remainder of this article seeks to do.
III.

FRAMEWORK FOR TAXATION OF FRINGE BENEFITS REVENUE CODE SECTION

INTERNAL

83

In determining how a system of taxing fringe benefits would work
as an alternative to the current patchwork of exclusions, two basic
policy choices must be made. One concerns the proper timing of the
inclusion of the fringe benefit in income, and the other concerns the
amount that will be included once the timing problem is settled. One
might suggest, for example, that the proper time to tax employer provided health benefits is when an unrestricted employer contribution
to the health plan is made, rather than taxing them when the benefit
is paid out. Another suggestion might be that the proper amount of
income to the employee as a result of the employer contribution to
the plan should be the fair market value of the contribution to the
plan. Alternatively, the amount taken into income might be determined to be the employer's cost.
The mechanism suggested by this article for the inclusion of
fringe benefits in income - using section 83 as the operative provision - involves clear choices on the questions of timing and amount
of inclusion that are rooted in policy determinations. To the extent
these policy determinations are related to the tax system, and hence
inherently legal, they will be explored in the context of this part and
in Part IV of this article. To the extent that the policy decisions are
essentially social, political, or economic, they will be mentioned but
not explored in depth.
Before going into a policy analysis, this part will analyze the use
of I.R.C. section 83 in providing the mechanism for taxing fringe benefits. As will be seen from the following description, in 1969, Congress
developed a comprehensive scheme for taxing compensatory property
transfers that was specifically concerned with issues about timing and
amount of inclusion, thereby attempting to create some clarity in one
specific and troublesome area. Congress may well respond to the taxation of fringe benefits with a similar piece of legislation. 6 2 But sec262.

It seems from the codification of most existing exclusion practices in 1984 that the
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tion 83 is already available and, as the analysis that follows will point
out, it represents a means 3of taxing fringe benefits without creating a
26
new section of the Code.
Although the history of section 83 reveals that it was intended to
clear up problems in the area of the taxation of stock option and
restricted stock plans,2 6 4 its scope is not limited to these fringe benefits alone. The section is so broadly written that, without straining
the language, it can encompass compensatory items other than the
ones to which it was specifically directed. The courts have already
chosen to apply section 83 to some fringe benefits,2 6 5 and the Treasury recognized its general applicability to fringe benefits in the 1981
proposed regulations.2 66 More recently, Congress mentioned section
Congress is likely to do little to radically reform this area. Nevertheless, both the Treasury's
initial proposal and the Bradley-Gephardt bill were designed to be more restrictive than the
law prior to 1984. See Simon, supra note 4, at 1204-05.
One proposal that should not be forgotten was made to Congress in 1980, before the current vogue of modified flat tax proposals and as a way out of the then-existing moratorium. At
that time the Tax Section of the American Bar Association passed a Legislative Recommendation that would add new § 128 to the Internal Revenue Code to provide for the treatment of
current nonstatutory fringe benefits under a comprehensive scheme. Under that proposal, the
value of "personal service benefits" received by an employee from an employer would not be
included in income if:
1. The benefit was incident to the employer's trade or business, the marginal cost of
providing the benefit was insubstantial, and the class of employees entitled to receive the
benefit was not a discriminatory one;
2. the benefit was provided for the benefit of the employer;
3. the benefit, such as recreation, was one described in I.R.C. § 274(e)(5);
4. the benefit was of nominal value (as there defined).
Apart from these provisions, any benefit that was currently a nontaxable, nonstatutory
fringe benefit would be subject to tax under I.R.C. § 83. See Committee on General Income Tax
Problems, Tax Section Recommendation No. 1980-1, 33 TAx LAW. 993, 1005 (1980). The discussion accompanying the recommendation notes the general agreement of the recommendation with proposals of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) and a
Task Force of the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation. Id. at 1002.
The current position of the American Bar Association regarding fringe benefit taxation is
along the lines of this earlier proposal. See Hearings, supra note 14, at 161 (statement of H.
Bernard Aidinoff, ABA).
The ABA proposal is obviously at odds with the proposal made in this article. Nevertheless, despite disagreement as to the scope of exclusions from taxable treatment, the ABA
proposal does recognize the validity of using current § 83 to tax benefits that do not come
within the exclusionary provisions. This conclusion is in general agreement with the thesis developed more explicitly and in more detail here.
263. Other commentators also view the prospect of new legislation as bleak. Stanley Surrey believes the tax legislative process has "completely disintegrated" and has fallen into "utter
chaos without responsible control residing anywhere." See Surrey, Our Troubled Tax Policy:
False Routes and Proper Paths to Change, 12 TAx NOTES (TAx ANALYSTS) 179, 185 (Feb. 2,
1981).
264. See supra notes 40-66 and accompanying text.
265. See infra notes 283-318 and accompanying text.
266. See Prop. Reg. § 1.61-18; supra note 9.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1984

53

Florida Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 5 [1984], Art. 1
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXVI

83 in legislative history regarding the taxation of fringe benefits
wholly unrelated to restricted stock transfers.2 6 7 If necessary, the current application of section 83 could be expanded at the behest of
Congress to specifically include currently nontaxable fringe benefits
of all types.
It should be noted that the use of section 83 to tax fringe benefits,
as is developed here, may accomplish no more as to the timing of the
inclusion than the application of ordinary cash method accounting
principles, augmented by the economic benefit and constructive receipt doctrines of section 61. Nevertheless, consideration of the use of
section 83 is warranted because such an extension of section 83 would
establish the sorts of restrictions that might be taken into account in
deferring income. In addition, by using section 83 as the operative
provision for inclusion, the fair market value is clearly the proper
amount to be included in income. While this may create problems in
certain instances, which are explored below, the decision to use fair
market value as the measure of the amount of income has the merit
of being the most theoretically defensible position. The issues as to
the manner in which the statute would apply to fringe benefit items
will be explored in this part.
A.

Section 83's Treatment of Compensatory Transfers of
Property

Outright compensatory transfers of property to individuals, which
are not considered to be fringe benefits, have always been considered
taxable. The Treasury's original position on "compensation not paid
in money" was promulgated in 1918. If a "stipulated value of the service in terms of money" existed, the Treasury deemed such value to
be the value of the "thing taken in payment," but if no stipulated
value existed, the amount of compensation income was the "market
or reasonable value of the thing taken in payment.""2 Where the
transferred property was corporate stock, the 1918 regulations provided for a corporate deduction in the amount of the actual value of
the stock, and the recipient had to include the same value as income.2" 9 This general rule has continued, largely unchanged, in the
267. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 2, at 864 (requiring the Treasury to "issue
regulations as soon as practicable and to the extent feasible, setting forth appropriate and helpful rules for the valuation of taxable fringe benefits, and coordinating the applications of sections 61 and 83").
268. Regulations 33 (Revised), art. 4, §§ 21-22, 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 130 (1919) ("Compensation paid an employee of a corporation in its stock is to be treated as if the corporation
sold the stock for its market value and paid the employee in cash.").
269. Id. art. 139, 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 196 (1918).
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regulations since 1918.270 However, due largely to confusion surrounding the taxation of compensatory stock options and transfers of
restricted stock, Congress decided in 1969 to enact a specific statutory rule governing the taxation of property transfers designed as
compensation.2 7 '
1.

General Rule of Section 83

Congress addressed essentially two concerns in section 83: First,
the timing of the amount of income to be included as a result of a
compensatory property transfer and, second, what effect restrictions
imposed on access to the property should have on the timing and/or
the amount to be included. Section 83's complicated language reflects
its convoluted history, but states an essentially simple set of rules.
When property is transferred in connection with the performance of
services, the amount subject to tax is the fair market value of the
property (not taking into account any restriction except one which by
its terms will never lapse) less the amount paid for it (if any). The
taxable event occurs "at the first time" the person having the beneficial interest in the property has full, unrestricted control of the property. This occurs when the property is not "subject to a substantial
2 72
risk of forfeiture" or when the property becomes "transferable.
perThe taxable amount is included in the income of the person who
273
property.
the
receives
who
of
irrespective
services,
forms the
2.

Definition of Terms
a.

Property

Section 83 applies to transfers of all types of property, real or personal. According to the regulations, however, it does not apply to
money or promises to pay that are not funded and secured. 4 The
reasons for the section 83 rule is fairly apparent with respect to
money. If cash is received without restriction, it is includable in income at the proper time under the taxpayer's method of accounting.275 On the other hand, if a taxpayer receives cash with restrictions
270. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d) (West 1985).
271. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
272. I.R.C. § 83(a) (West 1985).
273. For a general discussion of I.R.C. § 83, see Asimow, Section 83: A Tale of FourRestrictions, 15 BEv. HILLS B.J. 543 (1981); Baker, Restricted Property - Sec. 83, TAX MGMT.
(BNA) No. 262 (1972 with Supp.); Johnson, Stock Compensation under Section 83: A Reassessment, 32 U. So. CAL.TAX INST. 8-1 (1980); Metzer, The Receipt of Propertyfor Services, 38
N.Y.U. 38TH INST. ON FED. TAX 24-1 (1980).
274. See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(e) (1978).
275. The taxpayer who receives an item of income under claim of right is generally re-
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on its use, it may not be included in income under certain circumstances, on the theory that the taxpayer is either an agent for another 276 or merely a conduit. 277 Such an item will be includable if the
restrictions lapse and it becomes available for use, or if the taxpayer
appropriates the fund or a portion thereof.7 8
The receipt of an unsecured promise to pay is not subject to section 83 treatment because it is like an unmatured right to receive
income in the future. As such, there will be no taxable event until the
promise is either fulfilled2 79 or is made more secure by written evidence of an obligation convertible to cash or otherwise susceptible of
valuation. This exception to section 83 treatment appears to be applicable even in the case of rather sizable deferred compensation arrangements which exist by virtue of an employer's crediting an account on its books and which are not "qualified" under section 401.210
quired to include it in income at the time of receipt under the doctrine of North Am. Oil
Consol. v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417 (1932). Application of this doctrine in the compensation area
may be found in Healy v. Commissioner, 345 U.S. 278 (1953) and United States v. Lewis, 340
U.S. 590 (1951). A later restoration of item or a portion thereof will result in a deduction for
the taxpayer in the year of repayment or at another appropriate time depending upon the
method of accounting. Under certain circumstances, I.R.C. § 1341 will operate to relieve the
taxpayer of any disadvantage resulting from the operation of the normal process of inclusion
and deduction. See I.R.C. § 1341 (1982) (computation of tax where taxpayer restores substantial amount held under claim of right).
276. Compare Rev. Rul. 68-123, 1968-1 C.B. 35 (member of religious society acting as
agent for her order not required to include in income amounts paid for her services by checks
endorsed by her to the order) with Rev. Rul. 76-323, 1976-2 C.B. 18 (members of religious
orders, not acting as agents for their orders, were taxed on wages even though entire amount
minus living expenses was required to be endorsed to order).
277. See, e.g., Stevens Bros. & Miller-Hutchinson Co. v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 953
(1955) (one-half of profits which were received, but under contract made payable to another,
not taxable to payee); Eagleton v. Commissioner, 35 B.T.A. 551 (1937) (same rule with respect
to attorneys fees payable to another lawyer), aff'd on other grounds, 97 F.2d 62 (8th Cir. 1938).
278. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 71-449, 1971-2 C.B. 77 (contributions totaling $1,000 received by
political candidate for use in campaign; candidate required to include in income $400 of that
amount which was diverted to payment of his mortgage in year in which diversion occurred).
Cf. Rev. Rul. 74-23, 1974-1 C.B. 17 (no diversion of funds for personal use and, therefore, no
inclusion in political candidate's income).
279. See, e.g., Jackson v. Smietanka, 272 So. 2d 970 (7th Cir. 1921) (right to additional
commission did not occur ratably; it was taxable only when paid); Edwards v. Keith, 231 F. 110,
112 (2d Cir. 1916) (renewal commissions for sale of life insurance not taxable until received
because "there is no certainty that the sum conditionally promised for an ensuing year will ever
be paid ..
").
280. See Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174, applying cash accounting principles to prevent
current taxation of amount credited to unfunded deferred compensation plans but indicating
that the doctrine of constructive receipt must be examined in all such cases. A House attempt
to tax payments under such deferred compensation arrangements was rejected by the Senate.
See S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 306-07 (1969), reprintedin 1969-3 C.B. 423, 502. The
IRS attempt to tax certain deferrals which are made at the recipient taxpayer's option in 1975
Discussion Draft, Prop. Reg. § 1.61-61 [1983] II FED. TAxEs (P-H) 1 70,0677, was blocked by the
Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 132, 92 Stat. 2763, 2782-83.
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Compensation by use of an unsecured note or other evidence of employer indebtedness is also included in this exception to section 83
treatment, despite the fact that receipt of a note results in income for
the recipient in the amount of its fair. market value under section
61.281

Examples of the application of the statute to a funded promise to
pay money in the future may be found in cases dealing with educational benefit trusts, a fringe benefit arrangement under which employers contract to pay tuition at various educational institutions for
a taxpayer's dependents. Under such plans, an employee initially receives merely a forfeitable right to a future benefit, which will not
accrue until a child of the taxpayer attends an educational institution
and the trust pays the tuition. Only when the promise to pay in the
future is converted to money-by a tuition payment or reimbursement
does the right to the payment become nonforfeitable under section
83.
Although courts considering the matter have not examined directly the question of whether the receipt of the right itself constitutes a taxable event, they have applied section 83 principles in determining that a tuition payment by the trust is taxable to the
employee.28 2 The same result would presumably have been reached if
the Tax Court, which originated the rule in Armantrout v. Commissioner,28 3 had chosen to apply ordinary cash method accounting principles and the doctrine of constructive receipt, rather than section
281. Cf. Trees. Reg. § 1.61-2(d)(4) (West 1985), which provides that notes or other evidence of indebtedness given in payment for services constitutes income in the amount of fair
market value. The proposed I.R.C. § 83 regulations had specifically provided that notes would
be property for I.R.C. § 83 purposes. See Prop. Reg. § 1.83-3(e), 36 Fed. Reg. 10,789 (1971).
This criticized provision, however, was not included in the final regulations. See COMMITTEE ON
TAXATION, AsS'N OF THE.BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, COMMENTS ON PROPOSED REGULATIONS
UNDER § 83, at 40-41 (1971); NEW YORK STATE BAR Ass'N, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON EMPLOYEE BENEFITS ON PROPOSED

REGULATIONS

DEALING WITH THE TREATMENT OF PROPERTY

4 (1971).
282. See e.g., Grant-Jacoby Inc. v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 700, 710 (1980) (the Tax Court
said that time of payment was the proper time for taxation "since petitioners did not have
vested rights in the contributions made ...
to the trust"); Armantrout v. Commissioner, 67
T.C. 996, 1008 (1977), aff'd per curiam, 570 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1978) (the parties did not base
their arguments on § 83, but the court felt compelled to "point out that [its] decision is supported by the specific language of section 83 ....
"). See also Rev. Rul. 75-448, 1975-2 C.B. 55
(holding the amounts paid taxable and the employer's deduction allowable in the year in which
tuition is paid). But see Greensboro Pathology Ass'n v. United States, 698 F.2d 1196 (Fed. Cir.
1982) (amounts contributed to educational benefit plan of corporation currently deductible by
corporation because plan resembled those described in Treas. Reg. § 1.61-10(a) more than §
404(a) plans; the only question presented concerned § 162 and not employee excludability).
The company that administers the plans involved in Armantrout and Grant-Jacobyhad
sought to enjoin the issuance of the revenue ruling but the suit was held barred by the antiinjunction act. See Educo, Inc. v. Alexander, 557 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1977).
283. 67 T.C. 996 (1977), aff'd per curiam 570 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1978).
TRANSFERRED IN CONNECTION WITH PERFORMANCE OF SERVICES
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83.284 Support for the Tax Court's reliance on section 83 may be
found in section 402(b), which deals with the similar matter of the
taxability of contributions made by employers to nonexempt employees' trusts and which indicates that inclusion is to be determined "in
accordance with" section 83.286 Under the facts of the educational
benefit trust cases, the alternative times for taxing the compensation
to the employee would be either when the right is received or when
the employer makes a contribution to the trust. But, at neither of
these times does the employee have a matured and nonforfeitable
right to a payment on her behalf.28 6 The results in the educational
benefit trust cases can clearly be applied to the taxability of other
fringe benefits that are initially unfunded and unsecured promises to
pay money or to transfer property in the future. Examples of these
are the entitlement to employee discounts on goods and services, the
analysis of which is developed in Part B, Examples 1 and 2.
b.

Transfer

As defined in the regulations, the term transfer refers to the time
at which "a person acquires a beneficial ownership interest" in property.18 7 Presumably, this means less than complete beneficial ownership of property, because it is implicit in section 83 that a transfer of
the property may occur before a taxable event for the recipient occurs. The regulations describe various factors to be considered in determining whether a beneficial ownership interest has been transferred. There must, for example, be a transfer of some risk of loss28 8
in order for a transfer within the meaning of the statute to occur.
Otherwise, the "transfer" is similar to an option to acquire property.2 89 Although the grant of an option to acquire property may itself constitute a taxable event if the option has a readily ascertainable fair market value, a taxable transfer of the underlying property
284. Cf. Rev. Rul. 80-300, 1980-2 C.B. 165, applying constructive receipt principles to an
employer's stock appreciation right (SAR) plan. An employee would not be taxed upon receipt
of the SAR's because they were subject to forfeiture, but she would be taxed upon exercise. Id.
285. See I.R.C. § 402(b) (West 1985). See generally B. BrrrKER, supra note 16, at 60.3
(discussion of I.R.C. § 402(b)).
286. See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(c)(4), ex. (2) (1978). The related question of the timing of
the deduction by the employer is considered in Grant-Jacoby, Inc. v. Commissioner, 73 T.C.
700, 710-16 (1980).
287. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(a)(1) (1978).
288. See Treas Reg. § 1.83-3(a)(6) & (7), ex. (5) (1978) for definition and example.
289. See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(a)(4) (1978). The IRS has indicated it will not issue rulings
on whether a transfer has occurred for § 83 purposes if the amount received for the purported
transfer involves a non-recourse obligation. See Rev. Proc. 81-10, 1981-1 C.B. 647. See also
Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(a)(7), ex. (2) (1978).
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has not occurred.290 If a requirement is imposed that property be returned under certain circumstances and if the consideration to be
paid in such an event is minimal and bears no relationship to the
property's fair market value, Treasury Regulations 1.83-3(a)(3) and
(5) provide that such a requirement will be taken into account in determining whether a transfer of the property has occurred. Whether a
transfer has in fact occurred is important to a recipient who wishes to
elect inclusion under section 83(b) because the election is available
only in the event of a transfer.
For example, an employer gives an employee a car to use for a
year for business-connected travel by the employee and says that after the year the employee may have title to the car. The question is
whether a transfer within the meaning of the statute occurs before
the year lapses. Because no transfer of the beneficial ownership of the
car occurs until the end of the year, the "transfer" of the car for section 83 purposes does not occur until then. The use of the car during
the year solely for business purposes would presumably not constitute a taxable event under a reasonable rule excluding working conditions from income. If, however, the car were used for personal purposes, the value of such use during the year would be "transferred"
and would be taxable under section 83(a). 91
c.

In Connection with the Performance of Services

By its terms section 83 applies only to service-connected transfers
of property and has no application to gifts. It applies to all compensatory transfers whether for present, past or future services, 292 and it
applies to transfers of property to independent contractors as well as
to transfers to employees.293 Using section 83 in the employee death
benefit area should clarify any remaining issues with respect to such
transfers, as they are clearly compensation for past services.
d. Transferable or Subject to a Substantial Risk of Forfeiture
Property transferred in connection with the performance of services may be subject to a variety of restrictions on its use or aliena290.

See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(a)(2) (1978).

291. The current regulations define "property" for § 83 purposes in such fashion as to
exclude use from the definiton. See Prop. Regs. § 1.61.2T(a), 50 Fed. Reg. 7073 (1985), for
examples of the treatment of use. There is no logical reason why the right to use property
cannot be treated as a property right in and of itself and thus subject to the rules of § 83. There
would be no difference in treatment whichever section is the taxing provision.
292. See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(f) (1978).
293. See Cohn v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 443 (1979); Cassetta v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M.
188 (1979).
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bility.2 94 These restrictions may affect either the value of the property or the time when the transferee's rights in the property vest or
both. The statute sets up two distinct classes of restrictions on property. These are "lapse" restrictions and "nonlapse" restrictions, the
former important principally for timing the taxable event and the
latter principally for determining the amount to be included in
income.
Two types of restrictions fall within the definition of "lapse" restrictions, those which a:re substantial enough to defer taxation and
those which are not. Only those lapse restrictions affecting "transferability" of the property or making it "subject to a substantial risk of
forfeiture" are of the type which, if in existence at the time a transfer
by the employer occurs, will result in postponement of the taxable
event for the service performer. Any other "lapse" restrictions will
not defer taxation nor will they be taken into account for valuation.
If property is not subject to transferability restrictions and no conditions under which it might be forfeited exist, the taxable event will
occur when the compensatory transfer occurs.2 95
A somewhat different situation arises when the property is subject
to restrictions. For example, the employer gives the employee, as
compensation, a car to use for three years and says that the employee
may keep it until then and must use it for two years. The employer
will transfer title to the employee at the end of the three-year period
if she is still employed; otherwise, the car must be returned to the
employer. Nevertheless, the employee is entitled, under the terms of
the agreement with the employer, to give the car to her son after two
years.
The regulations under section 83 lump the two significant lapse
restrictions together by describing property subject either to transfer
restrictions or to substantial risk of forfeiture as "substantially
nonvested" property. 296 Practically, this use of one term to describe
both kinds of restrictions is warranted. Property will be taxable to
the person who performs services at the time when it is subject to no
substantial risk of forfeiture, regardless of whether it continues to be
subject to restrictions on transferability.2"97 Property cannot be
"transferable" within the meaning of section 83(c)(2) unless it is not
subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture in the hands of the trans294. I.R.C. § 83(a) (West 1935).
295. Id. § 83(d).
296. See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(b) (1978).
297. See, e.g., Sakol v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 986 (1977) (stock still subject to transfer
restrictions after lapse of a substantial risk of forfeiture; I.R.C. § 83 held constitutional), afJ'd

574 F.2d 694 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 859 (1978).
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feree.2 98 Thus, the recipient of the property (whether the person who
performs the services or some other individual) may well be able to
assign, pledge, or give the property away.2 99 The existence of a condition which constitutes a substantial risk of forfeiture to the transferee, however, will preclude the occurrence of a taxable event until
the condition lapses.
Under the facts of the hypothetical situation, the employee will
clearly have income at the time both restrictions lapse, that is, when
title to the car is transferred. The question is whether the expiration
of the restriction on transferability should render the car "substantially vested" and thereby trigger the taxable event at an earlier time.
The answer depends on whether the car would have to be returned to
the employer by the son if the employee leaves the job before receiving title to the car. If the son would be required to forfeit the car,
then the taxable event is deferred. If the son would not be required
to forfeit the car, the taxable event occurs when the employee gives
the son the car, because the gift to the son eliminates the substantial
risk of forfeiture. The meaning of "substantial risk of forfeiture" is
thus central to the application of section 83 to any situation.
Section 83(c)(1) provides that requiring an employee to continue
to render substantial future services to an employer prior to the vesting of property comes within the meaning of "substantial risk of forfeiture. 30 0 Whether the services required are "substantial" will depend on the facts of a given situation.3 0 ' Richardson v.
Commissioner3 0 2 dealt with a forfeiture provision in an agreement deferring payment of compensation by contributions to a nonexempt
employees' trust, made subject to the rules of section 83 by an
amendment to section 402(b) in 1969.103 The Tax Court held the provision did not constitute a "substantial risk of forfeiture" for section
298. See I.R.C. § 83(c)(2) (West 1985).
299. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(d) (1978), which defines transferability by stating.
[P]roperty is transferable if the person performing the services or receiving the property
can sell, assign or pledge. . . his interest in the property to any person other than the
transferor of the property and if the transferee is not required to give up the property or
its value in the event the substantial risk of forfeiture materializes.
300.
301.

See I.R.C. § 83(c)(1) (West 1985).
See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(c)(2) (1978):

[R]ights in property transferred to a retiring employee subject to the sole requirement
that it be returned unless he renders consulting services upon the request of his former
employer will not be considered subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture unless he is in
fact expected to perform substantial services.
302.
303.

64 T.C. 621 (1975).
Id.
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83 purposes. 30 4 The provision in Richardson required the taxpayer
doctor to render "advice and counsel" to the payor hospital after termination of his services so long as his health permitted. 0 5 It further
provided that if he should "fail and refuse to render such advice and
counsel, he shall, after -the notice of said breach, forfeit all rights
under this Agreement." 30 6 The Tax Court concluded there was no indication that the hospital would actually call on the doctor for "advice and counsel" in the future and that absent such an indication
that the future services would be required, the statutory standard for
deferring taxation was not met.3 0 The court pointed out that "a
practical rather than a formalistic test was intended."3 0 8
Another case, Burnetta v. Commissioner,30 9 demonstrates the
same general attitude toward insubstantial conditions.3 10 The issue in
Burnetta was the deductibility of employer contributions to a nonqualified pension plan.3 11 The deduction was conditioned on the inclusion of the amounts in the gross income of the employees under
section 83(a).3 21 Although the amounts contributed were subject to
forfeiture if an employee was dismissed for theft of company property or embezzlement, the Tax Court held the possibility of such an
event too remote for the risk of forfeiture to be substantial. 31 Therefore, the employer was entitled to the deduction.
In effect, these cases ignore conditions that impose no real burden
on a taxpayer's access to property. In so doing, they comport with
congressional intent not to allow tax deferral on the basis of nominal
restrictions that exist only for tax avoidance purposes.314 Thus, in the
case of fringe benefits, requiring restrictions be substantial and not
remote in order for vesting to be deferred would generally result in
current taxability of many items. For example, transfer restrictions
attached to a parking permit given by the employer to the employee,
or a permanent resale restriction on property purchased with an employee discount, would not determine the timing of the taxable event.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id. at
trust, consisting
307. Id. at
308. Id. at

C.B. 423,
309.
310.
311.

629. The agreement did not state what was to happen to the corpus of the
of all the previously contributed amounts. Id.
630-31.
630, citing S. REM. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 122-23, reprinted in 1969-3

501-502.
68 T.C. 387 (1977).
Id.
Id.

312. Id. at 403-05.
313. Id. at 4-5. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(c)(2) (1978).
314. The IRS has announced it will not issue rulings as to whether a restriction constitutes a substantial risk of forfeiture if the employee is a controlling shareholder of the corporation. See Rev. Proc. 81,010, 1981-1 C.B. 647.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol36/iss5/1

62

Simon: Fringe Benefits and Tax Reform Historical Blunders and a Proposal
FRINGE BENEFITS: TAX REFORM

1984]

The statute did not intend taking into account these types of transferability restrictions in deferring vesting and tax liability. They may
be taken into account in valuation, however, if they constitute
"nonlapse restrictions."
e.

Restriction Which by Its Terms Will Never Lapse

"Nonlapse" restrictions imposed on property do not affect the
timing of the taxable event, but may be taken into account in valuing
the property to determine the amount includable in gross income. A
restriction which by its terms will never lapse (otherwise referred to
in the regulations as a nonlapse restriction) is by definition not intended to constitute a substantial risk of forfeiture.3 15 The example
found in the statute and regulations is a permanent requirement that
stock transferred to an employee be sold or be offered for sale at a
formula price, including a permanent right of first refusal at a
formula price.3 16 Such a restriction on a fringe benefit might arise if
there is a permanent resale restriction on property purchased by an
employee at a discount. Although such a restriction should not defer
the taxable event, because it will never lapse, a reduction in value of
the item purchased and, correspondingly, of the amount includable in
income, could occur as a result of the restriction. Nonlapse restrictions are permanent restrictions on the use or transferability of the
property, and are enforceable not only against the initial recipient of
the property but also against transferees of the recipient of the
property.
Nonlapse restrictions must be taken into account in valuing property. For example, the statute specifically provides a rebuttable presumption that, where a restriction sets up a formula resale price, that
price is the fair market value of the property.3 17 This rule seems fair
and appropriate, because the reasons for the existence of nonlapse
restrictions are by and large unrelated to tax considerations. 8
3.
a.

Amount Includable in Income

If the Time for Inclusion Is When the Property Vests

In general, section 83(a) requires at the time of vesting the inclu315. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.83-3(c)(1), (h) & -5 (1978).
316. See also Ltr. Rul. 7943070 (July 26, 1979) (restrictive covenants held to constitute
nonlapse restrictions).
317. See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-5(a) (1978) (formula price may at times not be determinative
of value but will be a substantial factor). See also S. RaP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 88,
1969-3 C.B. 200, 255.
318. See H.R. REP. No 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 88, 1969-3 C.B. 200, 255.
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sion in income of the fair market value of the property transferred
less any amount paid for it.3 19 Determining fair market value is basically a factual matter. This may be difficult where the property is
subject to restrictions, because many restrictions will reduce the
property's value. For section 83 purposes, however, only a restriction
which by its terms will never lapse is permitted to be taken into account in valuation. If the nonlapse restriction is a requirement of resale at a specified formula price, the statute provides in subsection
(d)(1) that the price determined under the formula is deemed to be
the fair market value of the property.32 ° This is so unless the Secretary, who bears the burden of proof in this regard, proves to the contrary. 2 ' This statutory presumption gives little guidance, however, as
to how other types of nonlapse restrictions should be weighted.
Recall the hypothetical of the employer giving the employee a car.
If the employer imposed no restrictions on the employee's use of the
car, the amount includable in income would be the fair market value
of the car, say $5,000, at the time the car vests in the employee. If,
however, the employer retains the right to purchase the car for $4,500
if the employee no longer desires to use it, then $4,500 would be the
amount of includable income to the employee. This is so unless the
Commissioner proves that such a restriction is ludicrous or that the
value is actually $5,000 despite the employer's right of first refusal. If
the employer restricted the employee's use of the car, for example, by
not permitting out-of-state travel, that presumably would be insufficient to defer vesting. However, the restriction could affect the
amount includable in income if it were a nonlapse restriction.
The major justification for the general rule of valuation in section
83 is that any alternative would permit a conversion of compensation
income into capital gain. This would occur whenever the property's
value did not decrease, and when largely unimportant restrictions
were imposed in an attempt to reduce value and achieve this result.
This justification is important with respect to fringe benefits such as
restricted stock that have great value and are also subject to market
fluctuations. It has limited importance, however, with respect to
other fringe benefits.
Valuing property by the standard fair market value rule may be
problematic. An adjustment will be required whenever property is
sold at the discounted value or becomes less valuable prior to the
lapse of the restrictions and is sold after they lapse. Whether the adjustment would be in the form of a capital loss or an ordinary loss
319.
320.
321.

See I.R.C. § 83(a) (West 1985).
See id. § 83(d)(1).
See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-5(a) (1978) (valuation procedure).
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has not yet been determined. By analogy to the current inclusion/
subsequent deduction rule in the cash compensation area, the subsequent deduction should be for an ordinary loss even though it results
from a disposition of property.3 22 With regard to a subsequent forfeiture of property included in income when it becomes substantially
vested, the Treasury has provided that a loss resulting therefrom is
ordinary to the extent the basis of the property was increased as a
32 3
result of a recognition of income.
The statutory mandate to ignore lapse restrictions ought to reduce the number of cases alleging that the property transferred in
connection with the performance of services has no ascertainable fair
market value. Nevertheless, the statute and regulations admit to this
possibility in determining the tax consequences of a receipt of an option, and state that the general rule of section 83(a) will not apply to
an option without a readily ascertainable market value.3 24 Whether
such a rule will be developed with respect to the receipt of other
kinds of property remains to be seen. An argument might be made
that certain fringe benefits lack ascertainable value, but a de minimis
rule should alleviate such problems if section 83 principles are
applied.
b.

If the Time for Inclusion Is When the Property Vests and an
Amount Is Paid to Acquire the Property

Any amount paid to acquire the property subject to section 83
inclusion is subtracted from the amount includable in income. Such a
situation might arise when an employee is entitled to purchase employer-manufactured items at a company store for a nominal amount.
In such a case, the amount of income is the value of the discount.
If the amount paid for the discounted property is not paid in
cash, but rather by evidence of indebtedness, the failure to pay cash
may in some cases result in postponing the taxable event for section
83 purposes until the obligation is paid. 5 If notes are included in the
322. The Second Circuit has suggested tht the taxpayer in such an instance would at least
be entitled to a capital loss. Sakol v. Commissioner, 574 F.2d 694, 700 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 859 (1978). The capital loss theory is supported by Treas. Reg. § 1.83-2(a) (1978),

which provides that a loss due to forfeiture of property, the fair market value of which was
included in income pursuant to a § 83(b) election, is treated as capital if the asset is a capital

asset. The loss would in any event be limited to the excess of the amount paid for the property
over the amount received upon forfeiture. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-2(a) (1978).
323. See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-1(e) (1978).

324. I.R.C. § 83(e)(3) (West 1985). See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-7 (1978). This regulation applies
to all options, not just employee stock options. It was issued in 1978 shortly after LR.C. § 421
was repealed prospectively.
325. See Rev. Proc. 81-10, 1981-1 C.B. 647 (the IRS will not rule on whether a transfer

has occurred for I.R.C. § 83 purposes if the amount paid for the purported transfer involves a
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amount paid, the value of unstated interest is subtracted from the
amount actually paid to acquire the property as are amounts paid for
the use of the property or for other purposes.3 26 A subsequent forgiveness or partial forgiveness of debt included in the amount paid
for the property will result in an income inclusion for the year in
which the cancellation occurs. Whether the item of income is classified as a cancellation of indebtedness amount or an amount of compensation has not been settled.3 2 7 If the item is characterized as compensation, as it presumably should be, then the taxpayer will not
have available the exclusion of cancellation of indebtedness income
under section 108.328 Furthermore, the basis of the property will not
be adjusted under sections 108 and 1017 as it would be in connection
2
with such an exclusion. 2
4.

Other Rules

In addition to setting out rules regarding timing and amount of
inclusion in income, section 83 and the regulations thereunder attempt to provide a complete system with respect to compensatory
property transfers. 330 Thus, an election can be made to include an
item in income in the year of transfer even though it is not yet
vested. This election has only limited applicability in the fringe benefit area.33 1 Rules also exist regarding the effect of the transfer on the
transferor of the property, the basis, and holding period of the property. The deduction rule is clearly important for fringe benefit compensation. The other rules discussed here are less crucial, but can
become important if the fringe benefit is an item of tangible property
and has significant value.
a.

Effect on Employer

The availability of a deduction for a payor of compensation in the
non-recourse obligation). Cf. Lo Bue v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 1317 (1957) (on remand, the
court held the taxpayer realized income upon giving notes for the purchase of stock rather than
upon payment).
326. See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(g) (1978) (defining amount paid).
327. Id. § 1.83-4(c) states only that the amount is includable.
328. See I.R.C. § 108 (West 1985) (dealing with income from discharge of indebtedness).
329. Id. § 1017(a) (1982).
330. There are provisions regarding income from nonvested property (Treas. Reg. §§ 1.831(a)(1), -1(f), Ex. (1) (1978) and cancellation of nonlapse restrictions (Treas. Reg. § 1.83-5(b)(1)
(1978)) that have only limited applicability to fringe benefits. There are also rules regarding the
effect of arm's length (Treas. Reg. § 1.83-1(b) and (f) (1978) and gratuitous transfers (Treas.
Reg. § 1.82-1(c) (1978)) that, again, having little, if anything, to do with taxing fringe benefits
and are thus not described here.
331. See I.R.C. § 83(b) (West 1985). The manner of making the election is described in
Treas. Reg. § 1.83-2(c)-(e) (1978).
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form of transferred property under section 83(h) is predicated upon
inclusion of the same amount as compensation income by the person
who performed the services.33 2 The deduction is, however, available
only if the transferor of the property is the person who received the
services and if the deduction is otherwise available under section 162
or section 212. Section 83(h) thus creates a healthy tension between employer and employee in which competing tax considerations
may have a beneficial effect. Because little difference exists between
the top rate applicable to corporations (46%) and that applicable to
individuals (50%), the discount to be applied to both is theoretically
almost the same. As a practical matter the corporation may be paying
tax at a much lower rate and the employee's deferral may be more
valuable than an immediate deduction.
b.

Basis of Property Transferred in Connection with the
Performance of Services

Section 83 does not mention the basis of property to which it applies. Under section 1012 the basis is the cost in an arm's length
transaction.3 3 4 The regulations provide that the basis of substantially
nonvested property in the hands of any person other than a person
who has acquired it in an arm's length transfer must reflect the
amount paid for the property as well as any amounts included in income. 331 Once property becomes substantially vested, the basis is increased to reflect any additional income inclusion. If the property is
received by gift, any adjustments required under section 1015 will be
reflected in the basis as will any section 1016 adjustments. 3 6
332. See I.R.C. § 83(h) (West 1985). This same rule exists with respect to stock options
under Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(f) (West 1985).
333. See I.R.C. §§ 162 (trade or business expenses), 212 (expenses for production of income) (West 1985). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.83-6(d)(1) (1978), which treats a transfer of stock
by a shareholder to an employee as a contribution to the capital of the corporation by the
stockholder allowing a deductible expense to the corporation at the proper time under § 83.
Presumably this regulation was intended to reflect the holding in Deputy v. DuPont, 308 U.S.
488 (1940), and is supported by the section's legislative history. See S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. 123, 1969-3 C.B. 423, 502. Nevertheless, the provision was struck down as "clearly
outside the scope of the statutory provisions of section 83" in Tilford v. Commissioner, 75 T.C.
134, 145 (1980). This holding was later reversed by the Sixth Circuit in Commissiner v. Tilford,
705 F.2d 828 (6th Cir. 1983). See also Webb v. United States, 560 F. Supp. 150 (S.D. Miss.
1983) (holding that there was a contribution to capital); Smith v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 622
(1976), rev'd sub nom. Schleppy v. Commissioner, 601 F.2d 196 (5th Cir. 1979). Cf. Downer v.
Commissioner, 48 T.C. 86 (1967) (shareholder received a capital loss when depreciated stock
was transferred to an employee).
334. I.R.C. § 1012 (1982).
335. See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-4(b) (1978).
336. See I.R.C. §§ 1015 (basis of property acquired by gift and transfers in trust), 1016
(adjustments of basis).
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Holding Period

The beginning of the holding period of section 83 property is
geared, not surprisingly, to income inclusion under the statute. Under
section 83(f), the holding period for substantially nonvested property
begins immediately after the restrictions lapse and an amount is included in income under section 83(a).3 3 7 When an election under section 83(b) is made, the regulations provide for a holding period beginning just after the date when the property is transferred.3 3 8 As to
purchasers in an arm's length transaction, the holding period is determined under rules provided in section 1223. 311
B.

Application of Section 83 to Specific Types of Fringe Benefits

The proposal to use section 83 as the mechanism for a more comprehensive scheme for the taxation of fringe benefits raises a few significant problems. Apart from the difficulty created by the regulation's definition of "property," the primary problems are those of
timing and amount of inclusion. Essentially the same problems were
present in other property transfers prior to the enactment of section
83. Assuming that the use of section 83 for fringe benefit taxation
represents a sensible policy decision, of its application, three examples should be examined. The first is relatively straightforward in
that it involves a transfer of tangible property, whereas the second
two are less so in that they may involve no outright transfer of property in the narrow sense.
1. Example 1 -

Employee Bargain Purchase of Refrigerator

In January, 1983, Elmer begins working for Icy Refrigeration,
which manufactures refrigerators in Smalltown. Icy allows all employees to purchase refrigerators at cost plus ten percent for the less
expensive models and at cost plus twenty-five percent for the more
expensive models. The policy is restricted to current employees, each
of whom may not purchase more than two refrigerators a year. In
January, 1984, Elmer, who is married, purchases for his new home
one of the "more expensive models" for $400. Such refrigerators ordinarily sell in the furniture store in his town for $700 and in discount
stores in Big City, 200 miles away, for $600.
Applying section 83 to these facts reveals that the proper timing
of the taxable event is not when the unfunded and unsecured promise to pay in the future is made (i.e., when the employment relation337. See I.R.C. § 83(f) (West 1985).
338. See Treas. Reg. § 1.82-3(a) (1978).
339. See I.R.C. § 1223 (West 1985) (holding period of property).
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ship between Elmer and the employer begins). Rather the taxable
event occurs when Elmer exercises his rights under the promise and
purchases the refrigerator in 1984. Although some clear benefit inures
to Elmer from the mere promise that he may purchase the item, no
basis for measuring the benefit exists until he actually makes the
purchase.
The statute accomplishes this result by deferral of the taxable
event until a substantial risk of forfeiture no longer exists. Such a
risk exists in this instance because the opportunity to purchase at a
discount is available only to current employees, and termination of
Elmer's employment will terminate his right to make the purchase.
Thus, the right to make the purchase does not vest until the
purchase is made.
Deferral is appropriate for reasons of sound tax policy. Not only
does deferral eliminate the extraordinary difficulty of determining
the fair market value of the promise, but it also avoids the normal
administrative difficulties arising when items are taxed before employees actually receive a benefit from them. Deferral is also in accord with the judicially developed claim of right doctrine that requires taxpayers to include income items only when they have clear
title.3 4 0 Requiring the income to be reported earlier would result in
confusion as to timing of income in cases where the right is not firmly
established and would not comport well with the system of annual
accounting and the cash method.
Nevertheless, deferral does not overcome all of the valuation hurdles. Whenever products are sold in different markets, as in this example, considerable difficulty arises in selecting the market for determining fair market value. Because the lowest convenient retail
market would be the one selected by most taxpayers, it seems the
fairest one to use. Administrative difficulties could be dealt with by
promulgating regulations stating that the amount includable under
such circumstances would be the difference between the amount paid
and the average lowest retail price at which the item is sold. While
such a rule seems administratively manageable, it raises some obvious inequities due to its arbritrariness.
Although this example deals with a manufacturer, the rule would
be the same if the employer were a retailer. Thus, in neither of those
circumstances, with respect to tangible items, does the employer's
cost determine the includable amount. The general market, not the
market in which the taxpayer buys, determines the amount.
Under section 83, if Elmer had his employer transfer a refrigera340.

North Am. Oil Consol. v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417 (1932).
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tor to a friend or family member, he would be taxed on the spread
between amount paid and the fair market value of the refrigerator at
the time that person bought the refrigerator at discount. The fact
that Elmer disposes of the right to exercise his employee discount to
someone else for cash does not alter the analysis. In such a case, he
has simply managed to realize what would otherwise have been inkind compensation in cash which should be taxed when received.
2.

Example 2 -

Airline Employee Discounts

Sammy Steward is an employee of Inter-American Airways. He
lives in Los Angeles, but the flights he works are based in San Francisco. When space allows, Inter-American makes available to him the
opportunity to fly free on any of its flights in the continental United
States. The flights are available to Sammy by reservation if he pays
half-fare. His spouse and any dependents also are able to fly on any
of these flights for half-fare. In addition to these fringe benefits, Inter-American pays for Sammy's flights to and from Los Angeles so
that he will be in San Francisco at the appropriate time for his
scheduled working flights.
Accepting that the exercise of a right to use the employer's services below cost constitutes an item of property, the application of
section 83 to these facts is relatively easy. As in Example 1, the
proper time for the taxable event for Sammy is not when he is promised free travel to New York, but rather when he makes the trip. The
same is obviously true of half-fare flights for his family. Thus, the
results are the same under section 83 whether the fringe benefit is a
tangible item manufactured or sold by the employer or a service furnished by the employer. If these items are made available to the employee below market price, the amount included in the income of the
employee is the difference between the amount paid and the fair
market value.
Although some difference exists between these obviously personal
flights and Sammy's transportation between Los Angeles and San
Francisco, the result is the same. The travel in question is essentially
commuting, a personal and nondeductible expense for all employees,
no matter how long the commute may be. Employer payment for this
expense should result in income to the employee with no corresponding deduction for the employee. To hold otherwise would conflict
with Commissioner v. Flowers.341
341. 326 U.S. 465 (1946). Mr. Flowers was a lawyer employed by the Gulf, Mobile & Ohio
Railroad at its main office in Mobile, Alabama. Like our hypothetical Sammy, Flowers chose to
live a substantial distance from the office for personal reasons. He sought to deduct the commuting expenses between the town in which he resided and Mobile under I.R.C. § 162, but the
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The amount includable under section 83 is the fair market value
of the airfare. With respect to the space-available trips, the amount
would be figured on the standby fare. For the half-price and commuting trips, the amount includable should be the difference between
what is actually paid and the lowest available coach fare. 42 Some obvious difficulties in valuation arise here, as in Example 1, where the
items received are discounted in some markets and not in others. The
rule of valuation suggested may appear inequitable in certain individual cases, but those should not prevent adoption of a relatively simple administrative rule.
3. Example 3 -

Payment of Insurance Premiums by Employer

Edna Explorer is employed by Lost Ark Expeditions. Her job entails many hazardous trips to exotic lands. To provide for her safety
and comfort in carrying out her duties, Lost Ark pays premiums on
accident and health insurance for Edna. The only carrier that will
write such insurance is Lloyd's of London, and the premiums are
$3,000 annually, payable January 1 of each year. Although the policy
covers Edna while she is employed by Lost Ark, should she leave
Lost Ark's employ, Lloyd's will pay a refund to the company.
Applying section 83 to these facts, the first issue confronted is
whether a "transfer" of "property" occurs upon payment of the premium. This is more than a simple transfer of money. A contract right
is created in Edna and, when Lost Ark purchases an insurance policy
in her name, a property right is transferred to her. The result might
be more apparent if there were an actual physical transfer of the policy to Edna, but section 83 should not be interpreted in such a narrow, formalistic way when the policy is clearly safe from Lost Ark's
creditors. Applying section 83 to these facts creates the same result
as applying constructive receipt principles,343 so this is clearly not a
radical result.
The second question is whether a substantial risk of forfeiture exists in the terms of the insurance contract so as to defer vesting. The
refund clause does not constitute such a risk. Her coverage is conditional on her employment, requiring a rendering of substantial future
Supreme Court denied the deduction on the ground that the expense in order to be deductible
must be incurred in the pursuit of business. Id. at 472. To give Sammy nontaxable income in
the form of a free flight would amount to the same thing as giving Flowers the deduction he
was denied. See also Hantzis v. Commissioner, 638 F.2d 248 (1st Cir. 1981).
342. See Prop. Reg. § 1.61-20(c), Ex. (4), [1983] II FED. TAXEs (P-H) 70,181, at 70,182.5.
343. For a general discussion of this concept, see Metzer, ConstructiveReceipt, Economic
Benefit and Assignment of Income: A Case Study in Deferred Compensation, 29 TAX L. REv.
525 (1974).
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services within the meaning of section 83(c)(1)."' For the period of
her employment, however, she is fully covered, and the annual cost of
that coverage is $3,000. If she quits and an amount were refunded to
Lost Ark, she would have a lesser amount included. If the events
were to span more than one taxable year, she might have a claim for
refund or a deduction. Claim of right principles suggest these
results.3 4 5
Again, the real problem is the fair market value of the contract
right. The difficulties present in this example are inherent in all situations in which an intangible fringe benefit is purchased by the employer and then made available to the employee. In many cases the
employer will be able to take advantage of certain economies of scale
when purchasing the items in question. This is ordinarily true with
group insurance plans when the employer pays the premiums. The
existence of economies or, conversely, special circumstances increasing the cost to the employer, as suggested by the case of Edna and
Lost Ark, must have some bearing on the amount included in the
employee's income under section 83. But, a purchase by the employer
should not always mandate using the employer's cost to determine
the includable amount.
In the first example, which dealt with a manufactured, tangible
item, equity seemed to demand that the includable amount be measured by the general market price of the item. The same might be
said for large group insurance plans where the cost of the plan can
reasonably be said to represent a general market price. In other
words, the standard should be that employer's cost will be used as a
rule of convenience for purchased intangible items where the number
or amount of items purchased adequately establishes a market.
In circumstances where the number of items purchased is insufficient to establish a separate market, the rule of convenience would
not apply and the general rule of fair market valuation would be
used. How does that effect Edna? Presumably, under the test just
stated, her includable income from the purchase of the insurance
should be $3,000, if that is the amount that anyone would have to
pay for this insurance. If the amount paid by Lost Ark is greater
than the amount paid by others simply because of the insurer's experience with that company, Edna should include the lesser amount
(fair market value) under section 83.346 Such a rule would reflect the
344. See I.R.C. § 83(c)(1) (West 1985) (substantial risk of forfeiture).
345. For a discussion of the "claim of right" doctrine see supra note 275.
346. A case that stands for the proposition that the amount includable may be reduced if
the employee values the item less than does the market is Turner v. Commissioner, 23 T.C.M.
952 (1964). Turner also suggests that another rule is more appropriate. Turner is, however, the
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greater cost to the employer occurred because of its needs, rather
than hers. If the rule were otherwise, i.e., if $3,000 were includable,
both parties would be economically better off if Lost Ark were to pay
her the cash and have her purchase the insurance herself, a suggestion they might or might not be willing to follow.
Issues of valuation also arise due to Edna's lack of choice in the
matter. Despite some judicial expressions of concern,347 the proper
amount to be included in income should not be affected by what the
employee is compelled to purchase with her compensation. After all,
this was presumably part of the job description, and if Edna wanted
the job but did not want to bear the cost of the tax on the insurance
herself, she presumably could have bargained for more salary to ease
the pain.
In addition to ignoring compulsion as a factor in valuing fringe
benefits for purposes of their inclusion in the tax base, the fact that
payment in-kind does not give the taxpayer cash with which to pay
the tax liability should also be ignored. This article considers fringe
benefits, and the taxpayer can ordinarily expect to have a certain
amount of cash income from which the tax can be paid. This is essentially a matter that should be left to the bargaining table. Extreme
circumstances may arise, as in the case of company towns,348 where
the value of the fringes is so great that the includable amount will
exceed normal cash wages. These cases are, however, so rare as not to
detract from the propriety of the general rule.3 49 In addition, an arguonly case which so holds. Although other instances may exist in which such a rule should apply,
such as for prizes, the employment relationship clearly should not be one of them. Some would
accept the application of Turner in the compensation area. See New York State Bar Ass'n Tax
Section, Committee on Employee Benefits, Report and Recommendations on the Tax Treatment of Fringe Benefits, 18 TAX NoTEs (TAX ANALYSTS) 3, 9-10 (Jan. 3, 1983). The application

of Turner outside the scope of the limited facts involved in the case might be unwise. Unlike
compensation prizes are clearly not bargained for. The market could be established by looking
at comparative purchases, but in some instances a market of one might exist. This would essentially be a matter of proof.
347. See Rudolph v. United States, 370 U.S. 269, 278 (1962) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(concern that payment of expenses while attending convention should not constitute income).
348. See, e.g., Adolph Coors Co. v. Commissioner, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 256 (1968).
349. If employees could not pay their taxes because so much of their compensation was
furnished in-kind, employers would be forced to pay additional compensation in cash to enable
the employees to meet their tax obligations. Employers would be pressured either through employee bargaining or through market forces into making such cash payments.
The Treasury has at times found the "perceived hardship" for employees receiving in-kind
compensation too great to require the eitployee to pay the tax on the fair market value of inkind compensation. Instead, the Treasury proposed an excise tax levied on employers (or, as an
alternative, a disallowance of the business expense deduction for in-kind payments) on the
value (allocated cost plus a fair return on that cost) of the fringe benefits provided in-kind. See
Hearings, supra note 14, at 30-31 (testimony of John Chapoton), reprinted in 19 TAX NoTEs
(TAx ANALYSTS) 1193 (June 27, 1983).
The alternative suggested here would tend to cause the employer to bear more of the bur-
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ment based on this type of consideration need only be carried to its
logical conclusion to demonstrate its fallacy: persons successful in negotiating a compensation package including only "nontaxable" fringe
benefits present the best argument in favor of a rule which would tax
them.
A general rule, applicable to all funded promises to pay in the
future, can be extrapolated from the example. The taxable event is
the funding of the promise, either by paying for an item such as an
insurance policy, an annuity, or a parking permit, or by self-funding
the promise by contributing on an employee's behalf to a fund which
will pay benefits in the future. Thus, a person will pay tax on the
benefits received from having the fund made available even though
the individual never makes use of it, i.e., is never sick. The foregoing
logic would suggest the same result when the funded promise to pay
in the future is a retirement plan. The illogic of a system that taxes
currently the purchase of an annuity to furnish retirement security
while exempting contributions to "qualified" deferred compensation
plans adds support to this conclusion.
These three examples cover a range of various possibilities for
taxing fringe benefits under section 83. The first and second examples deal with unfunded promises to pay and opt for inclusion when
the employee's benefit is actualized. The third recognizes that when
the employer makes a nonforfeitable financial outlay on behalf of the
employee, inclusion should occur when the expenditure gives rise to
the benefit. With respect to valuation, the general rule of section 83
would ordinarily apply, and the market would be that in which the
general public purchases such items. In some circumstances, when
the fringe benefit is an intangible benefit purchased by the employer,
a rule of convenience is suggested which would use employer's cost
when it seems properly, from an objective standpoint, to accord with
market valuation. These three examples do not, however deal with
the need to distinguish taxable fringe benefits from nontaxable working conditions. Nor do they consider the possibility of the need for a
de minimis rule. Those issues and others regarding the policy aspects
of this proposal will be developed in Part IV.
den of taxation if the in-kind method of compensation is chosen. The focus on the employer,
however, would be less direct than in the solution suggested by the Treasury. In addition, the
appropriate measure of the amount of compensation to be accounted for is the fair market
value of the item, and the Treasury's proposal simply fails to use that measure in its reliance on
cost plus return. The Treasury's method of taxing fringes, proposed in part for its simplicity, is
no simpler than the method proposed here.
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C. Additional Proposals
Although the proposal to tax all fringe benefits under section 83
of the Code is complete unto itself, such a system may have certain
drawbacks. Thus, two additional proposals are in order to complement that scheme of taxation and to reflect certain equitable and social goals.
Retirement savings plans occupy a special place in the tax system
and may continue to require special rules under the scheme of taxation just explicated. Clearly, many members of society believe that
only a tax system that tends to encourage retirement saving will adequately ensure that the most basic needs of older people are taken
care of without resorting to wholesale state-sponsored programs for
the retired. Accepting the idea that saving for retirement should be
promoted, to propose an alternative to current exclusion in the form
of a deduction for funds invested in qualified retirement plans seems
appropriate. Adopting a rule lessening the burdens on employees
suddenly required to pay tax on previously untaxed items may also
be appropriate. An adjustment in the zero bracket amount is suggested as a means of accomplishing that result.
1.

Deduction for Qualified Plan Contributions

The principal features of such a deduction should be these: it
would be limited to an amount equal to a fixed percentage of income
with a cap on the total dollar amount that can be contributed; the
cap should be subject to increase as a result of inflation; and it should
be available only for contributions to qualified plans available on a
nondiscriminatory basis to all employees of a particular employer.
Otherwise, employers would tend to compensate only executives and
the deduction would not encourage the type of behavior intended.
The deduction should be available for voluntary employee contributions as well as for employer contributions to a plan.
Another important feature of such a deduction is that the cap
should be absolute. Employer contributions to plans in excess of the
cap amount would be taxable income to the employee which could
not be offset by the deduction. An additional employee contribution
in excess of an employer contribution would be deductible only up to
the amount of the cap. An overall limit of deductible plan contributions would also be imposed to prevent circumvention of the system
by persons having numerous employers, for example, a number of divisions of the same corporation. This cap should be coordinated with
the cap on self-employed earnings contributions so as to further eliminate complexity.
This system should prove easier to administer than the current
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myriad of exclusion provisions. The nondiscrimination requirements
would have to be tightly drafted to ensure adherence to the purposes
of the deduction without creating needless complexity in the description of the nondiscrimination rules. Such a rule would have the beneficial effect of eliminating the need for complex computations of contribution amounts for defined contribution plans. Instead, a capped
percentage of the employer compensation figure would be utilized.
Presumably the cap should be set high enough to allow flexibility in
executive compensation. However, a significant discrimination between employer and self-employed plans creates undue burdens on
tax administration, so the cap should be similar to that in effect for
self-employed plans. Perhaps some compromise would be necessary
to achieve relative parity.
As a corollary to the current taxation of employer contributions to
the plans, determinations of how earnings on the contributed
amounts should be taxed and the proper method of recovering the
investment in the fund must be made. The present system of deferring taxation on fund income is perfectly adequate from a policy
standpoint. Not only does that system tend to reduce complexity, it
is comparable to the method of taxing annuity investments. 3 0 Preservation of neutrality disfavors discrimination between forms of retirement saving. Additionally, not taxing the income as earned encourages this form of saving. Indeed, no other incentive to invest in
this type of plan exists apart from the deduction for the initial investment. One assumes that if the deduction is important, then deferring taxation on the earnings on the contributed amount is also
important to society.
Finally, the proper system of basis recovery under this deduction
plan involves two issues. First, it must be determined whether an upfront recovery of the investment, including the employer contribution, is more appropriate than some system of ratable basis recovery.
Second, the fate of the deductible employer contributions must be
addressed. Using ordinary cost recovery analysis, the contribution
should not give rise to basis. If the employer contribution is deducted, that cost is recovered then and cannot be recovered again.
Thus, with respect to amounts that are deducted, the changed
method of retirement savings taxation would closely resemble the
current system of taxing self-employed plans. The effect of taxing is
simply deferred.
A system such as that for annuities could be used to recover pre350. See I.R.C. § 72 (West 1985) (annuities; certain proceeds of endowment and life insurance contracts); B. BITTKER, supra note 16, at 12.2 (discussion of I.R.C. § 72).
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viously taxed contributions. 5 1 Otherwise, the investment could be
spread as a percentage of each benefit payment in a manner similar
to taxation of annuities prior to 1954.352
2.

Increase Standard Deduction (Zero Bracket Amount)

While base broadening and increasing equity essentially demand
the system of inclusion of fringe benefits in income, as suggested in
this article, nevertheless sound reasons exist for lessening the harshness of such a radical change by making an across-the-board increase
of perhaps $1,000 in the section 63(d) zero bracket amount.3 53 Such
an increase would ameliorate the burden imposed on individual taxpayers who benefitted from prior exclusions. In addition, the effect of
the increase in the zero bracket amount would apply to everyone.
This simple solution should have great appeal when considered in the
context .of this article. The reason for the increase in the zero bracket
amount should not be forgotten, however. Once a change in the general direction of taxing fringe benefits was made, to begin enacting
new and different fringe benefit exclusion provisions once again
would be inappropriate.
IV. POLICY ANALYSIS
Having demonstrated the lack of systematic thought involved in
the development of the current scheme of nontaxation of fringe benefits, as well as a possible alternative for taxing such items, the next
question is why fringe benefits ought to be subjected to this new system. The main point of this article is that all fringe benefits should
be taxed to employees under section 83 unless some weighty policy or
administrative convenience reason exists for exempting them. This
part of the article will explore that idea and propose some factors
that should be considered in defining the taxable categories.
A.

General Policy Reasons for Inclusion

Many believe that the broad-based exclusion of many fringe benefits from taxation creates significant problems for the tax system as a
whole. Although most of these distortions have been addressed in
considerable detail elsewhere, a capsule summary of the points generally made serves to demonstrate their importance in assessing the validity of this or any other reform proposal.
The first widely held belief is that the exclusions reduce tax eq351.
352.
353.

See I.R.C. § 72 (West 1985).
See Internal Revenue Act of 1939, ch. 2, § 22(b)(2), 53 Stat. 1, 8.
See I.R.C. § 63(d) (West 1985) (defining "zero bracket amount").
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uity. The detrimental effect on horizontal equity can be illustrated as
follows. Compare a person (A) who receives a certain portion of her
compensation in cash and the other portion in a selected number of
fringes - for example, child care, health insurance, and employersupplied recreational facilities - with a person (B) who is paid entirely in cash and must purchase those items in the open market with
after-tax income. After purchasing the above-mentioned items, B has
much less disposable income than A. 54 The perceived inequity can
presumably be remedied by requiring that A pay tax on the items
received tax-free from the employer.
Secondly, the difficulties presented by horizontal inequity resulting from untaxed fringe benefits are compounded by a different sort
of inequity, the vertical inequity between taxpayers in different tax
brackets receiving fringe benefits. Taxpayers are provided different
amounts of benefit from untaxed fringe benefits that depend solely
on the amount of income they earn. As with horizontal inequity, the
existence of this disparity in benefit seems clear and is demonstrated
3 55
elsewhere.
Another important aspect of the inequity created by the nontaxation of certain fringes is the public sensitivity to inequities in the tax
system in general. Although the extent of any publicly perceived unfairness in the tax system resulting from the tax treatment of various
fringes has never been systematically analyzed, such a perception
does exist. As a result, the social cost of continuing to allow broad
exclusions for certain types of highly visible benefits may be too great
to justify their existence. Though difficult to document, at some point
the sense of the tax system's unfairness becomes sufficient to cause
some otherwise law-abiding citizens to overcome scruples and fears
about cheating. The issue of which fringe benefits should be taxed to
undo either horizontal inequity, or vertical inequity or both should
also be viewed in that context.
Statistics supply the final proof that distortions result from
nontaxation of certain fringe benefits. These statistics show the magnitude of the annual "tax expenditure" resulting from the exclusion
of each fringe benefit.3 56 'The figures may be staggering, but showing
that a certain amount of revenue is foregone as a result of various
exclusions merely states the obvious. Two compelling questions are,
however, suggested by the statistics. The first is whether the failure
354. See Richmond, supra note 11, at 91.
355. See Popkin, supra note 11, at 449-51.
356. Tax expenditure projections for 1984-89 are available in 25 TAX NOTES (TAx ANALYSTS) 721, 727 (Nov. 19, 1984) (Table 1 contains tax expenditure estimates by function prepared by Joint Committee on Taxation).
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to tax certain fringe benefits is so inequitable on a broad scale basis
in the overall economy as to be unworthy of continuation. The second question is whether the exclusions are an inefficient way of accomplishing worthwhile goals. These two considerations illustrate the
concern about the overall allocative inefficiency of fringe benefit exclusions. Thus, the belief exists that the tax system creates broadbased inequities between employees in industries for which the provision of fringes is either easy or fairly inexpensive, and employees in
industries which do not widely utilize fringes. Statistics on tax expenditures resulting from fringe benefit exclusions suggest the direct
expenditure approach might be both more fair and efficient.
B. Possible Exclusions from Tax
1.

Working Conditions

As stated at the outset, the position is generally recognized that
working conditions are nontaxable and that section 83 should not be
interpreted to include such items in income. But, the meaning of the
term "working condition" is subject to dispute. Thus, a generally acceptable definition of working condition which would result in only
proper items being excluded from the tax base must be determined.
In 1981, the IRS defined working conditions in its draft of proposed fringe benefit regulations as "any item furnished by the employer either to enable or to facilitate the performance of employment services by the employee. '357 The definition is an acceptable
starting place for discussion. However, further analysis is required
because the regulations do not state the reason behind this definition.
The major rationale for a working conditions exclusion is that
such items are provided by employers for noncompensatory reasons.
Language to that effect would be a useful complement to the IRS
definition.
Additionally, the business expense deduction area provides guidance in making the judgment as to which working conditions should
be includable in income. This is essentially the same theory underlying the 1984 act definition of "working condition fringe" as "any
property or services . . . to the extent that, if the employee paid for
such property or services, such payment would be allowable as a deduction under section 162 or 167."111 The phrase "other than items
which are lavish or extravagant under the circumstances" should be
added to the definition. Under such a rule, the executive or the movie
357. See Prop. Reg. § 1.61-18(a), [1983] II FED. TAXEs (P-H) 1 70,181, at 70,182.1, defining "working condition." For further definitions, see supra note 9.
358. See I.R.C. § 132(d) (West 1985).
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star who is provided with a car and driver by the employer for workrelated transportation would not be taxed on the value of those services. On the other hand, that individual's secretary might be taxed
on the same benefit. The working condition rule would not, however,
exclude the fair market value of commuting in the same vehicle because that would not be related to facilitating the executive or movie
star's employment services. 359
Issues of administrative convenience and nondiscrimination also
arise in the context of an exception to the general rule of includability for working conditions. To a certain extent, discrimination in benefits furnished would suggest that the perquisites are compensatory, but the rule should permit some differences depending on
the status of the employee. Added language precluding lavish or extravagant expenditures would tend to facilitate proper distinctions as
would the stated requirement of a noncompensatory purpose. Administrative difficulties in valuation and allocation are further justification for the exclusion of working conditions.
2.

De Mimimis Rule

Another possible exception to the general rule of inclusion might
be a de minimis rule for fringe benefits which, unlike working conditions, are only indirectly related to job performance. The scope of the
exception is difficult to describe. Employer-provided recreation facilities are one example of where a de minimis rule could be useful.36 °
An exclusion might be allowed for truly de minimis employee use of
recreation facilities that the employer provides for carrying on its
trade or business. For example, a manufacturer of sports shoes might
have a testing track that it permits employees to use before and after
business hours. But if the employer erects a special recreation facility
for its employees, the employer should be precluded by section 83(h)
from taking away deductions for the facility, such as depreciation,
salaries for janitors, and water, unless and until the employees utilizing the facility include in income the value of the benefit they received.3 6 ' Such a rule would impose on the employer the burden of
359. The proposal here is at odds with the "working condition fringe" exclusion in I.R.C.
§ 132(d) (West 1985), which would allow an exclusion for the entire value of an automobile so
long as it was "provided primarily for the purpose of facilitating the employee's performance of
service for the employer and substantially all of the use of the property" would be in connection with the performance of services.
360. See Committee on General Income Tax Problems, supra note 262 (proposed § 128(d)
specifically refers to recreational benefits). Cf. Rev. Rul. 79-360, 1979-2 C.B. 236 and Ltr. Rul.
8323074 (Mar. 10, 1983) (recreational facilities and a general fitness program made available to
employees did not affect the exempt status of a § 501(c)(3) organization).
361. An analysis of recreational benefits provided by employers and the need to distin-
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keeping the necessary records required to properly allocate the benefit of the recreation facility among the employees who use it.
This example suggests that a de minimis exception would have to
be quite limited. In order for the exception to apply, the employee
fringe benefit would have to come about because of incidental use of
employer services or property. The rule should not encompass situations in which the employer would not be entitled to a deduction
with respect to an item unless the item is taken into income by
employees.
3.

Administrative Convenience

Then the question is whether any items should exist, in addition
to working conditions and minimal fringe benefits, that ought to be
excluded for reasons of administrative convenience because of the
difficulty of valuation or otherwise. Given the scope of exclusions previously discussed, a separate administrative convenience exception
does not seem necessary. A brief discussion of two candidates for
such a rule will explain this conclusion.
One of the principal possibilities for exclusion on administrative
convenience grounds is employee discounts on the purchase of employer products. New section 132 contains such an exclusion, although not for administrative convenience reasons," 61 and the IRS
proposed such an exclusion in the proposed regulations.3 63 The principal problem with both approaches is that they require valuation. If
valuation is required, as good an argument exists for inclusion as for
exclusion.
The answer is less clearly applicable to free parking, also excepted
by the IRS on administrative convenience grounds 364 and by section
132 as a "working condition fringe. 3 65 If one assumes the employer is
paying a personal, nondeductible expense on the employee's behalf,
free parking ought to constitute income to the employee. Such a result would simply be an extension of the rule that both personal use
guish among those benefits may be found in Guttentag, supra note 9, at 165-68. The distinction
made therein between relatively small benefits and larger ones on the basis of whether the
employer provides overnight accommodations makes a good deal of sense. In addition, as there
noted, a nondiscrimination rule would be needed in this context so that large benefits made
available only to executives would be taxed to the recipients.
362. The rules permitting the exclusion of "qualified employee discount[s]" are elaborate
in the extreme and require valuation of the amount of the discount for purposes of determining
whether the exclusion is available. This tends to suggest that administrative convenience was
not a factor in granting the exclusion.
363. See Prop. Reg. § 1.61-19, [1983] II FED. TAXEs (P-H) 70,181, at 70,182.2.
364. See Prop. Reg. § 1.61-19(b)(2), [1983] II FED. TAXEs (P-H) 1 70,181, at 70,182.3.
365. Free Parking is treated as a "working condition fringe" under the special rule of
LR.C. § 132(h)(4) (West 1985).
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of an employer's car to and from work and the trips between Los
Angeles and San Francisco in Example 2 in Part III are taxable.
Under this analysis, an example of rural employers who have vacant
lots adjacent to their plants used by employees to park does not support excluding from income free parking in Los Angeles, where parking may cost as much as $200 per month. The employees who park in
the vacant lot would presumably have no income anyway because the
fair market value of the parking has value that would be either zero
or de minimis.
On the other hand, location of the employer's business might have
some bearing on whether the benefit of free parking is taxed to the
employee. If so, the employer's decision to pay for parking in Los
Angeles is simply a means of putting its employees in the same position they would be in if the place of employment were on the outskirts of Ventura. If the second line of thinking is the more appropriate one, then the free parking would be excluded as a working
condition. In such a case, an administrative convenience exception to
the general rule would not be necessary. This statement is not intended to resolve whether the value of free parking should be excluded, it is intended merely to indicate the proper way of treating
such an exclusion.
4.

Other Arguments

Finally, one must consider the propriety of changing the current
scheme of taxation so radically at a time when certain fringe benefits
have become a way of life, so to speak. This rationale for continuing
any current exclusions is hardly persuasive because the possibility of
grandfathering would produce unlimited complexity in an essentially
simple proposal, and because such an approach to change seems unnecessary. 6 6 This article does propose an increase in the zero bracket
amount to partially eliminate the economic burdens of such a change.
Another suggestion might be to phase in the system over a ten-year
period. But no grants of exclusion should be given simply because the
particular fringe benefit has been nontaxable for a long time.
Finally, Congress may wish to further certain social goals through
the grant of an exclusion for a fringe benefit. As this article suggests,
a comprehensive analysis of all currently nontaxable items should be
made on a comparative basis, and an attempt should be made to
weight priorities of these tax expenditures against direct expenditures as well. Simply creating grandfather clauses for current exclu366. See generally Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in Income Tax
Revision, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 47 (1977).
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sions would not satisfy this suggested overhaul of the system.
C. Propriety of the General Rule
This article suggests that fringe benefits of all sorts should be included in income under section 83 of the Code. The proposal thus
has two essential parts: (1) That the amount includable in income be
the fair market value of the fringe benefit, and (2) that the item be
taxed when the benefit actually occurs. Any assessment of section 83
as the mechanism for taxing all fringe benefits must focus more on
the amount of the inclusion rather than the timing. The use of fair
market value presents significant issues besides administrative convenience. The rationale for the device will now be explored.
The conclusion that fair market value is the proper measure of
the inclusion is based on two assumptions. The first assumption is
that fringe benefits are compensatory in nature. The second is that
fringe benefits reduce or should reduce the actual cash compensation
paid to the employee in an amount equal or nearly equal to the value
of the fringe. The amount of the cash compensation reduction will
not always precisely equal the fair market value of the fringe benefit,
however, partially because the actual value of the benefit to any given
employee may be difficult to determine. In addition, a wide difference
may exist between employer cost and employee value. If so, how the
saving by the employer is shared is not clear. Nevertheless, rough
parity exists between the reduction in cash compensation and the
value of the fringe benefits received by an employee, and the makeup
of a compensation package is dictated by each party's awareness of
this fact.
Current bargaining between the employer and the employee is
skewed because an additional factor is taken into account in the process, the nontaxability of fringes. The tax exemption makes them far
more valuable to the recipient employee than cash income. The employee thus may be encouraged to opt for items that are nontaxable
simply because they are unrealistically cheap compared to items purchased with after-tax income. This result tends to be inefficient both
for the individual employee and for the economy as a whole because
inefficient choices are encouraged in all bargained-for compensation
decisions.367
The suggestion that section 83 be used as a mechanism for taxing
fringe benefits is tax neutral as to cash or kind compensation in regard to the employee. With respect to the employer, the principal
367.
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disadvantage of using section 83 to tax fringe benefits, aside from obvious valuation and allocation difficulties, would be the deferral of
deductions under section 83(h) when inclusion is deferred because an
item is subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture. 6 8 This result could
have a beneficial effect by encouraging the earlier vesting of benefits
included in the compensation package. Symmetry between employer
and employee treatment of the same item would be a dominant feature. Whether additional cash compensation or additional in-kind
compensation would be paid would be governed only by the employer's ability to make the payment and the employee's bargaining
power, not by the tax effect of the decision.
In addition to promoting greater efficiency in both individual
choices and in the labor market, taxing fringe benefits under section
83 would tend to promote equity both horizontally and vertically. Belief in the fairness of the tax system, which today suffers from both
real and perceived inequities, would also be increased. For these reasons, as well as the need to promote greater efficiency in the system,
valuing fringe benefits at fair market value rather than at employer's
3 70
cost 3 69 or at some other figure seems appropriate.
Valuation is nonetheless a factor that needs to be taken into account. Taxing fringe benefits to employees in the amount of the employer's cost or, in the alternative, making the employer subject to an
excise tax on the cost of the fringe benefits given to employees would
remove a substantial valuation burden. In addition, an excise tax
would relieve the employer of much of the burden of allocating the
benefits to the employees according to use. A significant part of those
burdens on the employer would be eliminated by the de minimis and
368. See I.R.C. § 83(h) (West 1985).
369. For a discussion of the merits of including the fair market value of fringe benefits in
income, see Simon, supra note 4, at 1212-16.
370. Marginal cost plus opportunity cost has been suggested as the appropriate measure
of the inclusion. See J. STEUERLE supra note 367, at 21(ff). The theory demonstrated by
Steuerle is a more compelling one than the suggestion that the measure of the amount includable be limited to the employer's allocated per employee cost. See, e.g., NEW YORK STATE BAR
Ass'N, supra note 281, at 6-7. The New York State Bar proposal has been criticized because the
allocated cost figure proposed there would actually result in a grater taxable amount for the
employee than would incremental costs. See Letter of Sol Coffino, President of the Tax Executive Institute (TEl), to Roscoe Egger, then Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Nov. 1, 1982),
quoted in 18 TAX NOTES (TAX ANALYSTS) 12, 12 (Jan. 3, 1983). The letter refers to the position
taken by the AICPA in the proposal advanced in 1979, Fringe Benefits: A Proposal for the
Future, that incremental costs be the measure.
See also Nolan, Taxation of FringeBenefits, 30 NAT'L TAX J. 359, 362 (1977) (advocating
fair market value as the appropriate measure; Hearings, supra note 14, at 30-31 (testimony of
John Chapoton), reprinted in 19 TAX NOTES (TAX ANALYSTS) 1193 (June 27, 1983) (suggesting
that "fair market value" is too difficult to determine, and, as an alternative, proposing an excise
tax on employers or disallowance of employer business expense deductions for fringes, in either
case using as value allocated cost plus a fair return on that cost).
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working condition exceptions suggested above.
Some problems would nevertheless remain. A possible, and not
altogether undesirable, result of taxing fringe benefits to employees
at their fair market value could result in a substantial shift away
from in-kind compensation because of the difficulties such a system
would create for employers. Perhaps fringe benefits have indeed become such a "way of life" that the suggestion discussed here may be
totally impractical.7 1 On the other hand, impracticality does not
make it incorrect in principle.
As to the timing decision inherent in section 83, the conclusion of
current taxability again reflects the notion that fringe benefits are
compensation and should be taxed as such when paid. Clearly, the
benefits most affected by a change to section 83 timing would be pensions and other deferred compensation plans. Such a result would
hardly be popular and would probably be politically infeasible, but
the change suggested here could be made despite the fact that saving
for retirement is regarded as valuable for society. Methods of encouraging such saving other than the current exclusion exist, among them
the suggestion outlined in Part II-C, which provides a deduction for
amounts contributed to qualified plans. If that suggestion were followed, taxing employer contributions to plans with vested benefits
would simply shift the focus of the policy of encouraging saving for
retirement to a deduction, which might be somewhat easier to administer. The conclusions may be somewhat different in the context of
Social Security, unemployment insurance, and workers' compensation contributions. Although, in theory, government plans are no different from private retirement plans, sufficient political reasons may
well exist to treat government plans differently from private plans.
One final consideration is that choosing to tax fringe benefits currently will avoid the transfer of tax liability to someone other than
the employee taxpayer. This will frequently be true if spouses are
divorced and the various benefits become part of a marital dissolution settlement. Another illustration of this aspect of current taxability concerns funded salary continuation plans that are taxable unless
371. Some of the practical problems with such a system are discussed in more detail in
Simon, supra note 4, at 1212-16. Logic suggests that there is more political rhetoric to objections about the difficulty of implementing a system of taxing fringe benefits than anything else.
It may well be, however, that the ordinary taxpayer would be willing to tolerate considerable
unfairness in the system in order to preserve the nontaxable nature of certain benefits and that
politicians are simply responding to what they perceive to be the sentiments of the general
public. Certainly organized labor has seized on this as an issue about which it can seem to be
doing something for the membership even though it is not clear that continuing nontaxable
treatment of fringe benefits will achieve the best overall tax results for those whom the unions
represent.
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they come within the limited exclusion of section 101(b).3 72 Taxing
the employee rather than the surviving beneficiary is more appropriate because it is the employee who renders the services for which she
is paid. 73
V.

CONCLUSION

This article has demonstrated a simple and straightforward
method of taxing all fringe benefits under I.R.C. section 83. An historical analysis has demonstrated how badly the system needs reform. This article suggests section 83 as a method of taxing fringe
benefits in order to eliminate the current complexities and inconclusiveness. Other proposals to deal with the nontaxation of fringe benefits might be helpful as well. Hopefully, this article will be seen as a
first step toward informing the current legislative debates about the
taxation of fringe benefits and toward persuading the Congress and
the Treasury that fundamental change in the direction suggested is
indeed necessary.

372. See I.R.C. § 101(b) (West 1985) (employees' death benefits).
373. To the extent the beneficiary receives amounts in excess of the employee's contributions, those amounts would be taxable to the extent they exceed the basis generated by the
prior inclusion in income. This is, of course, assuming the earnings of the invested plan contributions are not taxed currently to the employee whose rights to them have vested. The reason
for this result is the general notion of cost recovery. While it is true the rule suggested here
does not assign the cost to the proper party, it is similar to the rule in the gift area prescribed
by § 1015 basis. See I.R.C. § 1015 (West 1985) (basis of property acquired by gift and transfers
in trust). In addition, there seems to be no alternative other than double taxation.
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